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Abstract
Political science has long sought to understand how citizens form their political identities,
values and behaviours. However, robust causal evidence on how policy interventions can
shape the political socialisation process remains limited. The three papers that make up
this thesis investigate how citizens - and young citizens in particular - change their political
attitudes and behaviours in response to large-scale policy interventions, specifically: income
transparency, enfranchisement and compulsory voting.
In the first paper, I take advantage of a quasi-experiment in Finland to study whether
income transparency - the public release of citizens’ income information - affects support
for redistribution. Using survey data and a before-and-after research design, I show that
income transparency leaves public support for redistribution largely unchanged, but that
young people increase their support for redistribution in response to the intervention. This
suggests that redistributive preferences are rooted in more stable, underlying ideologies, that
are difficult to alter once they are formed in early adulthood.
In the second paper, I leverage a quasi-experiment in Germany to study whether en-
franchisement improves citizens’ political maturity. Using survey data and a difference-in-
differences approach, I show that enfranchising 16-year-olds can equalise prior differences
in political maturity between underage and adult youth. This suggests that political maturity
should be understood not just as a precondition, but also as an outcome of the right to vote.
In the third paper, I take advantage of a quasi-experiment in Brazil to investigate whether
compulsory voting instils voting habits in young people. Using administrative data and
a regression discontinuity design, I show that voting fails to be habit-forming when it is
compulsory. This finding clarifies the scope conditions of prior research on voting habits, as
it runs counter to available evidence from voluntary voting systems.
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How much do you care about politics? Which party do you vote for? Do you vote at all? For
many citizens, the answers to these questions crystallise during early adulthood and remain
relatively constant thereafter. As early as the 1950s, political scientists drew attention to the
importance of studying young people’s political socialisation, as they observed that, later in
life, individuals’ political attitudes and behaviours tend to become characterised by continuity
and regularity (Hyman, 1959). Several decades of research on political socialisation have
since shown that citizens do indeed develop relatively stable political attitudes and behaviours
during their adolescence and early adulthood, the so-called “impressionable years” (Bartels
and Jackman, 2014; Neundorf and Smets, 2017; Sears and Valentino, 1997). While there
is still no consensus on the precise age bracket that defines the impressionable years, many
studies focus on the years 17-25 (Neundorf and Smets, 2017). These studies typically find
that, during the impressionable years, individuals’ political attitudes and behaviours are
malleable by socialising agents (e.g. parents, teachers, or peers) and salient events (e.g.
economic shocks or elections) (Neundorf and Smets, 2017). Later in life, however, political
attitudes and behaviours can only be shifted temporarily, if at all (Margalit, 2013).
Which factors shape how young people think and act politically? The literature has
identified several important socialising agents, from parents and teachers, to peers and social
media (Neundorf and Smets, 2017). In contrast, the political context in which young people
grow up has received relatively little attention. Several studies have examined the influence of
early electoral experiences on political engagement later in life (Franklin and Hobolt, 2011;
Franklin et al., 2004; Plutzer, 2002). In addition, a few studies have analysed at how early
life exposure to economic shocks or political scandals affects attitudes and behaviours later
in life (Dinas, 2013; Finseraas, 2017; Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014; Roth and Wohlfart,
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2018). However, we still know relatively little about how specific policy interventions can
shape the political socialisation process.
This thesis examines how large-scale policy interventions, specifically income trans-
parency, enfranchisement, and compulsory voting, affect citizens’ political attitudes and
behaviours. From a public policy perspective this is important, because unlike political
scandals or parental influence, the interventions studied here fall within the traditional re-
mit of government action. Therefore, the findings can be used to inform on-going policy
debates. For example, by studying the effects of income transparency on public support for
redistribution, the first paper speaks to the on-going debate about how to counteract the trend
towards growing economic inequality that has crept across most of the industrialised world
(Piketty and Saez, 2014). By studying the consequences of lowering the voting age to 16,
the second paper speaks to the debate about how to improve the political engagement of
young people, who tend to be much less involved in formal politics than older generations
(Eichhorn and Bergh, 2020). Finally, by studying the consequences of compulsory voting,
the third paper speaks to the debate about how to counteract low and unequal turnout that
afflicts many advanced democracies (Lijphart, 1997).
1.1 Contributions
Each paper in this thesis makes specific contributions to the fields of political behaviour
and political economy. In the first paper, I study how income transparency - a policy
intervention that increases citizens’ exposure to information about economic inequality -
affects public support for redistribution. Previous studies in this area have primarily relied on
survey experiments, where subjects are exposed to customised information about income
inequality or their position in the income distribution (Cruces et al., 2013; Kuziemko et al.,
2015). However, such information treatments rarely occur in the real world, so we do not
know whether previous findings apply outside the experimental setting. I find that income
transparency leaves support for redistribution largely unaffected, which indicates that shifting
redistributive preferences may be more difficult to achieve via real-world policy interventions.
In the second paper, I study whether the enfranchisement of 16 year-olds affects their
political maturity - measured by their political interest, efficacy, willingness to vote, and attitu-
dinal consistency. Previous studies on voting at 16 have attempted to show that young people
at this age are not politically mature enough to vote by employing data on disenfranchised
16 year-olds or by extrapolating from data on enfranchised over-18 year-olds (Chan and
Clayton, 2006; McAllister, 2014). This is problematic, however, as the right to vote may
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itself influence the political maturity of previously disenfranchised groups. In line with this
reasoning, I find that enfranchisement can equalise prior political maturity differences be-
tween underage and adult youth, which suggests that political maturity should be understood
not just as a precondition but also as an outcome of the right to vote.
In the third paper, I study whether compulsory voting can instil voting habits in young
people. Using data from voluntary voting systems such as the US or the UK, previous
studies have found that voting in one election increases one’s propensity to vote in the future,
which they interpret as habit formation (Coppock and Green, 2016; Dinas, 2012; Fujiwara
et al., 2016; Meredith, 2009). In contrast, I find no evidence that voting is habit-forming
when it is made compulsory. Instead, the evidence points to a first-time compulsory voting
boost, which gradually dissipates as voters grow older. The paper therefore clarifies the
scope conditions of prior research on voting habits and shows that previous findings do not
necessarily generalise to contexts where voting is compulsory - as is the case in around one
quarter of all democracies worldwide.
1.2 Methodological approach
Studying the impact of policy interventions on individuals’ attitudes and behaviours poses
significant empirical challenges. In particular, establishing causality is not a trivial task. The
three papers in this thesis share a common methodological approach in that they all employ
econometric methods, which allow us to draw causal conclusions about the impact of policy
interventions on individuals’ attitudes and behaviours. In this respect, all three papers build
on the recent “credibility revolution” in the social sciences, which has seen the randomised
controlled trial elevated to the “gold standard” against which to assess research designs
(Angrist and Pischke, 2010). Randomised trials can be expensive, time consuming, and may
not always be practical or ethical to implement. Fortunately, in many instances, researchers
can take advantage of human institutions or forces of nature to construct informative natural-
or quasi-experiments that come close to the gold standard of the randomised trial (Angrist
and Pischke, 2010).
Natural experiments occur in situations where there is random assignment of a treatment
via a randomisation device (e.g. the Vietnam draft lottery), but where, in contrast to the
randomised trial, the assignment is not under the control of the researcher (Gerber and Green,
2012).1 Quasi-experiments in turn occur in situations where “as-if random” processes (e.g.
1Some definitions of the term natural experiment do not require random treatment assignment (e.g. Dunning
2012).
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near-victories and near-defeats in elections) cause different places, groups, or individuals
to receive different treatments (Gerber and Green, 2012). Because they do not employ
an explicit randomisation device, the causal inferences that quasi-experiments support are
subject to greater uncertainty and typically require additional supporting evidence (Gerber
and Green, 2012).
In all three papers, I use such quasi-experimental methods to isolate the causal effect
of policy interventions on citizens’ political attitudes and behaviours. The first paper takes
advantage of the fact that in Finland, the public release of citizens’ income information -
the so-called tax day - coincides with the implementation period of the European Social
Survey (ESS). Whether ESS respondents were interviewed shortly before or after the tax day
can be considered as-if random, so a comparison between the two groups can offer insights
into the causal effect of income transparency. The second paper leverages the fact that in
Germany, different sub-national states lowered to voting age to 16 at different times over the
last decades. By comparing survey respondents in different states before and after the voting
age reform, we can learn something about the causal effects of enfranchisement. Finally, the
third paper takes advantage of the fact that in Brazil, voting is voluntary at age 16 and then
becomes compulsory at age 18. By comparing turnout patterns between citizens who were
just old enough and just too young to be eligible for compulsory voting, we can establish
whether making elections compulsory instils voting habits in young people.
1.3 Case selection
The country case selection for the three papers was primarily determined by data availabil-
ity and each country’s unique institutional context, which enabled the quasi-experimental
analyses.
The regression discontinuity approach used in Chapter 4 requires a large data set, as it
focuses on a narrow sub-set of citizens who turn 18 shortly before and after the election
(and discards all observations further away from the voting age discontinuity). Fortunately,
Brazil’s progressive open data legislation means that the complete administrative voter
records are available to researchers. Furthermore, with an electorate of around 170 million,
Brazil is also the most populous country in the world to use compulsory voting. Taken
together, this lends considerable statistical power to the analysis of the administrative voter
records.
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The selection of Germany as a case study for Chapter 3 was guided by similar considera-
tions. Finding a suitable setting to investigate the impact of enfranchising 16 year-olds on
their political attitudes and behaviours is challenging. Not only because very few countries
have lowered the voting age to 16 (Eichhorn and Bergh, 2020), but also because most nation-
ally representative surveys restrict their samples to those aged 18 and above. Germany is
unique in that its (sub-national) states lowered the voting age to 16 in a staggered process
starting in the late 1990s. Germany also has long-running youth surveys, which include
questions on politics and capture the crucial age group of newly enfranchised 16 year-olds.
In Chapter 2 I use a before-and-after type research design to study the effects of income
transparency on support for redistribution. This research design relies on the fact that
Finland’s tax day coincides with the implementation period of the ESS. However, there are
additional reasons why Finland presents an ideal case study. Income transparency policies are
being increasingly used by companies and local governments to reduce gender and racial pay
gaps (Baker et al., 2019; Cooney, 2018) and tackle excessive executive pay (Mas, 2017). But
there are only very few countries - most of them in Scandinavia - that have elevated income
transparency to the level of state policy. Finland shares with its Scandinavian neighbours
a long tradition of making citizens’ tax records publicly available (Perez-Truglia, 2020).
However, Finland is unique in that it has turned the annual release of citizens’ income
information into a “public ritual of comparison”, where for a few days each year the issue
of income inequality is at the centre of public debate and media attention (Barry, 2018).
Finland is also one of the most equal societies in the industrialised world, which makes
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2.1 Introduction
“Finland is unusual, even among the Nordic states, in turning its release of personal tax data
into a public ritual of comparison. Though some complain that the tradition is an invasion of
privacy, most say it has helped the country resist the trend toward growing inequality that has
crept across of the rest of Europe.”1 New York Times, 1 Nov 2018
Income inequality has increased substantially in most industrialised democracies over
the past decades (OECD, 2011). Figure 2.1 below shows that between 1980 and 2019, the
share of total pre-tax income going to the top 10% of US adults increased from 33% to 45%,
while the share going to the bottom 50% decreased from 20% to 13%. Similar trends can be
observed in Europe, including in Finland. The canonical political economy model predicts
that governments will face greater pressure to redistribute income as inequality increases
and the distance between the median voters’ income and the mean income in society grows
(Meltzer and Richard, 1981).2 Yet, contrary to the model’s predictions, rising inequality
has not led to an increase in public support for redistribution (Ashok et al., 2015; McCall
et al., 2017).3 This disconnect has triggered a large amount of research into the factors that
might suppress demand for redistribution, including lack of information (Alesina et al., 2018;
Cruces et al., 2013; Hvidberg et al., 2020; Kuziemko et al., 2015), political ideology (Alesina
and Fuchs-Schuendeln, 2007), fairness beliefs (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005) and ethnic
heterogeneity (Alesina et al., 1999, 2001; Dahlberg et al., 2012). However, we still know very
little about whether and how specific policy interventions can shift support for redistribution
(Trump, 2018).4 Several recent survey- and field experiments (Condon and Wichowsky,
2020; Cruces et al., 2013; Dietze and Craig, 2020; Fehr et al., 2019; Karadja et al., 2017;
Kuziemko et al., 2015; Sands, 2017; Thal, 2020) try to address the question of what it takes
1https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/01/world/europe/finland-national-jealousy-day.html
2Most political economists agree that the Meltzer-Richard model has limited explanatory power and that it
makes unreasonable assumptions (e.g. that voters have perfect information) (Bredemeier, 2014). However, the
model continues to be widely used for its analytical tractability, as it sets a clear benchmark for assessing the
value of alternative theories (see Cavaille 2020).
3Survey evidence from several industrialised democracies suggests that support for redistribution has
remained flat or even decreased, depending on the measure used (Ashok et al., 2015; McCall et al., 2017).
Redistribution refers to the process of taking material goods from those who need it least, and giving it to those
who need it most (Cavaille, 2020).
4The comparative welfare state literature has long been interested in how welfare spending affects public
attitudes towards the welfare state (see Busemeyer et al. 2021 for a review). However, the focus has primarily
been on explaining long-run trends and cross-country differences in public opinion, rather than identifying the
causal effect of specific policy interventions.
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to shift demand for redistribution by manipulating subjects’ exposure to information about
inequality. While some find that subjects adjust their redistributive preferences when exposed
to information about inequality (e.g. Cruces et al. 2013), others find that redistributive
preferences remain largely unaffected (e.g. Kuziemko et al. 2015). A limitation of these
studies is that the experimental manipulations are either customised information treatments
that rarely occur in the real world (Cruces et al., 2013; Kuziemko et al., 2015), or interventions
in the field that are difficult to implement on a larger scale, such as randomising the presence
of a poor person in a wealthy neighbourhood (Sands 2017).

























































Data: World Inequality Database. Note: The graph shows the share of total pre-tax
income going to the top 10% of adults (left panel) and the bottom 50% of adults (right
panel) in Finland (solid), the EU (dashed) and the US (dash-dotted) for the years 1980-
2019.
Our paper advances the literature by studying the effect of a real-world policy (income
transparency) on support for redistribution. Income transparency – the public release of
citizens’ income information – has been promoted as an effective policy intervention to
reduce gender and racial pay gaps (Baker et al., 2019; Cooney, 2018), tackle excessive
executive pay (Mas, 2017), and deter tax evasion (Bø et al., 2015). It remains unclear,
however, whether income transparency can lead to shifts in public support for redistribution.
Despite the lack of evidence, we have good reasons to expect an effect. Income transparency
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is a policy that increases citizens’ exposure to information about income inequality (Perez-
Truglia, 2020), and previous survey- and field experiments suggest that such exposure can
correct misperceptions about inequality (Hvidberg et al., 2020) and trigger greater demand
for redistribution (Cruces et al., 2013; Sands and de Kadt, 2020).
We study the effect of income transparency on redistributive preferences in the context
of Finland, where public support for redistribution is relatively high and income inequality
is low compared to other industrialised democracies (see Figure 2.1). To isolate the causal
effect of income transparency on citizens’ attitudes, we take advantage of a quasi-experiment
in Finland, where every year on the first working day of November, the tax authority releases
the income information of everyone who earns more than e100,000 per year to the media.
The so-called tax day (Veropäivä) triggers an annual media spectacle focused on Finland’s
top-earners, celebrities and potential tax dodgers (Barry, 2018). Given that the tax day
takes place every year, we argue that the event primarily serves to increase the salience of
inequality in the public debate, rather than providing citizens with much new information
about income inequality in Finland.
We use media data from 2019 to show that the tax day coincides with a sharp spike
in the salience of income inequality in the media. To estimate how the tax day affects
citizens’ attitudes, we compare respondents who took part in the 2002-2018 European Social
Surveys (ESS) shortly before and after the event. We find that the tax day increases income
comparisons and perceptions that earnings of the top 10% are unfair. The effects are strongest
amongst below-median income earners. Despite these initial reactions, we find that the tax
day leaves citizens’ support for redistribution largely unaffected. We show that the overall
null effect is precisely estimated and unlikely due to ceiling effects or the repeated nature of
the tax day. However, the overall null effect also hides substantial heterogeneity. We find
that individuals in the top income decile respond to the tax day by decreasing their support
for redistribution, while individuals in the youngest age group (15-24 years) respond by
increasing their support for redistribution.
We explore potential mechanisms behind these heterogeneous effects. One explanation is
that the tax day suppresses demand for redistribution amongst the top income decile because
it triggers a process of motivated reasoning aimed at justifying their privileged position in
the income distribution, in line with recent sociological research on Finland’s top-earners
(Kantola, 2020; Kantola and Kuusela, 2019). The reaction amongst the youngest age group
(15-24 years) in turn appears to be driven by the tax day’s effect on (mis-)perceptions of
relative income status, which we show is stronger amongst the youngest age group compared
to older age groups. Taken together, our findings indicate that income transparency can
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increase citizens’ concern about income inequality, but may only marginally affect their
support for government action to ameliorate inequality. While the egalitarian context and the
repeated nature of the Finland’s tax day may limit the generalisability of our findings, they
imply that lack of exposure is not the key constraint preventing demand for redistribution
from “keeping up” with rising inequality. Instead, redistributive preferences appear to be
rooted in more stable, underlying ideologies, and may be difficult to alter once they are
formed in adolescence and early adulthood.
Our results have several important implications. First, they highlight the scope conditions
of previous survey- and field experiments (Condon and Wichowsky, 2020; Sands, 2017;
Sands and de Kadt, 2020) which have shown that subjects’ support for redistribution can
be manipulated by exposing them to information about inequality. Our results indicate that
triggering such a response may be more difficult to achieve via real-world policy interventions.
Second, lack of exposure to inequality (e.g. due to residential or educational segregation)
is frequently put forward as an explanation for why demand for redistribution has not kept
up with growing inequality (Condon and Wichowsky, 2020). Our results suggest that policy
interventions aimed at increasing cross-class exposure may not necessarily be sufficient to
address this mismatch. Third, our findings alleviate a common concern expressed by critics
of income transparency, which is that such policies could lead to a “populist backlash” (Mas,
2017). In Finland, we find no evidence that income transparency triggers a left- or right-ward
shift in public opinion.
Related literature - Our paper relates to several strands of literature. First, we contribute
to the literature on income transparency by studying, for the first time, its effect on political
attitudes. Previous studies have shown that the release of income information can affect
individuals’ job satisfaction (Card et al., 2012), job retention (Mas, 2017), job performance
(Blanes-i Vidal and Nossol, 2011; Cullen and Perez-Truglia, 2018), salary negotiations (Baker
et al., 2019), and tax compliance (Bø et al., 2015; Hasegawa et al., 2012). Most closely related
to our paper is a recent study by Perez-Truglia (2020), who finds that income transparency in
Norway widened the gap in self-reported happiness between the rich and poor by 29% and
increased the life satisfaction gap by 21%. We shift the focus to political outcomes and ask
whether income transparency can affect individuals’ support for redistribution.
Second, our paper speaks to the literature on redistributive preferences. We contribute
to a growing body of experimental studies that attempt to manipulate subjects’ support
for redistribution by providing them with information about inequality (Brown-Iannuzzi
et al., 2015; Condon and Wichowsky, 2020; Cruces et al., 2013; Fehr et al., 2019; Karadja
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et al., 2017; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Thal, 2020).5 A limitation of this literature is that
individuals’ support for redistribution is typically manipulated via customised information
treatments in survey experiments, which rarely occur in the real world. So it remains
unclear whether previous findings apply outside the experimental setting. To overcome this
challenge, two recent studies instead use field experiments that expose subjects to visible
markers of inequality. Sands (2017) randomizes the presence of a visibly poor person in
wealthy neighborhoods in Boston and finds that wealthy individuals become less supportive
of redistribution as a result. Sands and de Kadt (2020) run a field experiment in South Africa
where they randomize the presence of an expensive car in a poor neighborhood. They find that
passersby who are exposed to an expensive car are more likely to sign a wealth tax petition.
A challenge for these studies is that it may not be possible (or ethical) to implement the
experimental manipulations on a larger scale, so the policy implications remain uncertain. We
address the limitations of previous experimental work by studying the effect of a real-world
policy (income transparency) on support for redistribution.
Third, our paper relates to research on political socialisation, which shows that individuals
form stable political opinions during adolescence and early adulthood, the so-called “impres-
sionable years” (Bartels and Jackman, 2014; Neundorf and Smets, 2017; Sears and Valentino,
1997). There is no consensus on the precise age bracket that defines the impressionable
years, but studies typically focus on the years 17-25 (Neundorf and Smets, 2017). Most
closely related to our paper is a recent correlational study by Roth and Wohlfart (2018),
who use survey data from the US and Europe to show that individuals who experienced
higher macro-level inequality during their impressionable years tend to be less supportive
of redistribution.6 We contribute to this literature by providing first causal evidence that
exposure to information about inequality during the impressionable years can trigger greater
demand for redistribution, whilst older age groups remain largely unaffected.
Fourth, our paper speaks to political economy research which shows that exposure to
media content can shape individuals’ political beliefs and preferences (Dellavigna and Kaplan,
2007; Druckman and Parkin, 2005; Durante et al., 2019; Gerber et al., 2009; Hennighausen,
2015). Most closely related to our paper is a study by Hennighausen (2015) who uses quasi-
experimental evidence from socialist East Germany to show that exposure to West German
5Kuziemko et al. (2015), Cruces et al. (2013), Karadja et al. (2017), and Fehr et al. (2019) provide objective
income information treatments in survey experiments, with mixed results. Brown-Iannuzzi et al. (2015), Condon
and Wichowsky (2020) and Thal (2020) in turn manipulate survey respondents’ subjective social status, and
find heterogeneous effects on redistributive preferences depending on respondents’ objective income status.
6Several studies also examine whether experiencing a recession during the impressionable years affects
support for redistribution, with mixed findings (Carreri and Teso, 2020; Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014;
Neundorf and Soroka, 2018).
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media increased beliefs that effort rather than luck is important in determining success in
life. We contribute to this literature by showing that media coverage of Finland’s tax day
affects citizens’ fairness beliefs and income comparisons, whilst leaving their redistributive
preferences largely unchanged.
Finally, our paper relates to research in economics which shows that individuals care
about their relative income.7 In a seminal contribution, Easterlin (1974) provides correlational
evidence that relative income is a key determinant of subjective well-being. Similarly, Luttmer
(2005) and Ferrer-i Carbonell (2005) find that, holding own income constant, subjective
well-being decreases with the mean income of neighbors and other reference groups. Recent
experimental research suggests that the effect of relative income on well-being is non-linear.
Kuziemko et al. (2014) find that subjects are particularly averse to being ranked “last” in
the income distribution, while Fisman et al. (2020) find that subjects are averse to “topmost”
as well as “local” inequality. We study a policy intervention that exposes the incomes of a
nation’s top-earners, and find that this decreases subjective well-being at the bottom of the
income distribution.
2.2 Background
Finland is a consolidated democracy with one of the most comprehensive welfare systems in
the world (Pesonen and Riihinen, 2002). Support for redistribution in Finland is relatively
high and economic inequality is low compared to other industrialised democracies. Figure
2.1 shows that, even though income inequality in Finland increased markedly since the early
1990s, it has done so at much lower levels than in the US and the rest of Europe. Support for
redistribution in Finland is also higher, on average, than in the rest of Europe. For example,
in the ESS data from 2002-18, Finnish respondents are significantly more likely to agree
with the statement that the government should take measures to reduce differences in income
levels, compared to respondents in the rest of the EU.8 As in many other Western democracies,
the rich in Finland are less supportive of redistribution than the poor. In the Finnish ESS
data from 2002-2018, the correlation between respondents’ support for redistribution (“the
government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”) and respondents’
7See Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) for a seminal theoretical contribution to the literature.
8Response options range from disagree strongly (1) to agree strongly (5). The mean response in Finland
is 3.92 and the mean response in the rest of the EU is 3.86. The difference in means is relatively small but
statistically significant (t = -7.576, p < 0.001, n = 373,979). Data are from all available ESS rounds between
2002 and 2018. Israel, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine are excluded.
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income rank (household income deciles) is negative (β = -0.17) and statistically significant
(p < 0.001).
Income transparency has a long tradition in Finland and, in many parts of the country,
municipal tax records have been publicly available as far back as the 1920s. From the 1960s
until the late 1980s, ordinary citizens could purchase so-called tax calendars, which contained
the income information of everyone in their municipality. In 2000, new legislation came
into force, which allowed the media to purchase lists of individuals with the highest taxable
(earned and capital) income in Finland.9 The tax lists, which include everyone with a pre-tax
income of e100,000 or more in the previous tax year, are released to the media on the first
working day of November of every year.10 The specific information released on the tax day
includes the person’s name, year of birth and province of residence, the total earned and
capital income subject to taxation, the total amount of taxes and levies paid, and the total
amount of tax refund. The timing of the tax day is unrelated to other important political
events in Finland (e.g. national elections), and was chosen because the tax calendar ends in
October. Table A1 in the appendix lists the exact dates for all tax days since 2000.
Ever since the law change in 2000, the tax day has become an annual media spectacle
focused on Finland’s top-earners, celebrities and potential tax dodgers (Barry, 2018). His-
torically, income transparency in Finland was justified as a means to ensure tax compliance
(Lohiniva-Kerkelä, 2003). Today, the tax day is often justified as a means to encourage
cross-class comparisons between the rich and poor, and the issues of economic inequality
and redistribution feature prominently in the public debate (Barry, 2018; Yläjärvi, 2020).
Several national newspapers such as Helsingin Sanomat and Iltalehti use the tax day to
launch or update databases (Verokone) that allow readers to search for the names and incomes
of Finland’s top-earners.11 The tax day is a highly salient event in Finland and one of the
most important media events of the year (Barry, 2018). Figure 2.2 below uses data from 2019
to show that the tax day creates significant spikes in media coverage related to keywords
such as salary, income, and inequality during the first few days of November. The spikes are
large, but relatively short-lived. Figure A1 in the appendix shows that Google search queries
related to the tax day follow the same pattern.
9An English translation of the law is available at: https://finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1999/19991346
10Since 2019, individuals can request to be removed from the list of top-earners that is shared with the media
on the tax day. In 2019, around 200 top-earners had their information removed. In 2020, this rose to around
4,400 as the request could be submitted online via OmaVero. Requests have to be made separately each year.
11Note that the income information of every Finnish citizen (regardless of their income) can be requested by
phone or via customer terminals in local tax offices.
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Data: LianaMonitor/VATT Institute for Economic Research. Note: In 2019, the tax day was on Monday,
November 4th. The Finnish keywords for the top panel were “tulot”, “palkat”, “palkka”, and for the bottom
panel the Finnish keywords were “tuloero”, “tuloerot”. LianaMonitor searches all Finnish-language news
articles published online within a specified time period. This means that radio and television content is likely
underrepresented relative to print media content.
2.3 Conceptual framework
In this section we briefly set out our expectations about what signals the tax day sends to
Finnish citizens and how we expect them to respond to these signals.
2.3.1 The tax day increases the salience of inequality
Given that Finland’s tax day has taken place every year since 2000, we do not expect the
event to provide the public with much new information about the objective level of income
inequality in the country. Instead, we argue that the tax day and the resulting media coverage
of Finland’s top-earners primarily serves to bring the issue of income inequality to the
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attention of ordinary citizens. In other words, we expect the tax day to increase the salience
of income inequality amongst the public.12 We use the term salience to refer to the degree
to which citizens engage with a political issue, in our case income inequality (Moniz and
Wlezien, 2020).13 If the tax day increases the degree to which citizens engage with the issue
of income inequality, we expect the event to increase perceptions that incomes at the top are
unfairly high, especially amongst the less affluent.
H1a: The tax day increases perceptions that the incomes of the top 10% are unfairly
high, especially amongst the less affluent.
The social psychology literature argues that people make sense of abstract concepts such
as inequality by engaging in social comparisons, i.e. by comparing their own situation with
that of other people (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Income is only one dimension
along which individuals can make such social comparisons (others are ethnicity, gender,
or age), but income is considered one of the most important markers of social status in
Western societies (Thal, 2020; Veblen, 1899). If the tax day increases the salience of income
inequality amongst the public, we expect it to also trigger income comparisons between
citizens. The media coverage of the tax day focuses primarily on individuals who earn more
than e100,000 per year, as these top-earners are included in the tax list that is shared with the
media. We expect the media focus on the super-rich to primarily trigger “upward” income
comparisons amongst the public.14 Given that incomes of more than e100,000 per year are
significantly higher than the incomes of those at the lower end of the highest (10th) income
decile (e70,020 per year), we expect the tax day to trigger upward income comparisons
amongst the affluent and less affluent alike.15
H2: The tax day increases upward income comparisons, regardless of individuals’ income
status.
12In Figure 2.2 we provided some initial evidence that the tax day triggers a spike in the salience of income
inequality in the Finnish media. However, we also expect the tax day to increase the salience of income
inequality amongst ordinary citizens (not just in the media).
13Issue salience can be conceived as being a function of two factors: first, the importance an individual
attaches to the issue and, second, the extent to which an individual perceives the issue to be a problem (Moniz
and Wlezien, 2020).
14An individual engages in upward income comparisons when she compares her own income to those who
earn more than her, rather than the same as her or less than her (Condon and Wichowsky, 2020).
15Estimated income deciles are from the 2018 ESS Finland.
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2.3.2 Alternative signals
A crucial assumption in our conceptual framework is that the tax day increases the salience
of income inequality amongst the public. However, there are at least two alternative signals
that the tax day could send to Finnish citizens. First, that hard work pays off, and second,
that the rich pay their fair share of taxes.
If the tax day primarily acts as a signal to citizens that hard work pays off (i.e. that
income differences in Finland are justified to reward effort), we expect the tax day to reduce
perceptions that the incomes of the top 10% are unfairly high. We would expect such
a negative effect on unfairness perceptions regardless of individuals’ own income status.
This expectation builds on research in social psychology, which shows that individuals
support higher levels of inequality than predicted by their own self-interest when they believe
inequality to be the result of a fair process (Trump, 2020). In the Finnish context, the
hard-work-pays-off hypothesis makes intuitive sense given that the national media regularly
proclaim “capitalist heroes” on the tax day. In recent years, for example, several media
outlets ran favourable tax day stories about the young millionaire owners of the Finnish
gaming company Supercell (Barry, 2018).
H1b: The tax day decreases perceptions that the incomes of the top 10% are unfairly
high.
Another plausible signal the tax day could send to citizens is that the rich pay their fair
share of taxes (i.e. that the Finnish tax and welfare systems work as they should). This
scenario is plausible because the list of top-earners shared with the media does not only
report their taxable (earned and capital) income, but also reports the total amount of taxes
paid by each individual on the list. If this is the main signal that the tax day sends to citizens,
we expect the event to have no effect on perceptions that the incomes of the top 10% are
unfairly high, as such a signal would favour the status quo.
H1c: The tax day does not affect perceptions that the incomes of the top 10% are unfairly
high.
It is likely that the tax day sends different signals to different types of people, given that
citizens will self-select into different media coverage of the tax day (e.g. Finnish tabloids tend
to focus on celebrities, while the income inequality aspect is more likely to be emphasised
by broadsheets). However, by looking at the effect of the tax day on unfairness perceptions,
we can ascertain which signal is likely to outweigh on average.
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2.3.3 The tax day widens the gap in support for redistribution between
the rich and poor
We expect the tax day to widen the gap in support for redistribution between the rich and
the poor. Specifically, we expect that less affluent individuals will respond to the tax day
by increasing their support for redistribution, and that affluent individuals will respond by
decreasing their support for redistribution.16
H3: The tax day decreases (increases) support for redistribution amongst the (less)
affluent.
Several plausible mechanisms could explain why the tax day widens the gap in support
for redistribution between income groups. First, by increasing the salience of inequality,
the tax day might remind the (less) affluent that they would stand to (benefit) lose from
redistribution. This expectation builds on experimental research which shows that exposure
to visible markers of inequality makes the poor more likely to support redistribution (Sands
and de Kadt, 2020) and the rich “double down” on their class interest (Côté et al., 2015;
Nishi et al., 2015; Sands, 2017).17 Second, by focusing on the incomes of the super-rich, the
tax day may reduce the perceived social status of the less affluent, and as a result increase
their support for redistribution. This expectation builds on experimental research which
shows that poor subjects who are induced to perceive greater social distance from the rich,
express greater support for social welfare spending as a result (Condon and Wichowsky,
2020). Amongst the affluent, the tax day may also trigger status concerns and lead to a
“keeping up with the Kardashians” reaction, where the welfare state and the associated
tax burden are perceived as standing in the way of catching up with the super-rich. This
expectation builds on experimental research which shows that affluent subjects become more
economically conservative when exposed to information about others’ economic success
(Thal, 2020). Finally, the tax day could widen the gap in support for redistribution by
correcting individuals’ misperceptions about their relative position in the national income
16The expectation of heterogeneous effects builds on the income transparency literature, which has consis-
tently found that individuals’ relative income position is a crucial factor moderating their response to income
transparency. For example, Card et al. (2012) find that workers with below-median salaries report lower job
satisfaction when incomes are made public, while those earning above the median remain unaffected. Similarly,
Perez-Truglia (2020) finds that income transparency widens the subjective well-being gap between the rich and
poor.
17In a field experiment, Sands (2017) finds that affluent subjects become less supportive of redistribution
when randomly exposed to visibly poor person in their local neighbourhood. In a laboratory setting, Nishi et al.
(2015) find that visible endowment inequality makes richer participants contribute less to their network. In a
survey experiment, Côté et al. (2015) find that affluent participants become less generous (in a dictator game),
when they are induced to believe that they lived in an unequal area.
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distribution.18 This expectation builds on recent research which shows that individuals at
the lower end of the income distribution tend to overestimate their relative income position,
while those at the upper end of the income distribution tend to underestimate their relative
income position (Cruces et al., 2013; Fehr et al., 2019; Hvidberg et al., 2020; Karadja et al.,
2017).
2.3.4 The effect of the tax day is stronger amongst young people
We expect young people’s redistributive preferences to be more responsive to the tax day
compared to older age groups. This expectation builds on research in political socialisation,
which suggests that individuals’ political beliefs and preferences are malleable during adoles-
cence and early adulthood, but relatively stable throughout later life (Bartels and Jackman,
2014; Dinas, 2013; Neundorf and Smets, 2017; Sears and Valentino, 1997). According to the
“impressionable years” hypothesis, young people’s political beliefs and preferences can be
significantly shaped by socialising agents (such as parents or the media) as well as salient
political events (such as recessions or elections) (Dinas, 2013; Neundorf and Smets, 2017).
Later in life, however, such external stimuli leave individuals’ political attitudes largely
unaffected and attitudinal changes, if any, tend to be temporary (see Margalit 2013).
H4: The effect of the tax day on support for redistribution is stronger amongst young
people than amongst older age groups.
While the idea of heightened sensitivity to attitudinal change during adolescence and
early adulthood is widely accepted in the political socialisation literature (Neundorf and
Smets, 2017), the mechanisms that might explain age differences in attitudinal stability in
response to external influences are less well understood (Dinas, 2013). In the context of
the Finnish tax day, a plausible mechanism behind the impressionable years hypothesis
is that young people attach more weight to the income information revealed by the event.
Two factors could explain such an age-specific information effect. First, the probability of
exposure to a previous tax day may be lower for younger people, in which case the event
simply reveals more “new” information about income inequality in Finland to young people.
Second, even if the probability of exposure to a previous tax day is similar across age groups,
young people may attach more weight to the information revealed by the tax day because
they are less likely to interpret it through the lens of a consolidated political worldview (see
Dinas 2013). While the impressionable years hypothesis makes no explicit prediction about
18The repeated nature of the tax day makes this mechanism less likely, as most citizens will not receive much
new information about their relative income from being exposed to an additional tax day. An exception may be
young people who are less likely to have experienced previous tax days (see Section 2.3.4 below).
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the direction of the effect of the tax day on young people’s support for redistribution, we
expect it to be positive on average. This is because young people are disproportionately
represented at the bottom of the income distribution.19
2.4 Empirical strategy
2.4.1 Methods
The unique institutional setting of Finland’s tax day makes it possible to identify the causal
effect of income transparency on individuals’ attitudes in a before-and-after type research
design. We take advantage of the fact that the tax day coincides with the implementation
period of the ESS in Finland. Whether respondents took part in the ESS shortly before or
after the tax day can be considered as-if-random, so we can estimate the causal effect of
the tax day by comparing responses shortly before and after the event. This approach is
sometimes referred to as Unexpected Event during Survey Design, and has been used to
study the effect of events such as terrorist attacks (Finseraas and Listhaug, 2013; Legewie,
2013; Muñoz et al., 2020), election victories (Giani and Méon, 2019), leadership transitions
(Mikulaschek et al., 2020), and football victories (Depetris-Chauvin et al., 2020). Valid
identification relies on two key assumptions: temporal ignorability and excludability (Muñoz
et al., 2020). Temporal ignorability means that the moment at which each respondent is
interviewed during the fieldwork is independent from the timing of the tax day. Balance
tests on pre-determined covariates (age, gender, education, etc.) suggest that this assumption
is plausible within a 10-day window around the tax day (see Figure A2 in the appendix).
Further away from the tax day, as-if random treatment assignment is less plausible given that
respondents who are harder to reach are more likely to be interviewed later in the fieldwork
period (see Figure A4 in the appendix). Using an even narrower window around the tax day
in turn makes our estimates susceptible to bias from day-to-day variation in the number and
types of respondents interviewed each day (see Figure 2.3 below).20
Excludability means that the timing of the survey interview only affects the outcome of
interest through the respondent’s exposure to the tax day. Threats to identification can arise
19In the Finnish ESS data from 2002-18, the youngest age group (15-24 years) has a lower average household
income than any other age group except for the oldest age group (75-100 years). The differences between age
groups are statistically significant (p < 0.001).
20Although we do not employ a regression discontinuity (RD) design, we note that a 10-day window
minimises the mean-squared error (MSE) of the local polynomial RD point estimator (MSE-optimal bandwidth
= 11.6).
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from simultaneous events and from time trends in the outcome variable (Muñoz et al., 2020).
While the excludability assumption cannot be directly tested, we present results from several
placebo tests, which support our identification strategy. First, we show that the tax day has
no significant effects on a placebo outcome (attitudes towards gays and lesbians). Second,
we re-run our main analysis on ESS respondents from Sweden and find null effects. Third,
we test for effects of a “fake” tax day prior to the actual tax day and find null effects (see
Section E in the appendix).
We estimate the effect of the tax day using the following OLS model:
Yit = β1Treatmentit +β2Daysit +β3(Treatmentit ×Daysit)+ γt + εit (2.1)
where Yit refers to the outcome of interest (support for redistribution, unfairness percep-
tion, income comparison), Treatmentit is a dummy equal to one on and after the tax day, and
zero before the tax day, Daysit is a running variable indicating the number of days before
and after the tax day (with zero on the tax day itself), and γt refers to survey year fixed
effects. The main coefficient of interest is β1, which captures the size of the discontinuity
in the outcome on the tax day. The coefficient on the interaction term β3 in turn indicates
whether the treatment effect changes (weakens or strengthens) as time goes by after the tax
day. Finally, β2 captures linear time trends in the outcome variable prior to the tax day. We
follow Muñoz et al. (2020) and use conventional standard errors, as they have a very similar
setup with ESS data from a single country.21
In the baseline model, we restrict the sample to a 10-day window around the tax day
in a given year, as covariate balance tests suggest that as-if-random treatment assignment
is plausible within this window (see Figure A2). As a robustness check, we also present
estimates for alternative bandwidths of 5 to 30 days around the tax day. In the baseline model,
we furthermore exclude all respondents who were interviewed in the three days prior to the
tax day. We do this because the media coverage of the tax day typically builds up for a few
days before the event, so these respondents may have already been “treated” by the tax day.
The build-up in media coverage is reflected in the number of tax day-related keyword hits
that we observe just before the event (see Figure 2.2). As a robustness check, we also present
results for alternative exclusion windows just before the tax day.
21For completeness we also report the main results with robust standard errors clustered at the level of the
running variable (see Appendix B).
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2.4.2 Data
We use data from all available rounds of the Finnish ESS (2002-2018).22 The ESS is a
nationally representative survey that has been implemented in Finland every two years since
2002. The fieldwork period is typically from September to December, with a few interviews
also conducted into the next year. Figure 2.3 shows that the tax day falls roughly into the
middle of the fieldwork period, and that there is no obvious bunching of respondents before or
after the event.23 We interpret this as further evidence in support of the temporal ignorability
assumption. Figure 2.3 also shows that survey enumerators conducted fewer interviews on
Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays. Given that the tax day usually occurs on the first working
day of November, we therefore record substantially fewer respondents in the 2-3 days just
before the event.24 These respondents may differ systematically from other respondents, for
example because the ESS fieldwork guidelines require that unsuccessful interview attempts
must be followed-up at the weekend.25 While excluding three days prior to the tax day goes
some way to address this concern, we also show that our results are robust to including
day-of-the-week fixed effects in our regression models (Appendix C).
The fieldwork is implemented by Statistics Finland in collaboration with the Department
of Social Research at the University of Turku. The data are collected through face-to-face
computer assisted personal interviews (CAPI) in either Finnish or Swedish. The sample
is selected by one-stage random sampling and is representative of all persons aged 15 and
over who reside in private households.26 Quota sampling and substitution of non-responding
households or individuals are not permitted. The ESS aims for a response rate of at least 70%
and the Finnish sample typically includes around 2000 respondents per survey round. The
ESS fieldwork guidelines require at least four personal visits to each sample unit before it is
abandoned as non-productive.27 Figure A4 in the appendix plots the relationship between the
number of attempted contacts with sampled units and the fieldwork day when the interview
was completed. It shows that respondents who are harder to reach are more likely to be
22The ESS data are available at: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org
23Figure A3 in the appendix provides a more fine-grained picture by zooming in on the 40-days around the
tax day.
24This is confirmed by a non-parametric density test (see Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma 2018), which rejects
the null hypothesis that there is no discontinuity in the density of the running variable at the threshold (t=1.9;
p=0.06).
25Field Procedures in the European Social Survey Round 9: Guidelines for Enhancing Response Rates and
Minimising Nonresponse Bias (p.10).
26https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/country/finland/finnish/methods.html
27See Field Procedures in the European Social Survey Round 9: Guidelines for Enhancing Response Rates
and Minimising Nonresponse Bias (p.10).
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The left panel shows the number of survey respondents by weekday
on which the interview was conducted. The right panel shows the number of respondents by interview
date relative to the tax day. Exact dates for the tax days are found in Table A1. Figure A3 zooms in on
the 40 days before and after the tax day.
interviewed later in the fieldwork period. This suggest that our strategy of focusing on a
narrower 10-day window around the tax day is advisable to avoid potential biases related to
reachability (Muñoz et al., 2020).
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the dependent variables used in the analysis. Our
main dependent variable (support for redistribution) captures the extent to which respondents
agree that the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels,
ranging from one (disagree strongly) to five (agree strongly). This measure of support
for redistribution is quite general,28 and may tap into respondents’ attitudes towards the
appropriate size of government. As a robustness check, we therefore use four alternative
measures of support for redistribution, which capture, respectively, respondents’ support for
28For example, it does not distinguish between redistribution “from the rich” and “to the poor” (Cavaillé and
Trump, 2015).
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unemployment benefits, their support for public childcare, their preference for economic
equality, and their support for a social safety net (see Table A2 for details).
Table 2.1 Summary statistics
Years Obsv. Mean SD Min Max
Support for redistribution 2002-18 17766 3.92 0.99 1 5
Unfairness perception (of top 10% incomes) 2018 1681 5.70 1.53 1 9
Income comparison (with “others”) 2006 998 0.12 0.33 0 1
Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: Support for redistribution captures the extent to which respondents agree
that the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels. Unfairness perception
captures how fair respondents think the incomes of the top 10% in Finland are, with high values reflecting
higher unfairness perceptions. Income comparison identifies respondents who report being most likely to
compare their income to others.
To our knowledge, available national surveys implemented in Finland during the relevant
time period do not include standard issue salience questions, such as what respondents think
is the most important problem facing the country (Moniz and Wlezien, 2020). We therefore
use an 2018 ESS survey question on unfairness perceptions of top incomes as a proxy to
capture the salience of income inequality at the individual level. The survey item prompts
respondents to think about the 10% of employees working full-time in Finland who earn
more than e6000 per month, and whether they consider these incomes unfairly low, fair,
or unfairly high. Possible responses range from one to nine, with high values reflecting
perceptions that top 10% incomes are unfairly high.
To measure income comparison, we use an item from the 2006 ESS, which asks re-
spondents whose income they would be most likely to compare their own income to. The
response options are (1) work colleagues, (2) family members, (3) friends, (4) others, (5)
don’t compare, and (6) don’t know. Given that we are primarily interested in upward income
comparisons (rather than comparisons with colleagues, family or friends), we create a binary
variable that equals one for respondents who report being most likely to compare their income
to “others”, and zero otherwise. While this measure is limited in the sense that we do not
know who respondents think of as belonging into the “others” category, we can rule out
colleagues, family, and friends.
Our measure of household income is based on respondents’ self-placement into national
income deciles, which are pre-determined for each ESS round and calculated using income
data from the Finnish tax registry. In the ESS 2002-6, EU-wide income categories were used
instead of national income deciles. For these years, we impute national income deciles by
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assigning each respondent an income that is drawn from a uniform random distribution of
values between the lower and upper cut-off values of the EU-wide income bracket that they
placed themselves in. For outcomes that are available for several survey years (e.g. support
for redistribution), we have sufficient observations to disaggregate the analysis by income
deciles. However, for outcomes that are only available for one survey year (e.g. unfairness
perceptions), we have relatively small sample sizes (see Table 2.1), so we only distinguish
between below- and above-median income earners.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 The tax day increases unfairness perceptions
We find that the tax day increases perceptions that the incomes of the top 10% are unfairly
high. Figure 2.4 plots the estimated effect of the tax day on unfairness perceptions separately
for below- and above-median income earners and for different bandwidths of up to 30 days
around the tax day. The red vertical line marks the default 10-day bandwidth. For below-
median income earners, we observe a significant positive effect for all bandwidths up to 21
days. For above-median income earners, we only observe a significant positive effect for
bandwidths between 10 and 13 days. Table A3 in the appendix presents the corresponding
regression results from our baseline model with a 10-day bandwidth. In line with Hypothesis
1a, the results suggest that the effect of the tax day on unfairness perceptions is driven by the
reactions of below-median income earners, for whom the effect is around 3.5 times larger
than for above-median income earners.
For the whole sample (including both income groups), we observe a positive and statisti-
cally significant effect of 2.5 (see Table A5 in the appendix), which amounts to an increase
in unfairness perceptions of more than 1.5 standard deviations - a relatively large effect size.
The positive average effect on unfairness perceptions indicates that the tax day primarily
increases the salience of inequality amongst the public, rather than signalling that “hard work
pays off” (Hypothesis 1b) or that “the rich pay their fair share” (Hypothesis 1c). If one of
these alternative signals had outweighed on average, we would have observed a negative or
null effect respectively.
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Data: ESS Finland 2018. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax day (the
coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ unfairness perception for varying
bandwidths (days) around the tax day. Unfairness perception ranges from 1 to 9, with
high values reflecting perceptions that top 10% incomes are unfairly high. The results
are presented separately for below-median income earners and above-median income
earners. The red vertical line marks the default bandwidth of 10 days around the tax day.
2.5.2 The tax day increases income comparisons
We find that the tax day increases the likelihood that respondents compare their income
to that of “others”, in line with Hypothesis 2. However, we only observe this effect for
below-median income earners and not for above-median income earners. Figure 2.5 plots
the estimated effect of the tax day on income comparison separately for below- and above-
median income earners and for different bandwidths of up to 30 days around the tax day.
For below-median income earners, we observe a significant positive effect of the tax day
on income comparison for bandwidths between 8 and 12 days. For above-median income
earners, the estimates remain indistinguishable from zero regardless of the bandwidth. Table
A3 in the appendix presents the corresponding regression results from our baseline model
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with a 10-day bandwidth. The results suggest that the tax day triggers income comparisons
primarily amongst individuals at the lower end of the income distribution.
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Data: ESS Finland 2006. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax day (the
coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ income comparison for varying
bandwidths (days) around the tax day. Income comparison is a binary variable equal to
one for respondents who report being most likely to compare their income to “others”,
and zero otherwise. The results are presented separately for below-median income earners
and above-median income earners. The red vertical line marks the default bandwidth of
10 days around the tax day.
Given that the outcome variable is binary in this case, the coefficients from the OLS
model should be treated with caution and do not lend themselves to interpretation in terms of
standard deviations. In Table A7 in the appendix, we present results from a binary logistic
model. In the logistic model, the coefficient on the Treatment variable points in the same
direction as in the OLS model, but it falls short of the conventional significance threshold (p
> 0.05).
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2.5.3 The tax day decreases support for redistribution only amongst
top-earners
We find that the tax day leaves individuals’ support for redistribution largely unaffected.
Given that support for redistribution was measured in every ESS round since 2002, we can
disaggregate the analysis by income deciles. Figure 2.6 plots the estimated effect of the tax
day on support for redistribution for each income decile, using the default 10-day bandwidth.
The effect of the tax day is indistinguishable from zero for all income groups except for the
top income decile (n = 314), where it is negative (β = -1) and statistically significant (p <
0.05). The point estimate suggests that amongst the top income decile, the tax day decreases
support for redistribution by around one standard deviation - which is a large effect size.
For the whole sample (including all income groups), the estimated effect of the tax day on
support for redistribution is statistically insignificant (see Table A5 in the appendix). The
overall null effect is precisely estimated. We can rule out increases in overall support for
redistribution that are larger than 0.2 standard deviations and decreases that are larger than
-0.16 standard deviations – which are small effect sizes. Taken together, the results suggest
that the tax day leaves support for redistribution largely unaffected, except amongst Finland’s
top-earners, where the event triggers a relatively strong negative response.
The result for the top income decile withstands several robustness checks. First, the result
holds when we include day-of-the-week fixed effects (see Figure A8). Second, the result is
relatively robust to alternative bandwidth choices. We find significant negative effects for
all bandwidths between 7 and 13 days around the tax day (see Figure A9). Third, the result
holds when using alternative exclusion windows from 1 to 5 days prior to the tax day (rather
than the default 3 days) although the estimates are in some cases only significant at 90% (see
Figure A10).
2.5.4 The tax day increases support for redistribution only amongst
young people
Next, we disaggregate the analysis by age groups. Figure 2.7 plots the estimated effect of
the tax day on support for redistribution for different age groups, using the default 10-day
bandwidth specification. For most age groups, the estimates are indistinguishable from zero,
which suggests that the tax day leaves their support for redistribution unaffected. A notable
exception, however, are the youngest age group (15-24 years), where the tax day triggers
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax day
(the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ support for redistribution by
income decile. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are from our
baseline model with 10-day bandwidths, fitted separately on each income decile. The
three days prior to the tax day are excluded from the analysis. Support for redistribution
measures the extent to which respondents agree that the government should take measures
to reduce differences in income levels, ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree
strongly). Corresponding regression results are in Table A8.
an increase in support for redistribution of more than 0.5 standard deviations (β = 0.58; p =
0.01) - which is a medium-sized effect.
The result for the youngest age group withstands several robustness checks. First, the
result holds when we include day-of-the-week fixed effects (see Figure A11). Second, the
result is robust to alternative bandwidth choices. We find significant positive effects for all
bandwidths of up to 15 days around the tax day (see Figure A12). Third, we consistently find
positive effects for the youngest age group when using alternative exclusion windows from 1
to 5 days prior to the tax day. We note, however, that the estimates for exclusion windows
of 4 and 5 days do not reach conventional significance (see Figure A13). Fourth, we find
the same pattern (with noisier estimates) when controlling for household income (see Figure
A14), which suggests that age matters independently of income. Finally, we run the analysis
using smaller 4-year bins to determine age groups (see Figure A15). The estimates are noisier
due to the smaller sample sizes, but they point in the same direction as the main results. The
tax day triggers a positive and statistically significant (β = 0.74; p = 0.01) increase in support
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax day
(the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ support for redistribution by
age group, using 9-year bins. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Estimates
are from our baseline model with 10-day bandwidths, fitted separately on each age
group. The three days prior to the tax day are excluded from the analysis. Support for
redistribution measures the extent to which respondents agree that the government should
take measures to reduce differences in income levels, ranging from 1 (disagree strongly)
to 5 (agree strongly). Corresponding regression results are in Table A10.
for redistribution amongst the youngest age group (15-19 years). The estimated effect for the
20-24 year-old’s is also positive, but smaller and non-significant (β = 0.28; p > 0.05), which
suggests that the reaction is concentrated amongst the very youngest respondents.
2.6 Mechanisms
2.6.1 Why does the tax day leave support for redistribution largely un-
affected?
Weak treatment - Given that the tax day takes place every year, it is plausible that the
“treatment” of the tax day is simply not strong enough to shift individuals’ attitudes in a
manner that is comparable to the effect of income transparency interventions in other contexts
(Card et al., 2012; Perez-Truglia, 2020). As an external validity check, we therefore assess
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whether the tax day affects individuals’ subjective well-being. We look at subjective well-
being given that this outcome has been previously studied in the very similar context of
Norway, where citizens’ tax records became easily accessible online in 2001 (Perez-Truglia,
2020). We measure subjective well-being using responses to the following question, which
was included in all ESS rounds since 2002: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with
your life as a whole nowadays?” Possible responses range from one (extremely dissatisfied)
to 11 (extremely satisfied). Following Perez-Truglia (2020), we use the Probit-OLS method
to assign values to each response option and then standardise the variable to a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of 1.29 While self-reported measures of well-being have some limitations
(e.g. due to social desirability bias), they have been shown to be significantly correlated with
objective measures of well-being (Di Tella et al., 2003).
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax day
(the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ life satisfaction by income
decile. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are from our baseline
model with 10-day bandwidths, fitted separately on each income decile. The three days
prior to the tax day are excluded from the analysis. Life satisfaction is measured with the
following question: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole
nowadays?” Response options range from 1 (extremely dissatisfied) to 11 (extremely
satisfied). The values are adjusted using the Probit-OLS method and standardised to have
a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
Based on previous findings from Norway (Perez-Truglia, 2020), we expect the tax day to
increase the subjective well-being of the affluent and decrease the subjective well-being of
29The Probit-OLS method assigns values to match the distribution of responses to a normal distribution
(Ferrer-i Carbonell, 2005). The standardised Probit-OLS adjusted measure has 11 discrete values and runs from
-3.2 to 1.8. See Figure A6 for a histogram of the re-scaled life satisfaction variable.
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the less affluent. We find some evidence for this, although reactions to the tax day appear
to be concentrated at the bottom of the income distribution. Figure 2.8 plots the estimated
effect of the tax day on self-reported life satisfaction by income decile, using the default
10-day bandwidth specification. For most income deciles, the tax day leaves self-reported
life satisfaction unaffected. However, for the bottom income decile, we observe a sizeable
and statistically significant decrease in life satisfaction in response to the tax day (-0.9 SD; p
= 0.02). In the appendix, we present evidence to suggest that a plausible mechanisms linking
the tax day to decreased life satisfaction amongst the poorest is via its effect on perceived
income status (see Figure A17). We interpret this as evidence that the tax day “treatment” is
strong enough to shift attitudes in a manner that is similar to the effect of income transparency
interventions studied in other contexts (Card et al., 2012; Perez-Truglia, 2020).30
Information saturation - A related explanation for the overall null effect is that, because
the tax day has taken place every year since 2000, most citizens’ do not obtain any new
information from the event. If this is the case, we would expect to not observe null effects
in early rounds of the ESS, where the tax day arguably still revealed more new information
to Finnish citizens. Figure A16 plots the effect of the tax day on support for redistribution
separately for each survey round between 2002 and 2018. To avoid small sample sizes, we
only distinguish between below- and above-median income earners. We find no evidence
that the tax day triggers stronger attitudinal reactions in early rounds of the ESS. While this
evidence is only suggestive, we interpret it to mean that information saturation is unlikely
to be the main reason why we observe an overall null effect of the tax day on support for
redistribution.
Ceiling effects - Another plausible explanation for the overall null effect is that support
for redistribution in Finland is quite high to begin with (Figure A5). To address concerns
about ceiling effects, we turn to four alternative measures of support for redistribution,
where responses are less clustered at the higher end of the scale (Figure A7). As for our
main outcome, we find that the tax day leaves these alternative measures of support for
redistribution largely unaffected (Table A12). This suggests that our main null result is
unlikely to be driven by ceiling effects.
Partisanship - It is also possible that the overall effect of the tax day on support for
redistribution is limited because many citizens identify with a specific political party and
follow the cues of their preferred political party on the issue of redistribution (Cavaille, 2020).
30Note that our estimates are nor directly comparable, as these studies do not disaggregate their results
by income decile. In Norway, Perez-Truglia (2020) finds that income transparency increased the life satis-
faction–income gradient by 21%. In California, Card et al. (2012) find that income transparency decreased
self-reported job satisfaction by 0.22 standard deviations amongst respondents in the lowest income quartile.
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If this is the case, we would expect to observe null effects amongst citizens with partisan
attachments, but to observe changes in support for redistribution amongst citizens with no
partisan attachments. While the majority of our sample (56%) do indeed identify with a
specific political party, we find no evidence that their response to the tax day is more muted
than the response of non-partisans (see Figure A18). While this evidence does not rule out
that partisanship might explain the muted overall response to the tax day, it casts some doubts
on this explanation.
Political ideology - Finally, it is possible that the overall null effect of the tax day on
support for redistribution hides divergent reactions amongst left- and right-wing respondents.
This idea is supported by recent research (Fenton, 2020; Karadja et al., 2017), which suggests
that political ideology can be an important moderating factor determining whether and how
much citizens’ adjust their support for redistribution when exposed to information about
inequality. Figure A19 in the appendix shows the estimated effect of the tax day on support
for redistribution separately for left- and right-wing respondents.31 There is no evidence
that the overall null result is driven by divergent reactions amongst left- and right-wing
respondents.
2.6.2 Why does the tax day decrease support for redistribution amongst
the top income decile?
There are at least four plausible mechanisms that could explain why respondents in the
top income decile respond to the tax day by decreasing their support for redistribution.
While the available data do not allows us to confirm or rule out any of these complementary
mechanisms, we do find some evidence in support of one mechanism (motivated reasoning)
and little evidence in support of the others. We discuss each potential mechanism in turn.
Correcting misperceptions - The first potential mechanism is that the tax day corrects
misperceptions amongst the top 10% about their relative position in the income distribution.
We might expect a stronger corrective information effect amongst the top 10% because the
very rich tend to underestimate their relative income status more than any other income group
(Hvidberg et al., 2020).32 However, we think that this mechanism is unlikely to explain our
results for the following reasons. The tax day focuses on the incomes of the super-rich who
earn more than e100,000 a year, so perceptions of relative income status amongst the top
31The correlation between ideological self-placement (on a 10-point left-right scale) and support for redistri-
bution (on a 5-point scale) is negative and statistically significant (r = -0.28; p < 0.01).
32Hvidberg et al. (2020) use survey and administrative data from Denmark to show that people with incomes
above the 95th percentile overestimate the average income in the 95th percentile by 50%.
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10% should become even more biased downwards, if anything. Furthermore, we find no
evidence that respondents in the top income decile adjust their perceived relative income
status in response to the tax day. Unfortunately, we do not have data on perceived income
rank comparable to Hvidberg et al. (2020), so we cannot directly quantify misperceptions
about relative income. However, since 2002, the ESS includes an item on perceived income
adequacy, which we use as a proxy to measure perceived income status. Figure A17 in the
appendix shows that the tax day has no significant effect on perceived income adequacy
amongst the top income decile. While this evidence is only suggestive, it speaks against
the idea that the top 10% reduce their support for redistribution in response to the tax day
because the event corrects their (mis-)perceptions about their relative income status.
Salience of tax burden - A second possible mechanism is that the tax day suppresses
support for redistribution amongst the top income decile because it reminds these individuals
of their relatively high tax burden. This is plausible because the tax day reveals the total
amount of taxes paid by Finland’s top-earners and the newspapers’ search engines (Verokone)
usually report their tax rate as well.33 In this scenario we would expect the tax day to decrease
the proportion of respondents in the top income decile who agree with the statement that
“higher earners should pay a higher share of earnings in tax”. We find no evidence that this is
the case (see Figure A20). However, the null result may be driven by the small number of
observations, as the relevant item was only included in one survey round.
Status concerns - A third plausible mechanism is that the tax day suppresses support
for redistribution amongst the top income decile because it triggers a “keeping up with the
Kardashians” reaction. Such a reaction is plausible because the tax day facilitates upward
income comparisons with the super-rich who earn more than e100,000 a year.34 If status
concerns are the mechanism linking the tax day to reduced support for redistribution amongst
the top income decile, we would expect the event to increase the extent to which the top
10% report valuing money and other status goods. However, we find no evidence that the
tax day increases the proportion of respondents in the top income decile who agree with the
statement that it is “important to be rich, have money and expensive things” (see Figure A21).
In this case, the relevant item was included in all ESS rounds, so the null effect is unlikely
due to small sample size.
Motivated reasoning - A fourth plausible mechanism is that the tax day suppresses
demand for redistribution amongst the top income decile because the event triggers a process
33See e.g. https://www.iltalehti.fi/verokone. Finland’s top-earners typically pay between 30-50% taxes on
earned and capital income.
34In line with this expectation, experimental research from the US shows that exposing affluent subjects to
other people’s success causes them to hold more economically conservative views (Thal, 2020)
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of motivated reasoning. Given that the tax day focuses on the incomes of Finland’s top-
earners, individuals in the top income decile may feel unfairly targeted or singled-out by the
tax day and may therefore (re-)affirm their beliefs that income inequality in Finland is justified,
for example because high incomes are rewards for effort or talents.35 This explanation finds
support in recent sociological research from Finland (Kantola, 2020; Kantola and Kuusela,
2019), which shows that the nation’s top-earners tend to construct self-identities based on
hard work in order to justify their wealth in the face of strong egalitarian norms. We find
some suggestive evidence for the motivated reasoning mechanism. Figure 2.9 shows that,
amongst the top income decile, the tax day decreases support for the statement that “for
a fair society, differences in standard of living should be small.” The estimate for the top
income decile is negative and statistically significant (β = -1.43; p = 0.08), and amounts to a
reduction of 1.5 standard deviations. The relevant item is only included in two ESS rounds,
so the small sample size in the top income decile (n = 83) might explain the relatively large
confidence interval. However, despite the noisy estimates, Figure 2.9 shows a rightward shift
in fairness beliefs in response to the tax day amongst individuals at the top of the income
distribution. Reassuringly, we find a very similar pattern when using an alternative measure
of respondents’ beliefs that inequality is justified or fair. The relevant item was included in
two ESS rounds and asks respondents to what extent they disagree that “large differences
in income are acceptable to reward talents and efforts”, with higher values on the 5-point
scale reflecting higher levels of disagreement. Again, although the estimates are noisy, they
indicate that the tax day boosts beliefs amongst top-earners that inequality can be justified to
reward talents or effort (see Figure A22).
2.6.3 Why does the tax day increase support for redistribution amongst
young people?
Correcting misperceptions - A possible mechanism linking the tax day to increased support
for redistribution amongst the youngest age group is through its effect on perceptions of
relative income status. The information effect of the tax day might be stronger for the
youngest age group, either because they are less likely to have been exposed to previous
tax days, or because they are less likely to interpret the information through the lens of
35In line with this mechanism, Suhay et al. 2020 find that affluent Americans are more likely than other
income groups to attribute economic success to intelligence and hard work. They also find that “individual-
blaming” attributions for economic success are more strongly predictive of economic conservatism amongst the
affluent than amongst other income groups.
36 Does income transparency affect support for redistribution?

























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Income decile
Data: ESS Finland 2008 & 2016. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax
day (the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ belief that inequality is
unfair by income decile. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are
from an OLS model with 10-day bandwidths, fitted separately on each income decile.
The three days prior to the tax day are excluded from the analysis. To increase precision
of the estimates, we include controls for age, gender, education, and labour market status
(in paid job, unemployed, student, retired, doing housework). Belief that inequality is
unfair measures respondents’ support for the statement that “for a fair society, differences
in standard of living should be small.” Response options range from 1 (disagree strongly)
to 8 (agree strongly) so that higher values reflect more left-wing beliefs.
a consolidated political worldview (see Dinas 2013).36 Either way, we would expect the
youngest age group to adjust their perceptions of relative income status more than older age
groups. In this case, a leftward shift in redistributive preferences is plausible because young
people are disproportionately represented at the lower end of the income distribution, where
individuals tend to overestimate their relative income status (Hvidberg et al., 2020). We find
some evidence in support of this explanation. As earlier, we use perceived income adequacy
as a proxy for perceived income status. In line with our expectations, we find that the tax day
decreases perceived income adequacy amongst those in the youngest age group, and only
here (see Figure 2.10). The negative effect is sizeable and statistically significant (-0.7 SD; p
= 0.02). While this evidence is only suggestive, it speaks for the idea that the tax day leads
3615-24 year-olds are also least likely to have experience paying taxes. Only 26% of 15-24 year-olds are in
paid work, compared with 73% of 25-65 year-olds.
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to increased support for redistribution amongst the youngest age group because it corrects
(mis-)perceptions about their relative income status.
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax day
(the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ perceived income adequacy
by age group. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are from an
OLS model with 10-day bandwidths, fitted separately on each income decile. The three
days prior to the tax day are excluded from the analysis. To increase precision of the
estimates, we include controls for age, gender, education, and labour market status (in
paid job, unemployed, student, retired, doing housework). Perceived income adequacy
captures how respondents feel about their household’s income nowadays, with response
options ranging from 1 (finding it very difficult) to 4 (living comfortably).
Media diets - An alternative explanation for the stronger reaction amongst the youngest
age group is that young people systematically expose themselves to different media coverage
of the tax day than older age groups (e.g. coverage that is more critical of income inequality).
Unfortunately, the ESS does not ask respondents which newspapers they read or television
channels they watch. However, we can measure how much respondents are exposed to
news about politics and current affairs. We use an ESS item which asks respondents how
much time they spend on a typical day watching, reading or listening to news about politics
and current affairs (in minutes),37 and divide the sample into respondents with high media
exposure (>60 minutes per day) and low media exposure (<60 minutes per day).38 We
37This item was included in only two ESS rounds (2016 & 2018).
3860 minutes is the median and mean response.
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find that young people are significantly less likely to be exposed to news about politics and
current affairs compared to older age groups. For example, only 31% of 15-24 year-old’s
have high media exposure compared with 73% of 75-100 year-old’s.39 This suggests that
young people do indeed have a different media diet than older age groups. However, we
find no evidence that the tax day affects support for redistribution differently depending
on whether respondents have high- or low media exposure (see Figure A23). While this
evidence is only suggestive, it casts some doubts on the idea that systematically different
media diets explain why young people react more strongly to the tax day.
2.7 Discussion
Every year, on the first working day of November, Finland’s tax authorities release the
income information of everyone who earns more than e100,000 a year to the public. We
propose that the so-called tax day increases the salience of income inequality in the public
debate and expect it to widen the gap in support for redistribution between the rich and
the poor. We use media data to show that the tax day coincides with a significant spike
in media coverage related to income inequality. Using nationally representative survey
data and a before-and-after type research design, we also show that the tax day increases
income comparisons and perceptions that the incomes of the top 10% are unfairly high.
However, despite these initial effects, we find that the tax day leaves public support for
redistribution largely unaffected. We can rule out increases in support for redistribution
that are larger than 0.2 standard deviations and decreases that are larger than -0.16 standard
deviations. We explore possible explanations for the public’s muted response to the tax
day, and present evidence that the overall null effect on support for redistribution is unlikely
due to the repeated nature of the tax day, ceiling effects, political partisanship, or divergent
reactions amongst left- and right-wing respondents. Importantly, we show that the overall
null effect hides substantial heterogeneity between income and age groups. We find that the
tax day suppresses support for redistribution amongst individuals in the top income decile,
and we present evidence that this effect likely operates via changes in top-earners’ fairness
beliefs. Furthermore, we find that the tax day increases support for redistribution amongst
the youngest age group (15-24 years), and we provide evidence that this effect likely operates
through changes in young people’s perceived relative income status.
Regarding the external validity of our findings, we note that Finland is one of the most
equal societies in Europe (OECD, 2011) and support for redistribution is relatively high in
39The differences between the youngest age group and all older age groups are statistically significant.
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comparison to other countries in Europe.40 Although we present evidence that our results are
unlikely due to ceiling effects, it is possible that the impact of income transparency is more
pronounced in other contexts, where baseline support for redistribution is lower and income
differences are larger. Furthermore, although several Nordic countries have adopted income
transparency policies (see e.g. Bø et al. 2015), Finland’s tax day is unique in that it creates
an annual media spectacle focused on the nation’s top earners (Barry, 2018). In Norway,
for example, the availability of tailored search apps that were integrated into social media
platforms such as Facebook meant that Norwegians primarily used income transparency
to compare their own income with that of their neighbours and friends, rather than the
nation’s top-earners (Perez-Truglia, 2020). While it is difficult to rule out that the muted
response to Finland’s tax day is due to the specific nature of the event (rather than the nature
of redistributive preferences), we provide evidence that the tax day has similar effects on
citizens’ subjective well-being as a comparable income transparency intervention in Norway
(Perez-Truglia, 2020). This reassures us that the muted effect of income transparency on
support for redistribution in Finland is not solely determined by the specific institutional
context of the tax day.
A limitation of our research design is that we primarily focus on respondents who were
interviewed within 10 days of the tax day. We do this because the assumption of as-if random
exposure to the tax day is most plausible in such a narrow window. This approach comes
at a cost in that we can only assess the short-term effects of the tax day. However, we note
that this limitation is not unique to our study and pertains to most previous experimental
studies that manipulate subjects’ support for redistribution by exposing them to information
about inequality (Condon and Wichowsky, 2020; Cruces et al., 2013; Karadja et al., 2017;
Sands, 2017; Sands and de Kadt, 2020).41 Another limitation of our research design is that
we only have data from 2002 onward, which is two years after the tax authorities first started
releasing the income information of Finland’s top-earners to the media. We disaggregate our
analysis by survey round and find no evidence that the effect of the tax day on support for
redistribution was more pronounced in early rounds. However, we cannot rule out entirely
that the tax day had a significant effect on citizens’ redistributive preferences when it first took
place in 2000, and that the null effects we observe from 2002 onward are due to information
saturation.
Overall, our findings suggest that income transparency can trigger greater concern about
income inequality amongst ordinary citizens, but that it may only lead to marginal changes
40See footnote 8
41An exception are Kuziemko et al. (2015), who re-survey respondents after one month and find that 58% of
the initial effect size remains (p.1493).
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in public support for redistribution. This interpretation corresponds well with a seminal
study by Kuziemko et al. (2015), who show that randomly exposing survey respondents
to information on income inequality has large effects on their views about inequality, but
only slightly moves their support for redistributive policies. Our results contrast, however,
with several recent survey- and field experiments (Condon and Wichowsky, 2020; Cruces
et al., 2013; Sands, 2017; Sands and de Kadt, 2020), which find that subjects’ support for
redistribution can be shifted by exposing them to information about (or visible markers of)
inequality. We contribute to this experimental research, by studying, for the first time, the
effect of a real-world policy on support for redistribution in the context of a large-scale
quasi-experiment. While the debate on the “malleability” of redistributive preferences is far
from settled, our results indicate that triggering significant shifts in support for redistribution
may be more difficult to achieve outside the controlled experimental setting.
An important implication of our findings is that lack of cross-class exposure may not
be the main reason why public support for redistribution has failed to “keep up” with rising
inequality in Western democracies. Scholars and political commentators, especially in the
US context, frequently point to limited cross-class exposure due to residential or educational
segregation as an explanation for the disconnect between rising inequality and lack of support
for redistribution (e.g. Condon and Wichowsky 2020; Minkoff and Lyons 2019; Reardon and
Bischoff 2011). In Finland, income transparency is also frequently justified as a mechanism
to encourage cross-class comparisons and resist the trend towards growing inequality (Barry,
2018; Yläjärvi, 2020). We present evidence that income transparency does indeed trigger
cross-class comparisons, but that it only marginally affects public support for redistribution.
This casts some doubts on the idea that increasing cross-class exposure is all it takes for
redistributive demand to catch up with rising inequality. Of course, income transparency is
just one of many policy interventions that might increase cross-class exposure. For example,
residential integration programmes like the Moving to Opportunity initiative (see Chetty et al.
2016, 2014) are likely to expose participants to visible markers of inequality. Exposure to
inequality in local neighbourhoods may in turn have much more far-reaching consequences
for redistributive demand than the relatively abstract exposure to the super-rich triggered by
Finland’s tax day (see Sands and de Kadt 2020). Exploring the attitudinal effects of other
policies that might increase citizens’ exposure to inequality is a promising avenue for further
research.
A further implication of our findings is that income transparency is unlikely to trigger a
“populist backlash” as feared by opponents of disclosure policies (Mas, 2017). In California,
Mas (2017) shows that pay disclosure in the public sector reduced compensation of city
managers by around 7%. He attributes this effect to a “populist” aversion to high salaries
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amongst the public, but he stops short of examining whether pay disclosure shifted citizens’
redistributive preferences. In Finland, we find no evidence that income transparency triggers
a left- or right-ward shift in redistributive preferences, which casts some doubts on the idea
that disclosure policies will affect citizens’ political opinions more broadly. Further research
could explore whether income transparency impacts other possible measures of “populist”
sentiment amongst citizens, such as their support for radical right parties.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore in detail why citizens’ redistributive
preferences are relatively inelastic to increasing exposure to inequality. However, we think it
is plausible that citizens’ redistributive preferences are rooted in stable political worldviews
that are difficult to alter once they are crystallized during the “impressionable years” of
adolescence and early adulthood (Neundorf and Smets, 2017). Our finding that the youngest
age group (15-24 years) are more responsive to the tax day than older age groups supports
this view. Our data do not allow us to establish precisely why young people attach more
weight to the income information revealed by the tax day, but one plausible channel is that
individuals in this age group are less likely than older age groups to interpret the information
through the lens of a consolidated political worldview (see Dinas 2013). Further research is
needed to unpack the precise mechanisms behind young people’s heightened sensitivity to
attitudinal change.
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2.8 Appendix
A Supplementary descriptive material
Table A1 Finland’s tax days (2000-2020)
Year Date Day of the week
2000 Nov 1 Wednesday
2001 Nov 1 Thursday
2002 Nov 1 Friday
2003 Nov 3 Monday
2004 Nov 1 Monday
2005 Nov 1 Tuesday
2006 Nov 1 Wednesday
2007 Nov 1 Thursday
2008 Nov 3 Monday
2009 Nov 2 Monday
2010 Nov 1 Monday
2011 Nov 1 Tuesday
2012 Nov 1 Thursday
2013 Nov 1 Friday
2014 Nov 3 Monday
2015 Nov 2 Monday
2016 Nov 1 Tuesday
2017 Nov 1 Wednesday
2018 Nov 1 Thursday
2019 Nov 4 Monday
2020 Nov 3 Tuesday
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Oct1 Nov1 Dec1 Jan1
Topic: earned income taxes
Data: Google Trends. Note: Numbers represent search interest relative to the highest point on the chart for
the given region and time. A value of 100 is the peak popularity for the term. A value of 50 means that the
term is half as popular. A score of 0 means that there was not enough data for this term. In 2019, the tax day
was on Monday, November 4th.
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Voted in last election










Voted in last election
Attempts to survey (N/10)
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3 -.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3
± 20 days ± 15 days
± 10 days ± 5 days
Data: ESS Finland 2002-18 for all covariates except “attempts to survey”, which is from ESS rounds
2008-2018. Note: Entries report the difference in the mean of the covariates between the treatment and
control groups for various bandwidths (days) around the tax day. Thick and thin lines are 90% and 95%
confidence intervals, respectively.
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Days before / after the tax day
Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: Exact dates for the tax days are in Table A1.
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Number of interview attempts
Coefficient = 5.92  t-statistic = 54.326
Data: ESS Paradata 2008-18 for Finland. Earlier rounds are not included because the coding of
interview outcomes in the ESS Paradata changed from 2006 to 2008. Note: The figure plots the number
of attempts to survey before interview completion by fieldwork day when the interview was completed
(relative to the tax day). We use kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing with 95% confidence
intervals, as Muñoz et al. (2020). The coefficient and t-statistic are from an OLS model regressing
fieldwork day when interview was completed on the number of attempts to survey.
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Support for redistribution
Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: Support for redistribution
captures the extent to which respondents agree that the government
should take measures to reduce differences in income levels (1-
disagree strongly, 5-agree strongly).
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Life satisfaction (Probit-OLS adjusted & standardised)
Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: Life satisfaction is measured
with the following question: “All things considered, how satisfied
are you with your life as a whole nowadays?” Response options
range from 1 (extremely dissatisfied) to 11 (extremely satisfied).
The values are adjusted using the Probit-OLS method and standard-
ised to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
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Table A2 Summary statistics for alternative measures of support for redistribution
Years Obsv. Mean SD Min Max
Support for unemployment benefits 2008 & 2016 4092 8.34 1.68 1 11
Support for public childcare 2008 & 2016 4074 9.09 1.59 1 11
Preference for economic equality 2018 1734 2.94 1.08 1 5
Support for social safety net 2018 1739 3.85 0.87 1 5
Data: ESS Finland 2008, 2016, 2018. Note: Support for unemployment benefits captures the extent to which
respondents think that it should be governments’ responsibility to ensure a reasonable standard of living
for the unemployed (1-not at all, 11-entirely). Support for public childcare captures the extent to which
respondents think that it should be governments’ responsibility to ensure sufficient child care services for
working parents (1-not at all, 11-entirely). Preference for economic equality captures how much respondents
agree or disagree with the statement that a society is fair when income and wealth are equally distributed
among all people (1-disagree strongly, 5-agree strongly). Support for social safety net captures how much
respondents agree or disagree with the statement that a society is fair when it takes care of those who are
poor and in need regardless of what they give back to society (1-disagree strongly, 5-agree strongly).
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Support for social safety net
Data: ESS Finland 2008, 2016, 2018. Note: Support for unemployment benefits captures
the extent to which respondents think that it should be governments’ responsibility to
ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed (1-not at all, 11-entirely).
Support for public childcare captures the extent to which respondents think that it should
be governments’ responsibility to ensure sufficient child care services for working parents
(1-not at all, 11-entirely). Preference for economic equality captures how much respon-
dents agree or disagree with the statement that a society is fair when income and wealth
are equally distributed among all people (1-disagree strongly, 5-agree strongly). Support
for social safety net captures how much respondents agree or disagree with the statement
that a society is fair when it takes care of those who are poor and in need regardless of
what they give back to society (1-disagree strongly, 5-agree strongly).
B Regression tables
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Table A3 Effect of the tax day amongst below- and above-median income earners
(1) (2) (3)
Unfairness Income Support for
perception comparison redistribution
Below-median income
Treatment 5.461*** 0.862** 0.168
(1.732) (0.389) (0.156)
Days -0.622*** -0.155*** -0.017
(0.203) (0.053) (0.021)
Treatment × Days 0.657*** 0.175*** 0.006
(0.219) (0.055) (0.023)
Survey-year FE - - ✓
Observations 94 67 1,606
R-squared 0.119 0.155 0.007
Survey years 2018 2006 2002-18
Above-median income
Treatment 1.524* -0.204 -0.076
(0.806) (0.315) (0.149)
Days -0.133 0.033 0.024
(0.093) (0.040) (0.020)
Treatment × Days 0.049 -0.038 -0.034
(0.108) (0.042) (0.022)
Survey-year FE - - ✓
Observations 153 153 2,051
R-squared 0.030 0.006 0.005
Survey years 2018 2006 2002-18
Note: Estimates are from OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Treatment coefficient captures the
effect of the tax day on the outcome. The sample is restricted to a 10-day
window around the tax day in a given year and the 3 days prior to the tax day
are excluded. The top panel shows estimates for the less affluent sub-sample
(below-median income) and the bottom panel shows estimates for the affluent
sub-sample (above-median income). Unfairness perception ranges from 1 to
9, with high values reflecting perceptions that top 10% incomes are unfairly
high. Income comparison is a binary variable equal to one for respondents
who report being most likely to compare their income to “others”, and zero
otherwise. Support for redistribution captures the extent to which respondents
agree that the government should take measures to reduce differences in
income levels (1-disagree strongly, 5-agree strongly).
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Table A4 Effect of the tax day amongst below- and above-median income earners (clustered
standard errors)
(1) (2) (3)
Unfairness Income Support for
perception comparison redistribution
Below-median income
Treatment 5.461* 0.689** 0.140
(3.070) (0.255) (0.095)
Days -0.622* -0.132*** -0.012
(0.344) (0.034) (0.013)
Treatment × Days 0.657* 0.150*** 0.001
(0.349) (0.037) (0.017)
Survey-year FE - - ✓
Observations 94 67 1,606
R-squared 0.119 0.155 0.007
Survey years 2018 2006 2002-18
Above-median income
Treatment 1.524*** -0.145 -0.055
(0.312) (0.269) (0.128)
Days -0.133*** 0.026 0.020
(0.042) (0.033) (0.017)
Treatment × Days 0.049 -0.028 -0.031
(0.045) (0.033) (0.019)
Survey-year FE - - ✓
Observations 153 153 2,051
R-squared 0.030 0.006 0.005
Survey years 2018 2006 2002-18
Note: Estimates are from OLS regressions with robust standard errors clus-
tered at the Days level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The
Treatment coefficient captures the effect of the tax day on the outcome. The
sample is restricted to a 10-day window around the tax day in a given year and
the 3 days prior to the tax day are excluded. The top panel shows estimates
for the less affluent sub-sample (below-median income) and the bottom panel
shows estimates for the affluent sub-sample (above-median income). Unfair-
ness perception ranges from 1 to 9, with high values reflecting perceptions that
top 10% incomes are unfairly high. Income comparison is a binary variable
equal to one for respondents who report being most likely to compare their
income to “others”, and zero otherwise. Support for redistribution captures the
extent to which respondents agree that the government should take measures
to reduce differences in income levels (1-disagree strongly, 5-agree strongly).
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Table A5 Effect of the tax day (whole sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Unfairness Income Support for
perception comparison redistribution
Treatment 2.538*** 0.004 0.043
(0.793) (0.235) (0.106)
Days -0.268*** -0.005 0.004
(0.092) (0.031) (0.014)
Treatment × Days 0.240** 0.009 -0.015
(0.104) (0.032) (0.016)
Survey-year FE - - ✓
Observations 247 231 3,789
R-squared 0.043 0.001 0.003
Survey years 2018 2006 2002-18
Note: Estimates are from OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Treatment coefficient captures the effect
of the tax day on the outcome. The sample is restricted to a 10-day window
around the tax day in a given year and the 3 days prior to the tax day are
excluded. Unfairness perception ranges from 1 to 9, with high values reflecting
perceptions that top 10% incomes are unfairly high. Income comparison
is a binary variable equal to one for respondents who report being most
likely to compare their income to “others”, and zero otherwise. Support
for redistribution captures the extent to which respondents agree that the
government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels
(1-disagree strongly, 5-agree strongly).
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Table A6 Effect of the tax day (whole sample, clustered standard errors)
(1) (2) (3)
Unfairness Income Support for
perception comparison redistribution
Treatment 2.538*** 0.004 0.043
(0.767) (0.250) (0.092)
Days -0.268*** -0.005 0.004
(0.085) (0.031) (0.011)
Treatment × Days 0.240** 0.009 -0.015
(0.090) (0.032) (0.013)
Survey-year FE - - ✓
Observations 247 231 3,789
R-squared 0.043 0.001 0.003
Survey years 2018 2006 2002-18
Note: Estimates are from OLS regressions with robust standard errors clus-
tered at the Days level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The
Treatment coefficient captures the effect of the tax day on the outcome. The
sample is restricted to a 10-day window around the tax day in a given year
and the 3 days prior to the tax day are excluded. Unfairness perception ranges
from 1 to 9, with high values reflecting perceptions that top 10% incomes
are unfairly high. Income comparison is a binary variable equal to one for
respondents who report being most likely to compare their income to “oth-
ers”, and zero otherwise. Support for redistribution captures the extent to
which respondents agree that the government should take measures to reduce
differences in income levels (1-disagree strongly, 5-agree strongly).
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Table A7 Effect of the tax day on income comparison (Logit)
(1) (2)





Treatment × Days 1.692* -0.293
(0.864) (0.319)
Observations 66 154
Survey years 2006 2006
Note: Estimates are from binary logistic regressions with standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Treatment coefficient
captures the effect of the tax day on the log-odds that respondents report being
most likely to compare their income to “others”. The sample is restricted
to a 10-day window around the tax day in a given year and the 3 days prior
to the tax day are excluded. Model 1 shows estimates for the less affluent
sub-sample (below-median income) and Model 2 shows estimates for the
affluent sub-sample (above-median income). Income comparison is a binary
variable equal to one for respondents who report being most likely to compare
their income to “others”, and zero otherwise.
Table A8 Effect of the tax day on support for redistribution by income decile
Income decile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
Treatment 0.165 0.056 0.657* -0.114 -0.155 0.405 -0.216 0.110 -0.275 -0.998**
(0.376) (0.440) (0.373) (0.339) (0.292) (0.284) (0.305) (0.337) (0.387) (0.435)
Days -0.035 0.049 -0.085 0.021 0.016 -0.049 0.037 -0.022 0.071 0.157***
(0.049) (0.060) (0.052) (0.045) (0.040) (0.038) (0.042) (0.044) (0.051) (0.057)
Treatment × Days 0.042 -0.095 0.050 -0.013 -0.013 0.042 -0.044 0.018 -0.094* -0.170***
(0.055) (0.066) (0.057) (0.050) (0.043) (0.042) (0.047) (0.048) (0.055) (0.063)
Survey-year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 302 276 321 329 371 442 404 382 359 314
R-squared 0.040 0.034 0.063 0.021 0.020 0.036 0.008 0.023 0.055 0.063
Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: Estimates are from OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The
Treatment coefficient captures the effect of the tax day on support for redistribution for each income decile. The sample is restricted to a 10-day
window around the tax day in a given year and the 3 days prior to the tax day are excluded. Support for redistribution captures the extent to which
respondents agree that the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels (1-disagree strongly, 5-agree strongly).
Table A9 Effect of the tax day on support for redistribution by income decile (clustered standard errors)
Income decile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
Treatment 0.165 0.056 0.657** -0.114 -0.155 0.405** -0.216 0.110 -0.275 -0.998***
(0.207) (0.348) (0.233) (0.224) (0.154) (0.173) (0.333) (0.217) (0.198) (0.239)
Days -0.035 0.049 -0.085** 0.021 0.016 -0.049** 0.037 -0.022 0.071** 0.157***
(0.024) (0.042) (0.030) (0.034) (0.022) (0.020) (0.038) (0.034) (0.031) (0.026)
Treatment × Days 0.042 -0.095* 0.050 -0.013 -0.013 0.042* -0.044 0.018 -0.094** -0.170***
(0.029) (0.049) (0.044) (0.039) (0.030) (0.022) (0.047) (0.042) (0.034) (0.031)
Survey-year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 302 276 321 329 371 442 404 382 359 314
R-squared 0.040 0.034 0.063 0.021 0.020 0.036 0.008 0.023 0.055 0.063
Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: Estimates are from OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the Days level in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Treatment coefficient captures the effect of the tax day on support for redistribution for each income decile. The
sample is restricted to a 10-day window around the tax day in a given year and the 3 days prior to the tax day are excluded. Support for redistribution
captures the extent to which respondents agree that the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels (1-disagree strongly,
5-agree strongly).
Table A10 Effect of the tax day on support for redistribution by age group
Age group (years) 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-100
Treatment 0.586** 0.038 -0.272 -0.046 0.162 -0.155 -0.301
(0.237) (0.265) (0.288) (0.270) (0.259) (0.280) (0.428)
Days -0.055* 0.038 0.047 0.020 -0.046 0.037 0.031
(0.032) (0.036) (0.039) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.057)
Treatment × Days 0.027 -0.087** -0.063 -0.018 0.072* -0.047 -0.038
(0.035) (0.040) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.063)
Survey-year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 530 544 590 625 698 495 307
R-squared 0.024 0.024 0.014 0.012 0.035 0.016 0.019
Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: Estimates are from OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Treatment coefficient captures the effect of the tax day on support for redistribution for each age group.
The sample is restricted to a 10-day window around the tax day in a given year and the 3 days prior to the tax day are excluded.
Support for redistribution captures the extent to which respondents agree that the government should take measures to reduce
differences in income levels (1-disagree strongly, 5-agree strongly).
Table A11 Effect of the tax day on support for redistribution by age group (clustered standard errors)
Age group (years) 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-100
Treatment 0.586** 0.038 -0.272* -0.046 0.162 -0.155 -0.301
(0.247) (0.219) (0.134) (0.265) (0.165) (0.228) (0.356)
Days -0.055* 0.038 0.047** 0.020 -0.046 0.037 0.031
(0.028) (0.035) (0.020) (0.037) (0.029) (0.033) (0.048)
Treatment × Days 0.027 -0.087** -0.063** -0.018 0.072** -0.047 -0.038
(0.031) (0.039) (0.022) (0.041) (0.031) (0.034) (0.052)
Survey-year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 530 544 590 625 698 495 307
R-squared 0.024 0.024 0.014 0.012 0.035 0.016 0.019
Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: Estimates are from OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the Days level
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Treatment coefficient captures the effect of the tax day on support for
redistribution for each age group. The sample is restricted to a 10-day window around the tax day in a given year and the 3 days
prior to the tax day are excluded. Support for redistribution captures the extent to which respondents agree that the government
should take measures to reduce differences in income levels (1-disagree strongly, 5-agree strongly).
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Table A12 Effect of the tax day on alternative measures of support for redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Support for Support for Pref. for Support for
unemployed childcare econ. equality safety net
Below-median income
Treatment -0.105 -0.192 -0.812 1.223
(0.648) (0.669) (1.147) (0.787)
Days -0.006 0.017 0.174 -0.134
(0.102) (0.105) (0.134) (0.092)
Treatment × Days 0.006 -0.003 -0.207 0.115
(0.106) (0.109) (0.145) (0.099)
Survey-year FE ✓ ✓
Observations 426 422 97 97
R-squared 0.018 0.030 0.061 0.025
Above-median income
Treatment 0.503 0.333 1.298* -0.149
(0.460) (0.463) (0.662) (0.528)
Days -0.089 -0.072 -0.129* 0.031
(0.070) (0.070) (0.076) (0.061)
Treatment × Days 0.084 0.054 0.051 -0.034
(0.074) (0.074) (0.089) (0.071)
Survey-year FE ✓ ✓
Observations 574 570 158 158
R-squared 0.003 0.011 0.036 0.004
Data: ESS Finland 2008, 2016, 2018. Note: Estimates are from OLS re-
gressions with standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. The Treatment coefficient captures the effect of the tax day on the
outcome. The sample is restricted to a 10-day window around the tax day in
a given year and the 3 days prior to the tax day are excluded. The top panel
shows estimates for the less affluent sub-sample (below-median income) and
the bottom panel shows estimates for the affluent sub-sample (above-median
income). Support for unemployment benefits captures the extent to which
respondents think that it should be governments’ responsibility to ensure a
reasonable standard of living for the unemployed (1-not at all, 11-entirely).
Support for public childcare captures the extent to which respondents think
that it should be governments’ responsibility to ensure sufficient child care ser-
vices for working parents (1-not at all, 11-entirely). Preference for economic
equality captures how much respondents agree or disagree with the statement
that a society is fair when income and wealth are equally distributed among
all people (1-disagree strongly, 5-agree strongly). Support for social safety net
captures how much respondents agree or disagree with the statement that a
society is fair when it takes care of those who are poor and in need regardless
of what they give back to society (1-disagree strongly, 5-agree strongly).
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C Robustness checks
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax day
(the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ support for redistribution
by income decile. Estimates are from our baseline model with 10-day bandwidths and
day-of-the-week fixed effects, fitted separately on each income decile. Vertical lines
represent 95% confidence intervals. Support for redistribution measures the extent to
which respondents agree that the government should take measures to reduce differences
in income levels, ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly).
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax day
(the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on support for redistribution in the top income
decile for varying bandwidths (days) around the tax day. Support for redistribution
measures to extent to which respondents agree that the government should take measures
the reduce differences in income levels, ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree
strongly). The red vertical line marks the default bandwidth of 10 days around the tax
day.
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Fig. A10 Effect of the tax day on support for redistribution amongst the top income decile
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: Point estimates (with 95% confidence intervals) show
the effect of the tax day on support for redistribution depending on how many days prior
to the event are excluded from the analysis. The default is 3 days and highlighted in red.
Estimates are based on OLS with survey-year fixed effects. The sample is restricted to
the top income decile and a 10-day window around the tax day in a given year. Support
for redistribution captures the extent to which respondents agree that the government
should take measures to reduce differences in income levels (1-disagree strongly, 5-agree
strongly).
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax day
(the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ support for redistribution
by age group, using 9-year bins. Estimates are from our baseline model with 10-day
bandwidths and day-of-the-week fixed effects, fitted separately on each age group. Ver-
tical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Support for redistribution measures the
extent to which respondents agree that the government should take measures to reduce
differences in income levels, ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly).
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax day
(the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on support for redistribution in the youngest
age group (15-24 years) for varying bandwidths (days) around the tax day. Support for
redistribution measures the extent to which respondents agree that the government should
take measures to reduce differences in income levels, ranging from 1 (disagree strongly)
to 5 (agree strongly). The red vertical line marks the default bandwidth of 10 days around
the tax day.
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Fig. A13 Effect of the tax day on support for redistribution amongst the youngest age group
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: Point estimates (with 95% confidence intervals) show
the effect of the tax day on support for redistribution depending on how many days prior
to the event are excluded from the analysis. The default is 3 days and highlighted in
red. Estimates are based on OLS with survey-year fixed effects. The sample is restricted
to the youngest age group (15-25 years) and a 10-day window around the tax day in a
given year. Support for redistribution captures the extent to which respondents agree that
the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels (1-disagree
strongly, 5-agree strongly).
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax day
(the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ support for redistribution
by age group, controlling for respondents’ household income rank (in deciles). Vertical
lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are from our baseline model with
10-day bandwidths, fitted separately on each age group. The three days prior to the tax
day are excluded from the analysis. Support for redistribution measures the extent to
which respondents agree that the government should take measures to reduce differences
in income levels, ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly).
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Age groups (in years)
Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax day
(the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ support for redistribution by
age group, using 4-year bins. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Estimates
are from our baseline model with 10-day bandwidths, fitted separately on each age
group. The three days prior to the tax day are excluded from the analysis. Support for
redistribution measures the extent to which respondents agree that the government should
take measures to reduce differences in income levels, ranging from 1 (disagree strongly)
to 5 (agree strongly).
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D Supplementary material on mechanisms
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Above-median income
Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: Point estimates show the effect
of the tax day on support for redistribution, estimated separately
for each available survey year using OLS. Vertical lines represent
95% (thick) and 99% (thin) confidence intervals. The sample is
restricted to a 10-day window around the tax day in a given year and
the 3 days prior to the tax day are excluded. The top panel shows
estimates for below-median income earners and the bottom panel
shows estimates for the above-median income earners. Support
for redistribution captures the extent to which respondents agree
that the government should take measures to reduce differences in
income levels (1-disagree strongly, 5-agree strongly).
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax day
(the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ perceived income adequacy
by income decile. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are from
our baseline model with 10-day bandwidths, fitted separately on each income decile.
The three days prior to the tax day are excluded from the analysis. Perceived income
adequacy captures how respondents feel about their household’s income nowadays, with
response options ranging from 1 (finding it very difficult) to 4 (living comfortably).
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax day
(the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ support for redistribution for
varying bandwidths (days) around the tax day. Support for redistribution measures the
extent to which respondents agree that the government should take measures to reduce
differences in income levels, ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly). The
results are presented separately for partisans (top panel) and non-partisans (bottom panel).
Partisanship is measured the with the following item: “Is there a particular political
party you feel closer to than all the other parties?” (Yes = 1; No = 0). The red vertical
line marks the default bandwidth of 10 days around the tax day. All models control for
individuals’ household income rank (in deciles).
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax day
(the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ support for redistribution for
varying bandwidths (days) around the tax day. Support for redistribution measures the
extent to which respondents agree that the government should take measures to reduce
differences in income levels, ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly).
The results are presented separately for left-wing (top panel) and right-wing respondents
(bottom panel). A respondent is left-wing if she scored 4 or lower on a 0-10 left-right
self-placement scale, and right-wing if she score 6 or higher. The red vertical line marks
the default bandwidth of 10 days around the tax day. All models control for individuals’
household income rank (in deciles).
72 Does income transparency affect support for redistribution?





























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Income decile
Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax day
(the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ support for taxing top-earners
more by income decile. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are
from an OLS model with 10-day bandwidths, fitted separately on each income decile.
The three days prior to the tax day are excluded from the analysis. To increase precision
of the estimates, we include controls for age, gender, education, and labour market
status (in paid job, unemployed, student, retired, doing housework). Support for taxing
high-earners more is a binary variable which records whether respondents agree that
“higher earners should pay a higher share (a higher %) of their earnings in taxes”.
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax day
(the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ perception that being rich is
important by income decile. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Estimates
are from an OLS model with 10-day bandwidths, fitted separately on each income decile.
The three days prior to the tax day are excluded from the analysis. To increase precision
of the estimates, we include controls for age, gender, education, and labour market status
(in paid job, unemployed, student, retired, doing housework). Perceived importance of
being rich measures how much respondents’ think they are like a person who values
being rich, having money and expensive things. Response options range from 1 (very
much like me) to 6 (not at all like me).
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax
day (the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ belief that inequality is
unjustified by income decile. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Estimates
are from an OLS model with 10-day bandwidths, fitted separately on each income decile.
The three days prior to the tax day are excluded from the analysis. To increase precision
of the estimates, we include controls for age, gender, education, and labour market status
(in paid job, unemployed, student, retired, doing housework). Belief that inequality is
unjustified measures respondents’ support for the statement that “large differences in
people’s incomes are acceptable to properly reward differences in talents and efforts.”
Response options range from 1 (agree strongly) to 8 (disagree strongly) so that higher
values reflect more left-wing beliefs.
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Data: ESS Finland 2018. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax day
(the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ support for redistribution for
varying bandwidths (days) around the tax day. Support for redistribution measures the
extent to which respondents agree that the government should take measures to reduce
differences in income levels, ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly). The
results are presented separately for respondents with high media exposure (>60 minutes
per day) and low media exposure (<60 minutes per day). Media exposure refers to how
much time respondents spend on a typical day watching, reading or listening to news
about politics and current affairs (in minutes). The red vertical line marks the default
bandwidth of 10 days around the tax day.
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E Placebo tests
We conduct several placebo tests to assess the plausibility of the excludability assumption
(see Muñoz et al. 2020). First, we show that the tax day has no significant effects on a
placebo outcome (attitudes towards gays and lesbians) that is conceptually close to our main
outcome of interest, but should in theory remain unaffected by the event.42 We find null
effects regardless of whether we disaggregate the analysis by income decile (Figure A24)
or age group (Figure A25). Second, to rule out that global shocks or time trends are behind
our findings, we run the main analysis on ESS respondents from Sweden, who should in
theory remain unaffected by the tax day. Reassuringly, we find null effects regardless of
whether we disaggregate the analysis by income decile (Figure A26) or age group (Figure
A27). Finally, to check for problematic time trends, we split the control group sub-sample
(who were interviewed before the tax day) at its empirical mean (23 days before the tax day)
and test for the absence of a placebo effect at that point (see Muñoz et al. 2020). Again, we
find null effects regardless of whether we disaggregate the analysis by income decile (Figure
A28) or age group (Figure A29).
42Support for redistribution reflects the classical left-right dimension in politics, whilst attitudes towards
gays and lesbians taps into the “second” dimension of socio-cultural politics.
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax day
(the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ attitude towards gays and
lesbians by income decile. Vertical lines represent 95% (thick) and 99% (thin) confidence
intervals. Estimates are from an OLS model with 10-day bandwidths, fitted separately on
each income decile. The three days prior to the tax day are excluded from the analysis.
Attitude towards gays and lesbians measures respondents’ agreement with the statement
that “gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish”. Response
options range from 1 (Disagree strongly) to 5 (Agree strongly).
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax day
(the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ attitude towards gays and
lesbians by age group. Vertical lines represent 95% (thick) and 99% (thin) confidence
intervals. Estimates are from an OLS model with 10-day bandwidths, fitted separately
on each age group. The three days prior to the tax day are excluded from the analysis.
Attitude towards gays and lesbians measures respondents’ agreement with the statement
that “gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish”. Response
options range from 1 (Disagree strongly) to 5 (Agree strongly).
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Fig. A26 Placebo test - Effect of the tax day on support for redistribution amongst Swedish
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Data: ESS Sweden 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax
day (the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on Swedish respondents’ support for
redistribution by income decile. Vertical lines represent 95% (thick) and 99% (thin)
confidence intervals. Estimates are from our baseline model with 10-day bandwidths,
fitted separately on each income decile. The three days prior to the tax day are excluded
from the analysis. Support for redistribution measures the extent to which respondents
agree that the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels,
ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly).
80 Does income transparency affect support for redistribution?
Fig. A27 Placebo test - Effect of the tax day on support for redistribution amongst Swedish
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Data: ESS Sweden 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of the tax
day (the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on Swedish respondents’ support for
redistribution by age group. Vertical lines represent 95% (thick) and 99% (thin) confi-
dence intervals. Estimates are from our baseline model with 10-day bandwidths, fitted
separately on each age group. The three days prior to the tax day are excluded from the
analysis. Support for redistribution measures the extent to which respondents agree that
the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels, ranging
from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly).
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of a fake tax day
(the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ support for redistribution by
income decile. Vertical lines represent 95% (thick) and 99% (thin) confidence intervals.
The fake tax day is located at the empirical mean (23 days before the tax day) of the
control group (who were interviewed before the tax day). The sample is restricted to
respondents in the control group. Estimates are from our baseline model with 10-day
bandwidths, fitted separately on each income decile. The three days prior to the fake tax
day are excluded from the analysis. Support for redistribution measures the extent to
which respondents agree that the government should take measures to reduce differences
in income levels, ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly).
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Data: ESS Finland 2002-18. Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of a fake tax
day (the coefficient on the Treatment indicator) on respondents’ support for redistribution
by age group. Vertical lines represent 95% (thick) and 99% (thin) confidence intervals.
The fake tax day is located at the empirical mean (23 days before the tax day) of the
control group (who were interviewed before the tax day). The sample is restricted to
respondents in the control group. Estimates are from our baseline model with 10-day
bandwidths, fitted separately on each age group. The three days prior to the fake tax day
are excluded from the analysis. Support for redistribution measures the extent to which
respondents agree that the government should take measures to reduce differences in
income levels, ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly).
Chapter 3
Does enfranchisement improve citizens’
political maturity? Evidence from voting
at 16 in Germany
Abstract: Historically, women, racial minorities, and the working class were excluded from
voting on the basis of their supposedly insufficient political maturity. The same argument
is currently used by opponents of enfranchising 16-year-olds. An implicit assumption
underlying this argument is that citizens acquire political maturity independently of whether
or not they have the right to vote. I examine whether enfranchisement affects citizens’
political maturity by leveraging a quasi-experiment in Germany, where states enfranchised
16-year-olds at different times, starting in 1996. The results show that enfranchising 16-year-
olds can equalise prior differences in political maturity between underage and adult youth –
measured by their political interest, efficacy, willingness to vote, and attitudinal consistency.
This effect appears to be driven by an increase in demand for political information amongst
the newly enfranchised. The findings make it more difficult to argue against enfranchising 16-
year-olds on the basis of their supposedly insufficient political maturity, as political maturity
itself appears to be affected by the right to vote.
Keywords: Enfranchisement, voting at 16, young people, political maturity
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3.1 Introduction
Historically, one of the main arguments used to justify the exclusion of women, racial
minorities, and the working class from the franchise was that these groups are not politically
mature enough to vote – that they lack political interest and knowledge, or have inconsistent
political attitudes (Corder and Wolbrecht, 2006; Keyssar, 2009; Mill, 1861; Valelly, 2009).1
Nowadays, the same argument is used in the debate over lowering the voting age to 16,
which is on-going in many Western democracies (Eichhorn and Bergh, 2020).2 In striking
parallels to the historical debates, critics of voting at 16 worry that franchise extension could
reduce overall turnout by adding to the electorate a group of voters with a low propensity to
vote (Commission, 2004; McAllister, 2014). Furthermore, critics worry that 16-17 year-olds
would make less informed vote choices than adult citizens (Chan and Clayton, 2006).3 An
implicit assumption underlying these arguments is that citizens acquire political maturity
independently of whether or not they have the right to vote. However, recent research
suggests that voting or being entitled to vote can influence citizens’ downstream attitudes and
behaviours (Braconnier et al., 2017; Ferwerda et al., 2020; Mullainathan and Washington,
2006; Shineman, 2016), so citizens’ political maturity may also be a function of their right
to vote. This raises the question whether enfranchisement can improve citizens’ political
maturity.
I address this question by studying a quasi-experiment in Germany, where several states
enfranchised 16-17 year-olds (“underage youth”) in municipal and state elections at different
times over the past decades. The empirical strategy relies on nationally representative survey
data and a triple-difference approach, where already enfranchised 19-20 year-olds (“adult
youth”) and states that did not introduce voting at 16 are used as control groups. The results
provide evidence that enfranchisement can equalise prior maturity differences between
underage and adult youth – measured by their interest in politics, internal and external
efficacy, willingness to vote, and attitudinal consistency.4 While disenfranchised 16-17 year-
olds are on average less interested in politics than adult youth, these differences are reduced
by more than one third when voting at 16 is implemented. Even stronger equalising effects
are observed for willingness to vote and internal efficacy, where prior differences between
1Political maturity is the term most frequently used by critics of franchise extension. Alternatives are voter
preparedness and political capacity (Lau, 2012)
2In the US, several municipalities already allow 16-year-olds to vote. Voting at 16 has also been implemented
in Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Ecuador, Malta, and Nicaragua at the national level, and Estonia, Germany,
Norway and the UK at the sub-national level.
3A related concern is that 16-17 year-olds are more supportive of anti-establishment parties than adults
(Bronner and Ifkovits, 2019).
4Other measures such as political knowledge are unfortunately not available.
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underage and adult youth largely disappear when voting at 16 is implemented. Voting at 16
also appears to have equalising effects on external efficacy, but the results are less robust.
Finally, I find no significant difference in attitudinal consistency between disenfranchised
16-17 year-olds and adult youth, and the introduction of voting at 16 does not change this.
Exploring potential mechanisms, I find that an increase in demand for political infor-
mation amongst the newly enfranchised may explain why voting at 16 equalises maturity
differences between underage and adult youth. I also show that this demand effect applies
primarily to the first cohort of enfranchised 16-17 year-olds, which indicates that political
education initiatives implemented alongside the reform are crucial for ensuring that enfran-
chisement results in improved outcomes. Overall, the findings offer an important rebuttal
to the critics of voting at 16 – albeit with a caveat. On the one hand, they cast doubts on
the implicit assumption behind the critics’ argument, which is that citizens acquire political
maturity independently of whether or not they can vote. On the other hand, the results suggest
that enfranchisement alone is unlikely to lead to improved outcomes, as education initiatives
implemented alongside the reform may be crucial for enabling 16-17 year-olds to catch up
with their slightly older peers.
3.2 Related literature
The main contribution of this paper is to provide causal evidence showing that enfranchise-
ment can equalise maturity differences between 16-17 year-olds and adult youth. Previous
studies on voting at 16 have attempted to show that 16-17 are (not) politically mature enough
to vote by employing data on disenfranchised 16-17 year-olds (Chan and Clayton, 2006;
Mahéo and Bélanger, 2020; Stiers, Hooghe and Goubin, 2020) or extrapolating from data on
enfranchised adults (McAllister, 2014). However, these studies have failed to address the
relevant counterfactual, which is how politically mature 16-17 year-olds would be if they
had the right to vote. Recent studies from Scotland, Austria, and Norway – where voting
at 16 has already been implemented – are in a better position to address this (Bergh, 2013;
Eichhorn, 2017; Wagner et al., 2012; Zeglovits, 2013). However, the results have so far
been inconclusive and credible causal conclusions have not been possible, as these studies
primarily rely on simple cross-sectional or before-and-after research designs.
Eichhorn (2017) uses UK-wide survey data from 2015 to argue that the enfranchisement
of 16-17 year-olds in the 2014 Scottish independence referendum improved their political
maturity in comparison to the same age group in the rest of the UK. Unfortunately, there
are no pre-referendum baseline data, so the observed post-referendum differences cannot
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be attributed to enfranchisement. Besides Eichhorn’s 2017 study of the 2014 Scottish
independence referendum, recent research on voting at 16 has focused on the cases of Austria
and Norway. Zeglovits and Zandonella (2013) use survey data from Austria to argue that
enfranchisement increased the political interest of 16-17 year-olds. However, the study
compares 16-17 year-olds before and after the 2007 voting age reform, which makes it
difficult to attribute the observed difference in political interest to enfranchisement, as cohort
differences might explain some of the variation. Wagner et al. (2012) also use survey data
from Austria to show that there are no significant differences in political interest and quality
of vote choice between enfranchised 16-17 year-olds and older age groups. However, they
cannot assess whether this is the result of enfranchisement, as they do not have pre-reform
baseline data. Furthermore, their null results may be due to the small sample size (n = 263
for 16-25 year-olds). Bergh (2013) uses data from the 2011 Norwegian voting age trial and
finds no evidence that enfranchising 16-year olds improves their political knowledge, interest
or efficacy. However, Norwegian municipalities needed to apply to participate in the trial,
and only 20 were selected by the government – in part because they pursued active youth
policies – so the results may suffer from selection bias.
Finally, Stiers, Hooghe and Goubin (2020) employ a regression discontinuity design and
survey data collected in the wake of a ‘mock’ election organised for 16-17 year-olds in the
Belgian city of Ghent. The authors find that ‘mock’ enfranchisement of 16-17 year-olds has
zero effects on several measures of political engagement (reported frequency of political
discussions, political knowledge, internal and external efficacy, and political trust), but a
small positive effect on reported attention to politics. However, it remains unclear whether the
null results are simply due to the fact that this was a ‘mock’ election and most 16-17 year-old
respondents knew that their votes would not count. Furthermore, it is possible that the null
findings are driven by the relatively small sample size (n = 2360; the effective number of
observations used around the RD cut-off is not reported) or the non-representative nature of
the sample, which is presumably mostly composed of adolescents who are already politically
engaged (Stiers, Hooghe and Goubin, 2020).5 Whether enfranchising 16-17 year-olds affects
their political maturity thus remains a relatively open question in the literature on voting at
16.
A second contribution of the paper relates to the on-going debate over the transformative
potential of voting. While several studies find that voting can affect second-order outcomes
such as political interest, knowledge, polarisation and party identification (Braconnier et al.,
5The survey response rate was only 21.62 percent. The study used a type of snowball sampling procedure,
whereby the youngest sibling of an eligible family was asked to pass the survey questionnaires to any older
siblings.
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2017; Bronner and Ifkovits, 2019; Ferwerda et al., 2020; Shineman, 2016), others find no
evidence for the transformative voting hypothesis (De Leon and Rizzi, 2014; Holbein and
Rangel, 2020; Holbein et al., 2020; Rosenqvist, 2017). Importantly, previous studies have
relied on small-n field experiments (Braconnier et al., 2017; Loewen et al., 2008; Shineman,
2016) and regression discontinuity designs that focus on narrow sub-samples of respondents
around the voting-age threshold (De Leon and Rizzi, 2014; Holbein et al., 2020; Rosenqvist,
2017). This paper provides novel evidence in support of the transformative voting hypothesis
in the context of a large-scale voting age reform.
3.3 Voting at 16 in Germany
Several German states introduced voting at 16 for municipal and state elections at different
times, starting in 1996. This quasi-experiment can be leveraged to isolate the causal effect
of enfranchising 16-year-olds. Figure 1 provides an overview of the introduction of voting
at 16 (see Appendix A for a timeline). The national voting age remains 18 years. State
and municipal elections take place every five years, although not necessarily at the same
time.6 Electoral systems differ between states, but most states use a personalised closed-list
proportional representation system (“personalisierte Verhältniswahl”) for state elections7 and
an open-list proportional representation system for municipal elections. In state elections,
parties need to garner at least 5% of votes in order to obtain a seat. There is no equivalent
threshold in municipal elections. German citizens above the legal voting age are eligible
to vote in a state election if they have their primary residence in the state for at least three
months. In municipal elections, EU citizens also have the right to vote provided they have
their primary residence in the municipality for at least three months.8
6In Bremen elections take place every four years. Municipal elections often take place
at the same time as EU elections. All dates for previous state elections are available at:
https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/service/landtagswahlen.html. Dates for previous municipal elections
are found on the websites of the Returning Officer of each state (Landeswahlleiter). Available at:
http://www.wahlrecht.de/links.htmwl.
7As for national elections, citizens cast two votes: The first vote (Erststimme) is for a direct candidate, who is
elected by a simple plurality, and the second vote (Zweitstimme) is for a party list, which determines the final dis-
tribution of seats in the legislature. For an overview (in German) see https://www.bpb.de/politik/wahlen/wahlen-
in-deutschland/335656/wahlsysteme
8For details on state election laws see https://www.wahlrecht.de/landtage/. For details on municipal election
laws see http://www.wahlrecht.de/kommunal/.
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Voter registration in Germany is automatic and turnout is typically between 55-75% in
state elections and between 40-60% in municipal elections.9 Reliable turnout data for 16-17
year-olds are difficult to obtain as German law prohibits the distribution of electoral data at
low levels of aggregation.10 However, evidence from Brandenburg, Bremen and Hamburg
suggests that turnout amongst enfranchised 16-17 year-olds is typically higher than amongst
slightly older adult youth and very similar to overall turnout rates. As of 2019, there were
around 1.4 million German citizens aged 16-17 years, and if enfranchised, they would make
up around 2.3% of the electorate of 61.7 million. Around 80% of 16-17 year-olds still go to
school and 10% are trainees (Vehrkamp et al., 2015).
Why did some states introduce voting at 16 whilst others did not? Available evidence
suggests that constitutional constraints and party politics played a key role. In 11 states,
the voting age for state elections has constitutional status, so it can only be changed by a
two-thirds majority in the state legislature or a referendum (Leininger and Faas, 2020). Only
in Hessen, Hamburg, Bremen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and Schleswig-Holstein can the
voting age for state elections be changed with a simple majority – which was done in the
latter four cases. The voting age for municipal elections typically does not have constitutional
status and can be changed by a simple majority. With the exceptions of Brandenburg, Berlin
and Thüringen, voting at 16 has only been implemented in states and for elections where
the voting age could be changed with a simple majority (Leininger and Faas, 2020). Past
legislative initiatives to lower the voting age also reveal a clear left-right divide on the issue,
with Die Grünen and Die Linke supporting reform, SPD and FDP taking ambivalent positions,
and CDU/CSU and AfD opposing reform. Consequently, voting at 16 has primarily been
implemented in states that were governed by left-wing coalitions (Leininger and Faas, 2020).
3.4 Data and methods
The main data source is the Jugendsurvey (JS) and its successor Aufwachsen in Deutschland:
Alltagswelten (AIDA).11 Both are nationally representative, repeated cross-sections that track
the social and political development of young people in Germany. The JS was implemented
via face-to-face interviews in 1992, 1997 and 2003, with each wave reaching approximately
9Turnout data for state elections are available at: https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/service/landtagswahlen.html.
Turnout data for municipal elections are found on the website of the Landeswahlleiter of each state
(http://www.wahlrecht.de/links.htmwl).
10Articles 1-8 WStatG, see https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/service/glossar/w/wahlstatistik.html
11The JS and AIDA are implemented by the German Youth Institute, which is funded by the German Federal
Government (https://www.dji.de/)
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Note: Years refer to the first election year with voting at 16. If a state introduced voting
at 16 for municipal and state elections at different times, the first election with voting at
16 is used.
seven thousand respondents aged 16-29. AIDA was implemented via telephone and face-to-
face interviews in 2009 and 2013-15, reaching 7.4 and nine thousand respondents aged 16-29
respectively.12 As a robustness check, I also use data on political interest from the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) (see Appendix F). For the main analysis, only respondents
aged 16-17 (underage youth) and 19-20 (adult youth) are retained, and non-Germans are
excluded.
12Response rates: wave 1 (65%), wave 2 (59.6%), wave 3 (48.6%), wave 4 (50.3%, 0-24 year-olds, 32.8%
25-32 year-olds), wave 5 (44.8%, U33 panel).
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The key explanatory variable is an indicator equal to one for respondents in states and
survey years where voting at 16 has been implemented.13 I employ five different measures
of political maturity, all of which have been used in previous studies on voting at 16 (see
Appendix B). Respondents’ interest in politics, external efficacy (the belief that government
will respond to one’s demands), internal efficacy (the belief that one can understand politics
and therefore participate), willingness to vote in a hypothetical election,14 and attitudinal
consistency (on gender equality). The variables are described in detail in Appendix C. Table
3.1 presents descriptive statistics.
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics
Dataset Years Obs. Mean SD Min Max Var type
Interest in politics JS/AIDA 1992-2015 11815 2.78 1.00 1.00 5.00 Ordinal
External efficacy JS 1992-2003 6976 0.00 1.00 -1.81 3.51 Cont.
Internal efficacy JS 1992-2003 6976 0.00 1.00 -2.99 3.76 Cont.
Willingness to vote JS 1992-2003 6990 0.88 0.33 0.00 1.00 Binary
Attitud. consistency JS/AIDA 1992-2009 9400 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 Binary
Note: German respondents aged 16-17 and 19-20 years. Efficacy scores are standardised and obtained using
PCA on the following items: (a) I don’t think that politicians worry too much about what people like me
think; (b) I understand a lot about politics; (c) People like me have no influence one way or the other on what
the government does; (d) Politicians are only interested in getting elected and not in what the voters really
want; (e) Sometimes I think politics is so complicated that a normal person can hardly understand it; (f) In
our society there are only a few powerful people; everyone else has no influence on what the government
does. Responses to the efficacy items are measured on a 6-point agree-disagree scale.
To isolate the causal effect of voting at 16, I employ a triple-difference approach, us-
ing underage youth (16-17 years) in reforming states as the treatment group, and already
enfranchised adult youth (19-20 years) and states that did not introduce voting at 16 as
control groups. Intuitively, the staggered introduction of voting at 16 lends itself to a
difference-in-differences (DID) analysis, where state-level fixed effects account for unob-
served time-invariant characteristics of states and year fixed effects account for unobserved
time trends shared across states. However, time-varying state-level confounders are prob-
lematic in the DID design, as they violate the parallel trends assumption (Wing, Simon, and
Bello-Gomez 2018). In Appendix G, I show that the parallel trends assumption would likely
be violated in the simple DID design.
In our setting, one potential time-varying state-level confounder is the political party in
control of the state legislature. Given that school curricula and public education spending
13If a state introduced voting at 16 for municipal and state elections, the first election with voting at 16 is
used.
14This is a more suitable measure than turnout in real elections, given that some respondents aged 16-17
cannot vote
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are determined at the state-level, there is a concern that both the voting age reforms as well
as the political maturity of young people are co-determined by the party in power. Another
concern is that political mobilisation for voting age reforms differs across states and time,
which could affect both the likelihood of reform and young people’s political maturity. To
address these concerns, I use an additional within-state control group (19-20 year-olds) that
is not affected by the reform but is plausibly exposed to the same problematic confounders
(Muralidharan and Prakash, 2017). 18-year-olds are excluded to make sure that the older
control group does not include any “treated” individuals. This is a concern because 18-year-
olds typically attend the same class as 17-year-olds (who are in the treatment group), and the
German voting age reforms were accompanied by school-based political education initiatives
targeting the newly enfranchised. 18-year-olds are therefore likely to have been exposed to
enfranchisement-related political education initiatives, either directly or indirectly through
discussions with classmates. I discuss this further in the Section 3.6 and present results with
18-year-olds in Appendix F. Several robustness checks support the identifying assumption of
parallel trends in this setup (Appendix F).
In the baseline specification, the effect of enfranchising 16-17-year-olds is estimated by
Yigst = γs +λt +δg +Dst +β (Dst ∗δg)+(γs ∗λt)+Xigst + εigst (3.1)
where Yigst is a measure of individuals’ political maturity, with higher values denoting
greater political maturity, γs is a state-level fixed effect, λt is a survey-year fixed effect, δg
is an indicator equal to one if the respondent is aged 16-17 years and zero if she is aged
19-20 years at the time of the survey interview, Dst is a treatment indicator equal to one for
respondents in states and survey years where voting at 16 has been implemented,15 γs ∗λt
accounts for unobserved state-year specific shocks, and Xigst is a vector of time-varying
state-level and individual-level controls (used in robustness checks). The quantity of interest
is β , which identifies the marginal effect of enfranchisement on the political maturity of
16-17 year-olds relative to 19-20 year-olds. I then further relax the model and estimate a
fully saturated triple-difference specification.
Yigst = γs +λt +δg +Dst +β (Dst ∗δg)+(γs ∗λt)+(γs ∗δg)+(λt ∗δg)+Xigst + εigst (3.2)
15This means that the treatment group includes 16-17 year-olds who could already participate in an election
and 16-17 year-olds who are enfranchised, but could not yet exercise their right to vote.
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Excluding the additional pair-wise interactions in the baseline specification is justified
for statistical as well as theoretical reasons. First, the inclusion of the additional pair-wise
interactions in Model 3.2 increases the standard error of β relative to Model 3.1, but in most
cases does not affect the size of the coefficient β (see Appendix H). This indicates that lack of
power is the main reason that results from Model 3.2 do not reach conventional significance
levels. Indeed, the low level of statistical power is a key limitation of the research design,
which relies on variation across only 16 states. Second, the exclusions can be theoretically
justified. Unobserved time trends that are common across all states (e.g. national political
campaigns) are unlikely to affect underage and adult youth differently, so the interaction
between λt and δg may not be necessary. Similarly, unobserved time-invariant characteristics
of states (e.g. Bavaria’s unique political culture) are unlikely to affect underage and adult
youth differently, so the interaction between γs and δg may also not be necessary. The
exclusions are supported by F-tests, which suggest that the additional pair-wise interactions
do not add explanatory power to the model (see Appendix H). All models are estimated using
OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the state-level.
3.5 Results
Figure 3.2 plots the average interest in politics amongst underage and adult youth for all
survey years before and after the voting age reform.16 The sample is restricted to states
that switched to voting at 16 and the data are arranged so that year zero refers to the first
survey year after reform. The reform coincides with an increase in political interest amongst
16-17 year-olds, both in absolute terms and relative to the older control age group. However,
differential trends prior to reform caution against a causal interpretation. To isolate the causal
effect of enfranchisement, I therefore include an additional control group: states that did not
implement voting at 16.17 Results from the triple-difference type analysis are summarised in
Table 3.2.
16Trend plots for other outcomes are in Appendix D.
17A trend plot for non-switching control states is in Appendix D.
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Fig. 3.2 Voting age reform coincides with a (relative and absolute) increase in political
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Note: The plot shows the average interest in politics amongst 16-17 year-olds (red dots)
and 19-20 year-olds (blue triangles) for all survey years before and after the voting age
reform (vertical dashed line). The sample is restricted to reforming states and the data
are arranged such that year zero refers to the first survey year after reform.
Table 3.2 Effect of enfranchisement on political maturity (control age-group 19-20 years)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome Pol. interest Ext. efficacy Int. efficacy Will. to vote Att. consist.
Dataset (JS/AIDA) (JS) (JS) (JS) (JS/AIDA)
Treated state (voting at 16) -0.292*** -0.185** -0.123*** 0.286*** 0.074***
(0.021) (0.064) (0.039) (0.008) (0.008)
Treated group (16-17 years) -0.228*** -0.120*** -0.234*** -0.091*** -0.014
(0.020) (0.033) (0.030) (0.009) (0.013)
Treated state * treated group 0.094** 0.142 0.159** 0.040** -0.012
(0.037) (0.108) (0.066) (0.014) (0.016)
Observations 11,815 6,976 6,976 6,990 9,400
Reduction diff. btw. groups 41% - 68% 44% -
Note: OLS with state-, year-, and state-year fixed effects. Coefficients are shown with cluster-robust standard
errors in parentheses. The independent variables are Treated state (1 if voting at 16 has been implemented, 0
otherwise) and Treated group (1 if respondent is aged 16-17, 0 otherwise). 19-20 year-olds are the control
age group. The last row displays the percentage reduction in the difference between underage and adult
youth attributable to voting at 16, using the estimated difference in control states as baseline. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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The results show that voting at 16 can equalise prior differences in political maturity
between underage and adult youth. The negative coefficient on Treated group (16-17 years)
in column 1 indicates that disenfranchised underage youth are, on average, less politically
interested than adult youth. However, the positive coefficients on the interaction suggest
that this difference is reduced significantly (by 41%) when 16-17 year-olds are enfranchised.
I find even stronger equalising effects for internal efficacy (column 3) and willingness to
vote (column 4). For internal efficacy, prior differences between underage and adult youth
disappear completely when voting at 16 is implemented (see Figure 3.3). Voting at 16 also
appears to equalise prior differences in external efficacy between age groups (column 2), but
the effect is not significant at conventional levels. Finally, I find no significant difference
in attitudinal consistency between disenfranchised 16-17 year-olds and enfranchised adult
youth, and voting at 16 does not appear to change this (column 5).















































States with voting at 18
States with voting at 16
Note: Predicted values from OLS with cluster-robust standard errors. Blue triangles refer
to the estimated difference in outcomes between 19-20 year-olds and 16-17 year-olds
in states where the latter are disenfranchised. Red dots refer to the estimated difference
in states with voting at 16. Vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals. Attitudinal
consistency is omitted given that there are no significant differences between age groups
at baseline.
A variety of robustness checks support the main findings. First, I use data on political
interest from a different data source - the SOEP - to replicate the main analysis. The results
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are very similar, with a reduction of prior differences between age groups of around one
third (Table B18 in Appendix F). Second, the results hold when using logistic regression
to predict binary and ordinal outcomes, and when using 21-22 year-olds as the control age
group (Tables B3-B6 in Appendix E). Third, the results are robust to including several
time-varying state-level and individual-level controls (Tables B8-B11 in Appendix F). Fourth,
I use an event study approach to assess parallel trends. The non-significant placebo treatment
effects for all survey years leading up to reform support the identification strategy (Figure
B5 in Appendix F). Fifth, the results are robust to including state-specific linear time trends
(Table B13 in Appendix F). Sixth, I conduct placebo tests by comparing age groups that
should theoretically remain unaffected by the voting age reform. The null findings support
the identification strategy (Table B14 in Appendix F). Seventh, I show that the sample
composition remains unaffected by reform – a crucial assumption when using repeated
cross-sections (Table B15 in Appendix F). Finally, I employ a wild bootstrap procedure to
obtain more accurate p-values. The bootstrap results support the main findings, although the
p-values tend to be more conservative (Table B16 in Appendix F).
3.6 Mechanisms
Why do we observe a reduction in political maturity differences between underage and adult
youth when voting at 16 is introduced? There are two complementary channels through
which this effect could operate. On the demand-side, newly enfranchised youth may actively
seek out political information in order to inform (or justify) their vote. On the supply-side,
political parties, civic groups, and schools may target newly enfranchised 16-17 year-olds
with political education initiatives – as was the case during the voting age reforms in Germany
(Vehrkamp et al., 2015), Austria (Zeglovits and Zandonella, 2013) and Scotland (Eichhorn,
2017). While the equalising effect of the demand-side mechanism should in theory affect
every cohort of enfranchised 16-17 year-olds, not just the first one, the supply-side effect
could be relatively short-lived if, for example, political education initiatives only target the
first cohort of newly enfranchised voters.
Table B7 in Appendix E shows that prior differences between underage and adult youth
in demand for political information from newspapers and television disappear when voting
at 16 is implemented (see Figure 3.4 for a summary).18 This indicates that the equalising
effect of voting at 16 on young people’s political maturity may operate through increasing
18Similarly, Leininger and Faas (2020) find that enfranchisement is associated with an increase in voting
advice application usage amongst 16-year-olds in Schleswig-Holstein.
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demand for political information amongst the newly enfranchised. However, I cannot rule out
that political maturity is the mediator and demand for political information is the outcome.
Furthermore, there is evidence that the demand effect may be externally induced by political
education initiatives implemented alongside the reforms, rather than by enfranchisement
alone. Using an event study approach, I show that the equalising effect of voting at 16 on
demand for political information is largely confined to the first cohort of newly enfranchised
voters, which points in the direction of the supply-side mechanism (see Figure B6 in Appendix
F). Finally, I find some evidence that voting at 16 reduces prior differences between underage
and adult youth in terms of how frequently they discuss politics at school or university, which
also points towards the supply-side mechanism (Table B7 in Appendix E).19
Fig. 3.4 Voting at 16 reduces differences in demand for political information between
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(Newspapers)
Demand for political information
(Television)
States with voting at 18
States with voting at 16
Note: Predicted values from OLS with state- and survey-year fixed effects. Blue triangles
refer to the estimated difference in outcomes between 19-20 year-olds and 16-17 year-
olds in states without voting at 16. Red dots refer to the estimated difference in states
with voting at 16. The outcomes are reported frequency of using newspapers/television
as a source of information about politics, ranging from ‘never’ (1) to ‘very often’ (4).
Vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals. Data: Waves 2-3.
19I cannot disentangle demand- and supply-side determinants of political discussions at school. However,
the important influence of schooling on young people’s political attitudes is well documented (Dassonneville
et al., 2012; Neundorf et al., 2016; Quintelier, 2010; Torney-Purta, 2002).
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3.7 Discussion
This paper leverages a quasi-experiment in Germany to provide causal evidence that voting at
16 can equalise political maturity differences between underage and adult youth. The findings
substantiate previous correlational evidence from Scotland and Austria (Eichhorn, 2017;
Wagner et al., 2012; Zeglovits and Zandonella, 2013) and contribute to the growing (quasi-)
experimental literature on transformative voting (Braconnier et al., 2017; Holbein et al., 2020;
Shineman, 2016). Evidence on potential mechanisms suggests that the equalising effect of
voting at 16 may operate through increasing demand for political information amongst the
newly enfranchised. However, the relatively short-lived nature of this demand effect indicates
that it may be induced by education initiatives implemented alongside the reform, rather than
by enfranchisement alone.
The findings have important implications for contemporary and historical franchise
debates, as they provide a rebuttal to the critics of franchise extension – albeit with a caveat.
On the one hand, they cast doubts on the implicit assumption behind the critics’ argument,
which is that citizens acquire political maturity independently of whether or not they can vote
(Chan and Clayton, 2006; Keyssar, 2009; McAllister, 2014). On the other hand, the results
also suggest that enfranchisement alone is unlikely to be sufficient for equalising maturity
differences between underage and adult youth, and that political education initiatives may
be crucial for ensuring that 16-year-olds can rise to the occasion. Further research will
be necessary to establish precisely under which conditions enfranchisement can improve
citizens’ political maturity.
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3.8 Appendix
A Timeline
Table B1 Timeline of voting age reform in Germany
State Date of first vote at 16
State elections
Bremen 22 May 2011
Brandenburg 14 Sep 2014
Hamburg 15 Feb 2015
Schleswig-Holstein 07 May 2017
Municipal elections
Niedersachsen 15 Sep 1996
Schleswig-Holstein 22 Mar 1998
Sachsen-Anhalt 13 Jun 1999
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 13 Jun 1999
Nordrhein-Westfalen 12 Sep 1999
Berlin (Bezirksversammlung) 17 Sep 2006
Bremen (Beirat) 13 May 2007
Brandenburg 25 May 2014
Hamburg (Bezirksversammlung) 25 May 2014
Baden-Württemberg 25 May 2014
Thüringen 26 May 2019
Note: In Bremen, state and municipal elections take place at the
same time using the same ballot paper, except for the local legisla-
ture of Bremerhaven, which is elected with a separate ballot paper
on the same day as the state elections. Hessen introduced voting at
16 for state elections in 1998 but rescinded the law in 1999.
B Measuring political maturity
There is no consensus in the literature on how to best measure citizens’ political maturity
and previous studies on voting at 16 have used several different measures to approximate the
concept. Here, I provide a brief overview of how previous studies have measured political
maturity. The list of studies on voting at 16 included is not meant to be exhaustive and is
based on an informal rather than a systematic literature review.
Interest in politics is perhaps one of the most frequently used proxy measure of political
maturity. Political interest is typically operationalised using a single survey item, which asks
respondents to indicate on a 4- or 5-point response scale how interested in politics they are
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generally speaking (Aichholzer and Kritzinger, 2020; Bergh, 2013; Chan and Clayton, 2006;
Eichhorn, 2014; Hart and Atkins, 2011; Leininger and Faas, 2020; Mahéo and Bélanger,
2020; McAllister, 2014; Stiers, Hooghe and Dassonneville, 2020; Wagner et al., 2012;
Zeglovits and Zandonella, 2013).
Internal efficacy refers to the belief that one can understand politics and therefore
participate in politics. This variable is either operationalised using a single survey item or a
battery of survey items, where a latent construct (internal efficacy) is extracted using factor
analysis or principal component analysis (Aichholzer and Kritzinger, 2020; Bergh, 2013;
Eichhorn, 2014; Hart and Atkins, 2011; Mahéo and Bélanger, 2020; Stiers, Hooghe and
Dassonneville, 2020).
External efficacy refers to the belief that government will respond to one’s demands. As
internal efficacy, this variable is either operationalised using a single survey item or several
survey items, where a latent construct (external efficacy) is extracted using factor analysis
or principal component analysis (Aichholzer and Kritzinger, 2020; Bergh, 2013; Eichhorn,
2014; Hart and Atkins, 2011; Stiers, Hooghe and Dassonneville, 2020).
Willingness to vote captures self-reported turnout intention and is often operationalised
by asking respondents how likely they would be to vote in an upcoming election or if an
election took place next week (Bronner and Ifkovits, 2019; Eichhorn, 2014, 2017; Mahéo
and Bélanger, 2020; McAllister, 2014; Wagner et al., 2012).
Non-electoral participation refers to a range of different proxy measures aimed at
capturing citizens’ civic engagement outside the voting booth. The measures range from
reported participation in demonstrations, petitions, boycotts, or writing to a member of
parliament (Eichhorn, 2017; Wagner et al., 2012), reported participation in referendums and
participatory budget consultations (Mahéo and Bélanger, 2020), to reported participation
in community service (Hart and Atkins, 2011) or high-school activities (Zeglovits and
Zandonella, 2013).
Attitudinal consistency captures the extent to which respondents hold internally consis-
tent attitudes in one or several political domains (issue areas). For example, a respondent
can be considered to hold inconsistent attitudes towards gender equality if she agrees that
men should be the main breadwinners and, at the same time, also agrees that there should be
many more women in political and public leadership roles. Previous studies on voting at 16
operationalise attitudinal consistency with reference to several issue areas, including trust in
government, women’s employment, immigration, and climate change (Bergh, 2013; Chan
and Clayton, 2006; Mahéo and Bélanger, 2020).
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Political knowledge is a widely used proxy measure of political maturity and captures
respondents’ objective knowledge about political facts. Previous studies operationalise
political knowledge by aggregating respondents’ correct answers to a battery of factual
knowledge questions (e.g. Margaret Thatcher was a Conservative prime minister. Correct or
incorrect?) (Chan and Clayton, 2006; Leininger and Faas, 2020; Mahéo and Bélanger, 2020;
McAllister and Studlar, 2002; Stiers, Hooghe and Dassonneville, 2020), using correct party
placement on a left-right ideological scale (Wagner et al., 2012; Zeglovits and Zandonella,
2013), or using high-school grades in social studies (Rosenqvist, 2017).
Congruence of political preferences and vote choice aims to capture how close a
respondents’ reported vote choice is to her ideological self-placement on a left-right scale.
This is either operationalised as the absolute distance between ideological self-placement
and preferred party’s placement (by experts) on 10-point scale (Wagner et al., 2012), or as
a binary indicator of “correct voting” if reported vote choice is the one that is closest to




Interest in politics is measured by the question ‘How strong is your interest in politics?’
with five possible answers ranging from ‘very strong’ to ‘not at all’. The official English
translation of this survey item is awkward. In German, the question is ‘Wie stark interessieren
Sie sich fur Politik?’ with answers ranging from ‘überhaupt nicht’ (1) to ‘sehr stark’ (5). The
survey item is available in both JS and AIDA (waves 1-5).
External and internal efficacy
To measure external and internal efficacy, two continuous latent variables are extracted from
respondents’ answers to a battery of six survey questions on political efficacy. External
efficacy refers to the belief that government will respond to one’s demands, whereas internal
efficacy refers to the belief that one can understand politics and therefore participate in
politics (Balch, 1974). The six survey items capturing respondents’ political efficacy were
taken from a larger battery included in the American National Election Studies (ANES)
and are available only in the JS (waves 1-3). Respondents were asked to agree or disagree
(on a 6-point scale) with each of the following statements: (a) I don’t think that politicians
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worry too much about what people like me think; (b) I understand a lot about politics; (c)
People like me have no influence one way or the other on what the government does; (d)
Politicians are only interested in getting elected and not in what the voters really want; (e)
Sometimes I think politics is so complicated that a normal person can hardly understand it;
(f) In our society there are only a few powerful people; everyone else has no influence on
what the government does. Note that item (b) is positively phrased, whilst all other items
are negatively phrased. All efficacy items are re-coded so that 1 = lowest efficacy and 6 =
highest efficacy.
To extract continuous latent variables from this battery of efficacy items, I use principal
component analysis (PCA) on the two sub-sample of respondents that are subsequently
used in the regression analysis (16-17 and 19-20 year-olds as well as 16-17 and 21-22
year-olds). The PCA results presented in Table B2 indicate that two principal components
(latent variables) capture 62% of the variance from the six efficacy items. Whilst the first two
components have an eigenvalue that is larger than 1, the third component has an eigenvalue
of 0.7 (so its variance is smaller than the variance of the original standardised item). This
suggest that only the first two components should be retained for analysis. The component
loadings (eigenvectors) reveal that items (a), (c), (d) and (f) contribute mostly to the first
component, whilst items (b) and (e) contribute to the second component. This suggests
that the first component captures respondents’ external efficacy and the second component
captures respondents’ internal efficacy. For subsequent regression analysis, the principle
component scores are standardised to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
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Table B2 Principal component analysis of six political efficacy items
Sample: 16-17 and 19-20 years (N=6,976)
Principal components (eigenvectors)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(a) .4563474 -.1774939 .3027249 .6971309 .1027648 .4147874
(b) .1371869 .7894974 .5661603 -.1415197 .1299322 -.0206358
(c) .463957 -.124789 .1839999 -.2490729 -.8169026 -.0771261
(d) .4840671 -.1927633 .0398601 .014327 .3809809 -.7626145
(e) .3172334 .5323316 -.7165133 .2829612 -.1452329 -.0378815
Items
(f) .4719245 -.0953037 -.1974436 -.5930186 .372811 .4884274
Sample: 16-17 and 21-22 years (N=6,782)
Principal components (eigenvectors)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(a) .4557548 -.1513113 .3713816 -.6608721 .2110673 .3875137
(b) .1272811 .7852305 .5319996 .2500836 .1469863 -.0065037
(c) .4677762 -.1040588 .1921949 .1720259 -.8385748 -.0248543
(d) .4840156 -.2169304 .0605567 .0803673 .3499696 -.765549
(e) .3202639 .5396529 -.6684594 -.3704737 -.1147149 -.0946441
Items
(f) .4695022 -.1067973 -.3026685 .572192 .3082204 .5041332
Note: In the first panel: Component (1) eigenvalue: 2.60302; Component (2) eigenvalue: 1.1601 Cumulative
explained variance of (1) and (2): 0.6225. In the second panel: Component (1) eigenvalue: 2.56952;
Component (2) eigenvalue: 1.13188. Cumulative explained variance of (1) and (2): 0.6216. The table
presents principal components (eigenvectors) from a PCA of the correlation matrix of the six efficacy items,
using two sub-samples from the JS 1992-2003 data. The first sample contains 16-17 and 19-20 year-olds and
the second sample contains 16-17 and 21-22 year-olds. The individual components are orthogonal to each
other. Grey shading is used to highlight how the first two components load on the six efficacy items.
Willingness to vote
Willingness to vote is a binary indicator of whether respondents report that they would vote in
a hypothetical election in order to exert political influence. The relevant survey prompt reads
as follows: Let’s assume you would like to exert political influence or make your viewpoint
known on a subject that is important to you. Which of the following possibilities would you
consider and which would you not? Relevant response item: (a) Vote at elections. Item is
only available in the JS data (waves 1-3).
Attitudinal consistency
Attitudinal consistency is measured using a binary variable, where 1 identifies respondents
with consistent attitudes and 0 identifies respondents with inconsistent attitudes. Respondents
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with consistent attitudes agree or disagree with all of three statements about the role of
women in society, whereas inconsistent respondents agree with some of the statements and
disagree with others. The survey prompt reads as follows: The following question deals with
the everyday situation of men and women. To what extent do you believe in these statements?
Number one (1) means you don’t agree at all and a number six (6) means you completely
agree. Use the numbers in between to approximate the level to which you agree.
1. Even if a woman works the man should be the main earner and the woman should be
responsible for the household.
2. There should be many more women in political and public leadership roles.
3. If a family has children, the man should work and the woman should stay at home and
care for the children.
Responses to item 2 are reverse-coded so that for all three items, higher scores mean
stronger anti-gender equality attitudes. PCA on the complete sample (16-29 year-olds,
waves 1-4) suggests the three items are good at capturing a single latent dimension of
respondents’ general attitude towards gender equality, with weak evidence for a second
dimension capturing attitude towards women in public positions. The first component
(general attitude towards gender equality) has an eigenvalue of 1.76 and explains 59% of
the variance from the three survey items. The second component (attitude towards women
in public positions) has a much smaller eigenvalue of 0.84 and only explains 28% of the
variance from the three survey items. The Cronbach’s alpha of 0.64 is adequate in light
of only three items and suggests that the items have relatively high internal consistency.
Responses above 3 are treated as agreement with the statement and responses below or equal
to 3 are treated as disagreement. Items are available in JS 1992-2003 and AIDA 2009 (waves
1-4).
Demand for political information from newspapers and television
Demand for political information from newspapers and television are measured by the
question ‘How often do you inform yourself about political topics from the following
sources?’ with ‘newspapers/magazines’ and ‘television’ as possible sources, and four possible
answer options for all sources ranging from 1 (never) to 4 (very often). Other possible sources
(not used in the analysis) are: books, radio, internet, conversations/discussions, and attending
a political event. The two items for newspaper and television consumption are available in
the JS data from 1997 and 2003 (waves 2-3).
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Frequency of political discussions at school/university
Frequency of political discussion at school (or university) is measured on a four-point scale
running from 1 (never) to 4 (very often) based on respondents answer to the following prompt:
‘Please think again about the people with whom you discuss political questions. How often
do you talk with the people, whom I’m about to mention, about politics? How often do
you talk... A) with your mother? B) with your father? C) with your partner or spouse? D)
with friends or acquaintances? E) with schoolmates or fellow university students? F) with
colleagues? G) with your siblings?’ Answers to option E) are used to measure the frequency
of political discussions at school (or university). The political discussion item is available in
the JS data (waves 1-3).
Controls
Data on time-varying state-level covariates come from various sources. Data on state-level
unemployment rates (years available: 1994-2018) and public education spending (years
available: 1995-2018) come from the German Federal Statistical Office.20 State-level
population data (years available: 1990-2015) come from the Quality of Government EU
Regional Database.21 Data on state-level voter turnout and vote share of the centre-right CDU
in the most recent general election (years available: 1990-2009) come from the European
Election and Referendum Database.22 Data on individual-level controls come from the JS
and AIDA surveys. Respondents’ gender is measured using a binary indicator equal to 1 for
female respondents and 0 for male respondents. The item is available in all survey waves.
The binary indicator of whether a respondent still lives with her parents at the time of the
survey is coded from two distinct items in the JS and AIDA surveys. In the JS, respondents
were asked: Do you live in your parent’s household all the time or most of the time? Birth
parents, adoptive parents, stepparents, foster parents and single parents are meant here!,
with the answer options being yes and no. In the AIDA survey, respondents were instead
asked whether they have moved out of their parent’s house (Sind Sie schon einmal aus der
elterlichen Wohnung bzw. Ihrem Elternhaus ausgezogen?), with the answer options being
yes and no.
20Available at: https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online/data
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Year
16-17 years 19-20 years
Note: The plot shows the average interest in politics amongst 16-17 year-olds (red dots)
and 19-20 year-olds (blue triangles) for all available survey years (1992-2014). The
sample is restricted to states that did not switch to voting at 16. Solid vertical lines
represent the introduction of voting at 16 in municipal elections. Dashed vertical lines
represent the introduction of voting at 16 in state elections.
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Survey years before / after voting age reform
16-17 years 19-20 years
Note: The plot shows the average external efficacy amongst 16-17 year-olds (red dots)
and 19-20 year-olds (blue triangles) for all survey years before and after the voting age
reform (vertical dashed line). The sample is restricted to states that switched to voting at
16 and the data are normalised so that year zero refers to the first survey year after the
voting age reform.
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Survey years before / after voting age reform
16-17 years 19-20 years
Note: The plot shows the average internal efficacy amongst 16-17 year-olds (red dots)
and 19-20 year-olds (blue triangles) for all survey years before and after the voting age
reform (vertical dashed line). The sample is restricted to states that switched to voting at
16 and the data are normalised so that year zero refers to the first survey year after the
voting age reform.
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Survey years before / after voting age reform
16-17 years 19-20 years
Note: The plot shows the average willingness to vote amongst 16-17 year-olds (red dots)
and 19-20 year-olds (blue triangles) for all survey years before and after the voting age
reform (vertical dashed line). The sample is restricted to states that switched to voting at





Table B3 presents results for regression models predicting interest in politics. Models 1-2
present results from linear fixed effects regression models, using 19-20 year-olds and 21-22
year-olds as control groups respectively. The results indicate that disenfranchised underage
youth are on average less interested in politics than (enfranchised) adult youth, but that
this difference is significantly reduced – by around one third – when 16-17 year-olds are
enfranchised. Models 3-4 in turn present results from ordered logistic regression models
predicting respondents’ interest in politics. The results point in the same direction as the
findings from the linear models – enfranchising 16-17 year-olds significantly reduces the
difference in interest in politics between underage and adult youth. Finally, Models 5-6
present results from binary logistic regression models (using a binary version of the outcome
variable). The results from the binary logistic models are consistent with findings from the
linear models and the ordered logistic models.
Table B3 Effect of enfranchisement on interest in politics
Control age group 19-20 21-22 19-20 21-22 19-20 21-22
Model OLS OLS Ord. Log. Ord. Log Bin. Log. Bin. Log.
Treated state (voting at 16) -0.292*** -0.712*** 0.545*** 0.288*** 0.534*** 0.237***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.020) (0.011) (0.029) (0.012)
Treated group (16-17 years) -0.228*** -0.295*** 0.642*** 0.571*** 0.637*** 0.568***
(0.020) (0.031) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.040)
Treated state * treated group 0.094** 0.122** 1.229*** 1.283*** 1.331*** 1.404***
(0.037) (0.049) (0.082) (0.108) (0.138) (0.143)
Constant 3.053*** 3.097*** - - 0.533*** 0.507***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Observations 11,815 11,339 11,815 11,339 11,815 11,339
Note: Coefficients (or odds ratios in the case of the logistic models) are shown with cluster-robust standard
errors in parentheses. The outcome variable in Models 1-4 is respondents’ interest in politics, ranging from
0 (not at all) to 5 (very strong). The outcome variable in Models 5-6 is respondents’ interest in politics
measured as a binary indicator (1 if respondent is “strongly” or “very strongly” interested in politics, 0
otherwise). The independent variables are Treated state (1 if voting at 16 has been implemented, 0 otherwise)
and Treated age group (1 if respondent is aged 16-17, 0 otherwise). Intercepts (cut-points) are omitted from
the ordered logistic regression output to save space. All models include state fixed effects, survey-year fixed
effects, state*survey-year fixed effects and cluster-robust SEs. Data: Waves 1-5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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External and internal efficacy
Table B4 presents results from linear fixed effects regression models predicting respondents’
external efficacy (the belief that government will respond to one’s demands) and internal
efficacy (the belief that one can understand politics and therefore participate in politics).
Table B4 Effect of enfranchisement on external and internal efficacy
Control age group 19-20 21-22 19-20 21-22
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS
Treated state (voting at 16) -0.185** -0.295** -0.123*** 0.036
(0.064) (0.103) (0.039) (0.068)
Treated group (16-17 years) -0.120*** -0.153*** -0.234*** -0.329***
(0.033) (0.018) (0.030) (0.041)
Treated state * treated group 0.142 0.137 0.159** 0.126
(0.108) (0.144) (0.066) (0.100)
Constant 0.071*** 0.241*** 0.234*** 0.234***
(0.021) (0.009) (0.019) (0.021)
Observations 6,976 6,782 6,976 6,782
Note: Coefficients are shown with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable in
Models 1-2 is a latent external efficacy score, standardised to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
The outcome variable in Models 3-4 is a latent internal efficacy score, standardised to have a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of 1. The independent variables are Treated state (1 if voting at 16 has been implemented,
0 otherwise) and Treated age group (1 if respondent is aged 16-17, 0 otherwise). All models include state
fixed effects, survey-year fixed effects, state*survey-year fixed effects and cluster-robust SEs. Data: Waves
1-3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Willingness to vote
Table B5 presents results for regression models predicting respondents’ willingness to vote in
a hypothetical election in order to exert political influence. Models 1-2 present results from
linear probability models (OLS). Models 3-4 present results from binary logistic regression
models. The results point in the same direction as those from the linear probability models
presented in the main text – enfranchising 16-17 year-olds appears to reduce the difference
in willingness to vote between underage and adult youth. Note, however, that the results
are only statistically significant at conventional levels when 21-22 year-olds are used as the
within-state control group.
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Table B5 Effect of enfranchisement on willingness to vote
Control age group 19-20 21-22 19-20 21-22
Model OLS OLS Bin. Log. Bin.Log
Treated state (voting at 16) 0.286*** 0.178*** 17.752*** 6.805***
(0.008) (0.010) (2.307) (1.132)
Treated group (16-17 years) -0.091*** -0.107*** 0.414*** 0.324***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.031) (0.038)
Treated state * treated group 0.040** 0.064*** 1.100 1.703**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.199) (0.368)
Constant 0.812*** 0.868*** 5.606*** 8.600***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.308) (0.701)
Observations 6,990 6,764 6,978 6,764
Note: Coefficients (or odds ratios in the case of logistic models) are shown with cluster-robust standard errors
in parentheses. The outcome variable is a binary variable (1 if respondent is willing to vote, 0 otherwise). The
independent variables are Treated state (1 if voting at 16 has been implemented, 0 otherwise) and Treated age
group (1 if respondent is aged 16-17, 0 otherwise). Data: Waves 1-3. All models include state fixed effects,
survey-year fixed effects, state*survey-year fixed effects and cluster-robust SEs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
Attitudinal consistency
Table B6 presents results from regression models predicting respondents’ attitudinal consis-
tency. Models 1-2 present results from linear probability models (OLS). The non-significant
coefficients on the age group indicator (16-17 years) suggest that there are no differences
in attitudinal consistency between disenfranchised underage and enfranchised adult youth.
Furthermore, the non-significant coefficients on the interaction term indicate (when the
default comparison group of 19-20 year-olds is used) that the introduction of voting at 16
does little to change this. Results from binary logistic regression models (Models 3-4) are
consistent with results from the linear probability models.
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Table B6 Effect of enfranchisement on attitudinal consistency
Control age group 19-20 21-22 19-20 21-22
Model OLS OLS Bin. Log. Bin.Log
Treated state (voting at 16) 0.074*** 0.232*** 1.371*** 2.597***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.043) (0.070)
Treated age group (16-17 years) -0.014 -0.015 0.945 0.942
(0.013) (0.011) (0.048) (0.042)
Treated state * treated age group -0.012 -0.027** 0.951 0.897**
(0.016) (0.011) (0.062) (0.042)
Constant 0.542*** 0.452*** 1.184*** 0.825***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.038) (0.019)
Observations 9,400 8,878 9,400 8,878
Note: Coefficients (or odds ratios in the case of logistic models) are shown with cluster-robust standard errors
in parentheses. The outcome variable is a binary measure of attitudinal consistency (1 identifies respondents
with consistent attitudes and 0 identifies respondents with inconsistent attitudes). The independent variables
are Treated state (1 if voting at 16 has been implemented, 0 otherwise) and Treated age group (1 if respondent
is aged 16-17, 0 otherwise). Data: Waves 1-4. All models include state fixed effects, survey-year fixed effects,
state*survey-year fixed effects and cluster-robust SEs.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Demand for political information
Table B7 presents results from regression models predicting several measures of demand for
political information. Models 1-2 present results for respondents’ reported use of newspapers
as a source of political information. Models 3-4 present results for respondents’ reported
use of television as a source of political information. Finally, Models 5-6 presents results for
reported frequency of political discussions with their schoolmates or fellow university stu-
dents. For the political discussions measure the interaction effect does not reach conventional
significance thresholds (regardless of the comparison age group used).
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Table B7 Effect of enfranchisement on demand for political information
Outcome Newspapers Television Pol. discussions
Control age group 19-20 21-22 19-20 21-22 19-20 21-22
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Treated state (voting at 16) -0.129*** 0.113*** -0.225*** 0.009 0.076*** 0.031
(0.031) (0.013) (0.019) (0.030) (0.025) (0.051)
Treated group (16-17 years) -0.222*** -0.266*** -0.146*** -0.121*** -0.048 -0.108***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.036)
Treated state * treated group 0.180*** 0.144*** 0.091** 0.018 0.063 0.096
(0.054) (0.023) (0.035) (0.046) (0.040) (0.065)
Constant 2.685*** 2.635*** 2.986*** 2.883*** 2.350*** 2.404***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.021)
Observations 5,219 4,880 5,220 4,883 5,932 5,413
Note: In Models 1-2 the outcome variable measures respondents’ reported frequency of using newspapers
as a source of information about politics, ranging from ‘never’ (1) to ‘very often’ (4). In Models 3-4 the
outcome variable measures respondents’ reported frequency of using television as a source of information
about politics, ranging from ‘never’ (1) to ‘very often’ (4). In Models 5-6 the outcome variable measures
respondents’ reported frequency of discussing political issues with their schoolmates (or fellow university
students), with answer options ranging from ‘never’ (1) to ‘very often’ (4). The independent variables are
Treated state (1 if voting at 16 has been implemented, 0 otherwise) and Treated age group (1 if respondent is
aged 16-17, 0 otherwise). Data: Waves 2-3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
F Robustness checks
Adding controls
To assess the robustness of the results, I include several time-varying state-level controls as
well as individual-level controls in the baseline regression model. Individual-level controls
are not necessary for causal identification but can increase the precision of the estimates
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009). The set of time-varying state-level controls includes economic
shocks, captured by the local unemployment rate, demographic shocks, captured by the
local (log) population, and political preference shocks, captured by the local vote share of
the centre-right CDU in the last general election. Furthermore, I control for voter turnout
in the last general election to capture the local level of political mobilisation, and public
education spending per capita as a proxy for state-level shocks to the education system.
Individual-level controls are respondents’ gender as well as an indicator of whether they still
live with their parents at the time of the survey. Most of the results are robust to the inclusion
of time-varying state-level and individual-level controls. Note, however, that with controls,
the results for internal efficacy fall just short of the conventional significance level.
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Table B8 Effect of enfranchisement on interest in politics (with controls)
Control age group 19-20 years 21-22 years
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated state (voting at 16) -0.084 -0.083 -0.066* -0.056
(0.054) (0.053) (0.037) (0.039)
Treated group (16-17 years) -0.235*** -0.227*** -0.296*** -0.254***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.034) (0.030)
Treated state * treated group 0.099** 0.086** 0.124** 0.106**
(0.038) (0.038) (0.046) (0.045)
Constant 14.883* 12.583 18.588* 17.398*
(8.106) (7.756) (9.258) (8.894)
Time-varying state-level controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Individual-level controls ✓ ✓
State fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey-year fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Cluster-robust SEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 10,026 10,013 9,402 9,386
Note: Note: OLS models with state- and survey-year fixed effects. Models 1 and 3 control for time-
varying state-level covariates (unemployment rate, log population, CDU vote share, turnout, public
education spending per capita). Models 2 and 4 in addition control for individual-level covariates
(gender, lives with parents). Coefficients are shown with robust standard errors in parentheses. The
outcome variable is respondents’ interest in politics, ranging from 0 (not at all) to 5 (very strong). The
key independent variables are Treated state (1 if voting at 16 has been implemented, 0 otherwise) and
Treated age group (1 if respondent is aged 16-17, 0 otherwise). Models 1-2 use 19-20 year-olds as the
control age group, and Models 3-4 use 21-22 year-olds as the control age group. Data: Waves 1-5. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B9 Effect of enfranchisement on external efficacy (with controls)
Control age group 19-20 years 21-22 years
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated state (voting at 16) -0.255** -0.260** -0.123 -0.129
(0.095) (0.094) (0.129) (0.130)
Treated group (16-17 years) -0.088** -0.092** -0.106*** -0.082**
(0.034) (0.040) (0.028) (0.033)
Treated state * treated group 0.115 0.116 0.085 0.084
(0.109) (0.107) (0.143) (0.142)
Constant 43.386 42.584 21.138 23.563
(31.823) (31.204) (35.046) (35.069)
Time-varying state-level controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Individual-level controls ✓ ✓
State fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey-year fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Cluster-robust SEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 5,205 5,203 4,861 4,857
Note: Note: OLS models with state- and survey-year fixed effects. Models 1 and 3 control for time-varying
state-level covariates (unemployment rate, log population, CDU vote share, turnout, public education spending
per capita). Models 2 and 4 in addition control for individual-level covariates (gender, lives with parents).
Coefficients are shown with robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is a latent external
efficacy score, standardised to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The key independent variables
are Treated state (1 if voting at 16 has been implemented, 0 otherwise) and Treated age group (1 if respondent
is aged 16-17, 0 otherwise). Models 1-2 use 19-20 year-olds as the control age group, and Models 3-4 use
21-22 year-olds as the control age group. Data: Waves 1-3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B10 Effect of enfranchisement on internal efficacy (with controls)
Control age group 19-20 years 21-22 years
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated state (voting at 16) -0.102 -0.124 -0.107 -0.115
(0.078) (0.072) (0.115) (0.114)
Treated group (16-17 years) -0.195*** -0.170*** -0.316*** -0.293***
(0.037) (0.043) (0.047) (0.059)
Treated state * treated group 0.116 0.118 0.117 0.116
(0.072) (0.069) (0.100) (0.099)
Constant 57.213*** 57.167*** 49.103** 54.559**
(17.885) (17.775) (18.741) (19.481)
Time-varying state-level controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Individual-level controls ✓ ✓
State fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey-year fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Cluster-robust SEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 5,205 5,203 4,861 4,857
Note: OLS models with state- and survey-year fixed effects. Models 1 and 3 control for time-varying state-
level covariates (unemployment rate, log population, CDU vote share, turnout, public education spending
per capita). Models 2 and 4 in addition control for individual-level covariates (gender, lives with parents).
Coefficients are shown with robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is a latent internal
efficacy score, standardised to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The key independent variables
are Treated state (1 if voting at 16 has been implemented, 0 otherwise) and Treated age group (1 if respondent
is aged 16-17, 0 otherwise). Models 1-2 use 19-20 year-olds as the control age group, and Models 3-4 use
21-22 year-olds as the control age group. Data: Waves 1-3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B11 Effect of enfranchisement on willingness to vote (with controls)
Control age group 19-20 years 21-22 years
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated state (voting at 16) -0.040 -0.041 -0.048 -0.046
(0.029) (0.030) (0.038) (0.038)
Treated group (16-17 years) -0.074*** -0.080*** -0.082*** -0.087***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
Treated state * treated group 0.021* 0.021* 0.041*** 0.039**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Constant 24.541** 24.363** 24.565** 24.530**
(9.025) (9.085) (9.959) (9.912)
Time-varying state-level controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Individual-level controls ✓ ✓
State fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey-year fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Cluster-robust SEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 5,222 5,220 4,877 4,872
Note: OLS models with state- and survey-year fixed effects. Models 1 and 3 control for time-varying state-
level covariates (unemployment rate, log population, CDU vote share, turnout, public education spending
per capita). Models 2 and 4 in addition control for individual-level covariates (gender, lives with parents).
Coefficients are shown with robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is a binary variable
(1 if respondent is willing to vote, 0 otherwise). The key independent variables are Treated state (1 if voting
at 16 has been implemented, 0 otherwise) and Treated age group (1 if respondent is aged 16-17, 0 otherwise).
Models 1-2 use 19-20 year-olds as the control age group, and Models 3-4 use 21-22 year-olds as the control
age group. Data: Waves 1-3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Dynamic treatment effects
To assess the plausibility of the parallel trends assumption and examine the persistence of
treatment effects over time, I employ an event study framework. Specifically, I code a binary
indicator that equals 1 for the first survey year after a state switched to voting at 16 (and
0 otherwise) and then include four leads and three lags of this switching indicator in the
regression models, each one interacted with the treatment age group indicator.23 Figure
B5 presents the estimated interaction effects from event study models predicting several
measures of political maturity (with 19-20 year-olds as the control age group). Figure B6
instead presents results from event study models predicting different measures of young
people’s demand for political information. I find no placebo treatment effects for the four
survey years leading up to the voting age reform, which is evidence in support of the parallel
trends assumption. The non-significant placebo effects for the survey years after the switch
to voting at 16 may indicate that the initial equalising effect of the reform does not persist
over time. However, these results should be interpreted with caution, given that the time
series is quite short and the estimates are relatively imprecise.24
23In contrast to the treatment indicator used in the main analysis, the (real and placebo) switching indicators
are equal to 1 only in the relevant survey year (see Autor 2003; Hainmueller and Hangartner 2019).
24I also examine dynamic treatment effects using a semi-dynamic event study model, where all leads of the
switching indicator are set to zero. This specification is more suitable for detecting dynamic treatment effects,
as it does not suffer from the under-identification issues highlighted in Borusyak and Jaravel (2017). The results
from the semi-dynamic model (available on request) also suggest that the initial equalising effect of the voting
age reform does not persist over time.
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Fig. B5 Dynamic effect of enfranchisement on difference in political maturity between
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Survey years before / after voting age reform
Willingness to vote
Note: Point estimates show the marginal effect of switching to voting at 16 on outcomes of 16-17 year-olds
relative to 19-20 year-olds for survey years before (blue triangles) and after (red dots) the voting age reform.
Point estimates are from a linear fixed effects regression with four leads and three lags of the switching
indicator, each interacted with the age group indicator. Switching indicators are equal to one only in the
relevant survey year. Survey year 0 refers to the first survey year after voting at 16 was implemented. Vertical
lines are 95% confidence intervals. 19-20 year-olds are the control age group. Data are from switching and
non-switching states for all available survey waves.
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Fig. B6 Dynamic effect of enfranchisement on difference in demand for political
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Survey years before / after voting age reform
Demand for political information
(Television)
Note: Point estimates show the marginal effect of switching to voting at 16 on outcomes of 16-17 year-olds
relative to 19-20 year-olds for survey years before (blue triangles) and after (red dots) the voting age reform.
Point estimates are from a linear fixed effects regression with four leads and three lags of the switching
indicator, each interacted with the age group indicator. Switching indicators are equal to one only in the
relevant survey year. Survey year 0 refers to the first survey year after voting at 16 was implemented. Vertical
lines are 95% confidence intervals. 19-20 year-olds are the control age group. Data are from switching and
non-switching states for all available survey waves.
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State-specific linear time trends
An alternative way to assess the plausibility of the parallel trends assumption is to relax the
baseline model specification and estimate
Yigst = γs + γs ∗ t +λt +δg +Dst +β (Dst ∗δg)+(γs ∗λt)+Xigst + εigst (3.3)
where the state fixed effect γs is interacted with a linear time index t (equal to 1 for survey
wave 1, and 2 for survey wave 2, etc.). The inclusion of state-specific linear time trends
ensures that unobserved state-specific differences that vary smoothly over time are purged
from the estimate of β , so that only breaks in the local trends of political maturity differences
between age groups that directly coincide with the voting age reform are captured by β . The
results are robust to the inclusion state-specific linear time trends.
Table B12 Effect of enfranchisement on political maturity (state-specific time trends):
Control group (19-20 years)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome Pol. interest Ext. efficacy Int. efficacy Will.to vote Att. consist.
Dataset (JS/AIDA) (JS) (JS) (JS) (JS/AIDA)
Treated state (voting at 16) -0.086* -0.210 -0.107 -0.008 -0.037
(0.048) (0.149) (0.135) (0.053) (0.037)
Treated group (16-17 years) -0.222*** -0.118*** -0.232*** -0.091*** -0.012
(0.020) (0.034) (0.030) (0.009) (0.013)
Treated state * treated group 0.085** 0.139 0.155** 0.038** -0.017
(0.038) (0.108) (0.066) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 11,815 6,976 6,976 6,990 9,400
Note: OLS models with state- and survey-year fixed effects and state-specific linear time trends. Coefficients
are shown with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are Treated state
(1 if voting at 16 has been implemented, 0 otherwise) and Treated age group (1 if respondent is aged
16-17, 0 otherwise). Data: Waves 1-5. All models include state fixed effects, survey-year fixed effects,
state*survey-year fixed effects and cluster-robust SEs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B13 Effect of enfranchisement on political maturity (state-specific time trends):
Control group (21-22 years)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome Pol. interest Ext. efficacy Int. efficacy Will.to vote Att. consist.
Dataset (JS/AIDA) (JS) (JS) (JS) (JS/AIDA)
Treated state (voting at 16) -0.034 -0.084 -0.060 -0.044 0.005
(0.044) (0.161) (0.188) (0.066) (0.043)
Treated group (16-17 years) -0.287*** -0.150*** -0.333*** -0.108*** -0.012
(0.031) (0.019) (0.042) (0.010) (0.010)
Treated state * treated group 0.114** 0.133 0.133 0.066*** -0.033**
(0.047) (0.146) (0.101) (0.016) (0.011)
Observations 11,339 6,782 6,782 6,764 8,878
Note: OLS models with state- and survey-year fixed effects and state-specific linear time trends. Coefficients
are shown with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are Treated state
(1 if voting at 16 has been implemented, 0 otherwise) and Treated age group (1 if respondent is aged
16-17, 0 otherwise). Data: Waves 1-5. All models include state fixed effects, survey-year fixed effects,
state*survey-year fixed effects and cluster-robust SEs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Placebo tests
Another way to assess the robustness of the identification strategy is to conduct placebo tests.
Using several measures of political maturity, I re-run the baseline model, but instead compare
18-19-year-olds to 21-22-year-olds. In theory, the introduction of voting at 16 should not
affect the difference in political maturity between these two age groups, as both groups
already have the right to vote before the reform. Table B14 presents results from linear fixed
effects regression models predicting respondents’ political maturity, where 18-19-year-olds
are the placebo treatment group and 21-22-year-olds are the control group. Except for Model
4 (willingness to vote), the coefficients on the interaction terms are statistically insignificant,
which is evidence in support of the identification strategy.
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Table B14 Effect of enfranchisement on political maturity (placebo regressions)
Placebo treatment group 18-19 years
Control age group 21-22 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome Pol. interest Ext. efficacy Int. efficacy Will.to vote Att. consist.
Dataset (JS/AIDA) (JS) (JS) (JS) (JS/AIDA)
Treated state (voting at 16) -0.927*** -0.152** -0.259*** 0.163*** 0.069***
(0.011) (0.055) (0.036) (0.009) (0.008)
Placebo group (18-19 years) -0.101*** -0.025 -0.117** -0.021** -0.012
(0.031) (0.026) (0.046) (0.008) (0.012)
Treated state * placebo group 0.044 -0.008 0.039 0.035** 0.007
(0.025) (0.087) (0.060) (0.015) (0.013)
Observations 11,339 6,782 6,782 6,764 8,878
Note: Coefficients are shown with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables
are Treated state (1 if voting at 16 has been implemented, 0 otherwise) and Placebo group (1 if respondent
is aged 18-19, 0 if respondent is aged 21-22). Data: Waves 1-5. All models include state fixed effects,
survey-year fixed effects, state*survey-year fixed effects and cluster-robust SEs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
Compositional stability
One important limitation of the research design relates to the fact that I rely on repeated
cross-sections rather than panel data. An additional identifying assumption in this case
is that the composition of the target population does not change between pre- and post-
treatment periods. Such compositional differences could confound the relationship between
enfranchisement and political maturity since the estimated effect may be attributable to
changes in the target population (Lee and Kang, 2006). It seems unlikely that voting age
reforms in Germany prompted citizens to move to different states. More plausibly, unrelated
migratory and demographic trends may have altered the target population between different
survey waves. To test for problematic compositional changes in the target population, I
estimate several two-way fixed effects (DID) regression models, using time-varying state-
level covariates as outcomes (unemployment rate, log population, CDU vote share, turnout,
and public education spending per capita). In this case, the unit of analysis is the state-year,
and the dataset is a balanced panel for all years between 1990 and 2018. Failing to reject the
null hypothesis of no treatment effect attributed to the voting age reform can be interpreted
as evidence in favour of compositional stability (Wing et al., 2018). The results presented
in Table B15 support the assumption of compositional stability, as none of the estimated
treatment effects are statistically significant at conventional levels.
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Table B15 Effect of enfranchisement on time-varying state-level covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome Unemp. rate Log pop. CDU share Turnout Edu. spending
Voting at 16 0.465 -0.004 0.294 0.466 -42.428
(0.627) (0.026) (0.749) (0.644) (28.430)
Observations 400 416 464 400 352
Note: OLS models with state- and year fixed effects. Coefficients are shown with standard
errors (clustered at the state-level) in parentheses. The treatment variable (Voting at 16)
equals 1 if the voting reform has been implemented in a specific state and 0 otherwise.
The dataset is a balanced state-year panel for years 1990-2018. The data on outcomes are
from various sources (see Appendix C, Controls). All models include state fixed effects,
year fixed effects and cluster-robust SEs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Bootstrap
As an additional robustness check, I employ a wild cluster bootstrap procedure to obtain
more accurate p-values. This is advisable given that in a setting with few clusters – 16 states
in our case – the standard cluster-robust variance estimator may lead to over-rejection of the
null and confidence intervals that are too narrow (Bertrand et al., 2004; Cameron et al., 2008).
Intuitively, the procedure generates many bootstrap samples that mimic the distribution from
which the original sample was obtained. It then computes a t-statistic for the coefficient of
interest in each bootstrap sample. The refined p-value is the proportion of the bootstrap t-
statistics that are more extreme than the t-statistic obtained from the original sample (Angrist
and Pischke, 2009). In a setting with very few ‘treated’ clusters – 10 states in our case – the
standard wild cluster bootstrap will typically under-reject the null of no treatment effect when
the null is imposed (restricted), and over-reject when the null is not imposed (unrestricted)
(MacKinnon and Webb, 2018; Roodman et al., 2019). To account for this problem, I also
employ the ‘sub-cluster’ wild bootstrap procedure proposed by MacKinnon and Webb (2018),
where the wild bootstrap data-generating process is clustered at a finer/lower level (i.e. state-
year or individual level) than the covariance matrix (i.e. state level). Table B16 presents
the results from the different wild bootstrap approaches. As expected, the standard wild
cluster bootstrap procedure under-rejects (or over-rejects) when the null is imposed (or not
imposed). Clustering the bootstrap errors at the finer/lower state-year or individual level,
however, leads to more consistent p-values. Overall, the bootstrap results support the main
findings, although as expected the bootstrap p-values tend to be more conservative than the
p-values obtained from the standard cluster-robust variance estimator.
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Table B16 Wild cluster bootstrap
Control age group 19-20 years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Pol. interest Ext. efficacy Int. efficacy Will. to vote
Treatment effect (β ) 0.085 0.145 0.153 0.037
Cluster-robust SE 0.037 0.108 0.068 0.014
t-statistic 2.30 1.34 2.23 2.58
p-value 0.036 0.200 0.042 0.021
p-value from:
Bootstr. by state, restricted 0.131 0.395 0.048 0.161
Bootstr. by state, unrestricted 0.084 0.403 0.177 0.040
Bootstr. by state-year, restricted 0.082 0.399 0.061 0.076
Bootstr. by state-year, unrestricted 0.083 0.393 0.145 0.029
Bootstr. by individual, restricted 0.067 0.285 0.102 0.056
Bootstr. by individual, unrestricted 0.068 0.285 0.097 0.058
Note: Note: OLS with state-, survey-year and age-group fixed effects, where the age-group indicator (1 if
respondent 16-17 years old, 0 otherwise) is interacted with a treatment indicator (1 for respondents in states
and survey years where voting at 16 has been implemented, 0 otherwise). β refers to the coefficient on the
interaction between the treatment indicator and the age group indicator. Standard errors clustered at the
state-level. Wild bootstraps are run with 9999 replications and 10 grid points. Restricted bootstraps impose
the null that β = 0 and unrestricted bootstraps do not impose the null that β = 0.
Replication using SOEP data
As a robustness check, I replicate the main analysis using data on political interest from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is an annual, nationally representative
longitudinal survey of private households, run by the German Institute for Economic Re-
search. Beginning in 1984, SOEP has surveyed around 15,000 households and about 30,000
individuals every year, on topics including household composition, education, occupational
biographies, employment, earnings, health, and satisfaction indicators.25 For the analysis,
only German respondents aged 16-17 and 19-20 and who completed the SOEP’s individual-
or youth questionnaire are kept. Interest in politics is measured by the question ‘Generally
speaking, how interested are you in politics?’ with four possible answers ranging from ‘not
at all’ (1) to ‘very much’ (4). The survey item is available for every year since 1985. Table
B17 presents descriptive statistics.
Using SOEP data on interest in politics produces very similar results to the main analysis
of the JS/AIDA data. Table B18 presents the regression output from the SOEP replication.
25For data and documentation, see http://companion.soep.de/
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Table B17 Descriptive statistics (SOEP)
Dataset Years Obs. Mean SD Min Max Var type
Interest in politics SOEP 1985-2017 26610 2.00 0.78 1.00 4.00 Ordinal
Note: German respondents aged 16-17 and 19-20 years.
As in the main results, the negative coefficient on Treated age group indicates that disen-
franchised underage youth are, on average, less politically interested than adult youth. As
in the main results, the positive coefficient on the interaction suggests that this difference
is reduced significantly when 16-17 year-olds are enfranchised. The estimated reduction in
prior differences amounts to 34% in the SOEP data, which is comparable in size to the 41%
reduction found in the JS/AIDA data.
Table B18 Effect of enfranchisement on interest in politics (SOEP)
Control age group 19-20 years
Outcome Interest in politics
Dataset (SOEP)
Treated state (voting at 16) 0.183
(0.124)
Treated group (16-17 years) -0.114***
(0.012)
Treated state * treated group 0.039**
(0.016)
State fixed effects ✓
Survey-year fixed effects ✓
State * survey-year FEs ✓
Cluster-robust SEs ✓
Observations 26,603
Reduction in difference between age groups 34%
Note: Note: OLS with state-, year-, and state-year fixed effects. Coefficients
are shown with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. The independent
variables are Treated state (1 if voting at 16 has been implemented, 0 otherwise)
and Treated age group (1 if respondent is aged 16-17, 0 otherwise). 19-20
year-olds are the control age group. The last row displays the percentage
reduction in the difference between underage and adult youth attributable to
voting at 16, using the estimated difference in control states as baseline. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Including 18-year-olds
In the main analysis, 18-year-olds are excluded to make sure that the older control group does
not include any “treated” individuals. This is a concern because 18-year-olds typically attend
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the same class as 17-year-olds (who are in the treatment group), and the German voting age
reforms were accompanied by school-based political education initiatives targeting the newly
enfranchised. 18-year-olds are therefore likely to have been exposed to enfranchisement-
related political education initiatives, either directly or indirectly through discussions with
classmates. Table B19 presents results from fixed effects regression models predicting various
measures of political maturity. The specification is the same as the one used for the main
results (Table 3.2), except that 18-19 year-olds are used as the control age group rather than
19-20 year-olds.
As in the main results, there is evidence for an equalising effect of enfranchisement on
political maturity differences between underage and adult youth. The negative coefficient
on Treated age group indicates that disenfranchised 16-17 year-olds are, on average, less
politically mature than 18-19 year-olds. As in the main results, the exception is attitudinal
consistency, where there are no baseline differences between age groups to begin with. The
positive coefficients on the interactions (except for attitudinal consistency) suggest that the
baseline difference in political maturity between age groups is reduced when 16-17 year-olds
are enfranchised. In this case, the reductions are statistically significant for willingness to
vote and external efficacy, while for interest in politics and internal efficacy the reductions
fall short of the conventional significance threshold.
Table B19 Effect of enfranchisement on political maturity (including 18-year-olds)
Control age group 18-19 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome Pol. interest Ext. efficacy Int. efficacy Will.to vote Att. consist.
Dataset (JS/AIDA) (JS) (JS) (JS) (JS/AIDA)
Treated state (voting at 16) -0.633*** -0.306*** -0.179*** 0.248*** 0.117***
(0.029) (0.041) (0.030) (0.006) (0.006)
Treated group (16-17 years) -0.190*** -0.115*** -0.204*** -0.085*** -0.006
(0.020) (0.034) (0.029) (0.010) (0.010)
Treated state * treated group 0.072 0.125* 0.092 0.028** -0.033**
(0.051) (0.071) (0.053) (0.011) (0.013)
Observations 12,162 7,271 7,271 7,298 9,636
Reduction diff. btw. groups - 109% - 32% -
Note: OLS with state-, year-, and state-year fixed effects. Coefficients are shown with cluster-robust standard
errors in parentheses. The independent variables are Treated state (1 if voting at 16 has been implemented,
0 otherwise) and Treated age group (1 if respondent is aged 16-17, 0 otherwise). 18-19 year-olds are the
control age group. All models include state fixed effects, survey-year fixed effects, state*survey-year fixed
effects and cluster-robust SEs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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G Does the parallel trends assumption hold in the DID design?
The staggered introduction of voting at 16 across German states intuitively lends itself to
a generalised difference-in-differences (DID) type analysis, where state-level fixed effects
account for potential bias from unobserved time-invariant state-level characteristics and year
fixed-effects account for unobserved time trends shared across all states. However, in the
main text, I argue that the parallel trends assumption is likely violated in the DID design,
due to time-varying confounders that also vary across states (such as political mobilisation
and incumbent party ideology). In this section, I provide empirical evidence to support this
argument.
In a generalised DID with multiple treatment groups (states) and multiple periods (survey
years) it is difficult to provide a visual inspection of parallel trends in treatment and control
states prior to the voting age reform. However, we can assess the parallel trends assumption
by employing an event study approach. This entails coding a binary ‘switching’ indicator
equal to 1 for the first survey year after a state switched to voting at 16 (and 0 otherwise) and
then including four leads and three lags of this indicator in the generalised DID model. The
event study model is estimated by








Ds,t+θm + εst (3.4)
where Yigst is a measure of individuals’ political maturity, γs is a state-level fixed effect,
λt is a survey-year fixed effect, Dst is the ‘switching’ indicator, and εst is the error term. The
parameter β captures the immediate effect of the voting age reform on the political maturity
of 16-17 year-olds, δs captures any ‘phase-in’ effects of the reform for S survey years prior
to reform, and θm captures any additional effects of the reform for M survey years after the
reform. The generalised DID regression model relies only on data from 16-17 year-olds, as
the within-state control age group from the triple-difference type design is dropped. If the
parallel trends assumption holds, the coefficients on all leads δ should be zero. Figure B7
presents estimated treatment effects on several measures of political maturity for all leads
and lags (with their 95% confidence intervals). The results indicate that the parallel trends
assumption is likely violated, as several of the leads (in blue) have statistically significant
coefficients.
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Willingness to vote
Note: Estimated treatment effect of switching to voting at 16 on outcomes of 16-17 year-olds for survey
years before (blue) and after (red) the voting age reform. Point estimates are from a linear fixed effects
regression with four leads and three lags of the switching indicator. Switching indicators are equal to
one only in the relevant survey year. Survey year 0 refers to the first survey year after voting at 16 was
implemented. Vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals. Sample: 16-17 year olds.
H Fully-saturated models
As a robustness check, I also replicate the main results using a fully saturated triple-difference
model, which is estimated by
Yigst = γs +λt +δg +Dst +β (Dst ∗δg)+(γs ∗λt)+(γs ∗δg)+(λt ∗δg)+ εigst (3.5)
where Yigst is a measure of individuals’ political maturity, γs is a state-level fixed effect,
λt is a survey-year fixed effect, δg is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent is aged 16-17
years and 0 if she is aged 19-20 years, Dst is a treatment indicator equal to 1 for respondents
in states and survey years where voting at 16 has been implemented, (γs ∗λt), (γs ∗δg) and
(λt ∗δg) are pair-wise interactions between state-, survey-year and age-group fixed effects,
and εigst is the error term. As in the less saturated model specification used in the main
analysis (Model 3.1), the quantity of interest is β , which identifies the marginal effect of
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enfranchisement on the political maturity of 16-17 year-olds relative to the slightly older
control age group.
Table B20 and Table B21 below report the estimated treatment effects (β ) and associated
standard errors obtained from the less saturated model (Model 1) as well as the fully saturated
model (Model 2, highlighted in grey) for several outcome variables. It shows that the
inclusion of the two additional pair-wise interactions in Model 2 increases the standard
error of β relative to Model 1 but leaves the size of the coefficient β largely unchanged.
This indicates that lack of power may be the main reason that the results from the fully
saturated model do not reach conventional significance levels. An exception are the results
for external efficacy, where the coefficient in Model 2 is roughly half the size compared to
Model 1. Finally, F-tests suggest that including the two additional pair-wise interactions
does not significantly improve the explanatory power of the model regardless of the outcome
variable used. The F-tests test whether the two additional pair-wise interactions in Model
2 are jointly significant. Failure to reject the null that all parameters of the two additional
pair-wise interactions are equal to zero is evidence that they do not improve the explanatory
power of the model. The results are as follows: Interest in politics: F(19, 11714) = 1.32; Prob
> F = 0.1564. External efficacy: F(17, 6909) = 1.56; Prob > F = 0.0665. Internal efficacy:
F(17, 6909) = 1.46; Prob > F = 0.0976. Willingness to vote: F(17, 6923) = 1.15; Prob > F =
0.3006.
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Table B20 Effect of enfranchisement on political maturity (fully saturated model)
Control age group 19-20 years
Outcome Interest in politics External efficacy
Model (1) (2) (1) (2)
Treatment effect (β ) 0.094** 0.081 0.142** 0.079
(0.039) (0.070) (0.062) (0.099)
State fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey-year fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Age-group indicator ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
State * survey-year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Age group * survey-year FEs ✓ ✓
Age group * state FEs ✓ ✓
Observations 11,815 11,815 6,976 6,976
Note: Model 1 is an OLS model with state-, survey-year and state*year fixed
effects. The age-group indicator (1 if respondent 16-17 years old, 0 otherwise)
is interacted with a treatment indicator (1 for respondents in states and survey
years where voting at 16 has been implemented, 0 otherwise). Model 2
(highlighted in grey) is a fully saturated triple-difference model, which is the
same as Model 1 except that two additional pair-wise interactions (between
age group and survey year FEs as well as age group and state FEs) are included.
In Model 1, β refers to the coefficient on the interaction between the treatment
indicator and the age group indicator. All models use 19-20 year-olds as the
control age group. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B21 Effect of enfranchisement on political maturity (fully saturated model) – cont.
Control age group 19-20 years
Outcome Internal efficacy Willingness to vote
Model (1) (2) (1) (2)
Treatment effect (β ) 0.159** 0.167* 0.040** 0.031
(0.064) (0.101) (0.017) (0.030)
State fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey-year fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Age-group indicator ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
State * survey-year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Age group * survey-year FEs ✓ ✓
Age group * state FEs ✓ ✓
Observations 6,976 6,976 6,990 6,990
Note: Model 1 is an OLS model with state-, survey-year and state*year fixed
effects. The age-group indicator (1 if respondent 16-17 years old, 0 otherwise)
is interacted with a treatment indicator (1 for respondents in states and survey
years where voting at 16 has been implemented, 0 otherwise). Model 2
(highlighted in grey) is a fully saturated triple-difference model, which is the
same as Model 1 except that two additional pair-wise interactions (between
age group and survey year FEs as well as age group and state FEs) are included.
In Model 1, β refers to the coefficient on the interaction between the treatment
indicator and the age group indicator. All models use 19-20 year-olds as the
control age group. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Chapter 4
Is compulsory voting habit-forming?
Regression discontinuity evidence from
Brazil
Abstract: Voting in one election increases one’s propensity to vote in the future. It remains
unclear, however, whether this pattern holds when voting is compulsory – as is the case in
a quarter of all democracies. Is compulsory voting habit-forming? I address this question
using a regression discontinuity design and administrative turnout data from Brazil, where
voting is voluntary at age 16 and compulsory at age 18. I find no evidence that compulsory
voting instils voting habits. Instead, the evidence points to a first-time compulsory voting
boost, which gradually dissipates as voters grow older. I show that targeted mobilisation of
first-time compulsory voters is a plausible mechanism behind the turnout boost. Alternative
explanations find less support in the data. The results clarify the scope conditions of prior
research on voting habits, and have important implications for the debate over the second-
order effects of compulsory voting.
Keywords: Compulsory voting, voting habits, first-time voting boost, regression discontinu-
ity, Brazil
Note: This chapter has been published as a peer-reviewed journal article in Electoral Studies
(Dunaiski, 2021).
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4.1 Introduction
One of the most robust empirical findings in political science is that interpersonal differences
in voter turnout persist over time (Campbell et al., 1960; Miller and Shanks, 1996). A common
explanation for this persistence is that voting and abstaining in elections is habit-forming.
Several experimental and quasi-experimental studies from the US show that voting in one
election increases one’s propensity to vote in the future, which is interpreted as evidence
for habit formation1 (Coppock and Green, 2016; Dinas, 2012; Fujiwara et al., 2016; Gerber
et al., 2003; Meredith, 2009). However, given that these studies focus on voluntary voting, it
remains unclear whether this pattern holds when voting is compulsory. This is remarkable
given that a quarter of all democracies have compulsory voting systems (Birch, 2009) and
compulsory voting is frequently put forward as an effective mechanism to counteract low and
unequal turnout in Western democracies (Bechtel et al., 2016; Franklin et al., 2004; Lijphart,
1997). A priori, it is not obvious what to expect when voting is compulsory. Evidence from
the US shows that a positive shock to the cost of voting induced by rainfall on Election Day
reduces turnout contemporaneously as well as in subsequent elections, which suggests habit
formation (Fujiwara et al., 2016). But can an exogenous increase in the cost of abstention
induced by compulsory voting have similar knock-on effects? Or does the coercive element
of compulsory voting undermine habit formation?
This paper provides first causal evidence on the long-term, individual-level turnout
consequences of compulsory voting. I study a quasi-experiment in Brazil, where voting is
voluntary for individuals aged 16-17 and compulsory for individuals who turn 18 before or
on Election Day. 2 To isolate the causal effect of compulsory voting on citizens’ downstream
turnout, 3 I employ a regression discontinuity (RD) design, which compares turnout in one
election between individuals who were just old enough or just too young to be eligible
for compulsory voting in the previous election. In line with prior studies on voting habits
(Coppock and Green, 2016; Fujiwara et al., 2016; Meredith, 2009), I interpret positive
1I use the term “voting habit formation” to refer to the independent and positive causal effect of having
voted in one election on voting again in the future, in line with previous (quasi-) experimental studies (Coppock
and Green, 2016; de Kadt, 2017; Dinas, 2012; Fujiwara et al., 2016; Gerber et al., 2003). Habit formation
defined in this way does not correspond to what psychologists would refer to as habits, which are “learned
sequences of acts that have become automatic responses to specific cues, and are functional in obtaining certain
goals or end-states” (Verplanken and Aarts, 1999, p.104). Voting cannot be performed in a subconscious or
automatic manner, so it is difficult to reconcile voting behaviour with psychological theories of habituation
(Blais and Daoust, 2020; de Kadt, 2017).
2At age 70 voting becomes voluntary again.
3I borrow terminology from (Green and Gerber, 2002) to distinguish between the effect of the being
compelled to vote in one election on turnout in that same (contemporaneous) election and turnout in subsequent
(downstream) elections.
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downstream turnout effects as evidence for habit formation.4 I use administrative data from
the complete Brazilian voter files for all elections between 2008 and 2016. Each voter file
records validated, individual-level turnout of around 150 million registered voters as well as
unique identifiers that allow me to track individuals across elections.
I find no evidence that compulsory voting is habit-forming, even after several compulsory
elections. Instead, the results show that the introduction of compulsory voting at age 18 is
associated with a precisely estimated decrease in turnout in subsequent compulsory elections
of around 1 percentage point. This negative downstream effect is observed across all
municipal and general elections in the sample and withstands several robustness checks. I
interpret the negative downstream effect as a first-time compulsory voting boost amongst
individuals who are compelled to vote for the first time as opposed to the second time.5
Further analysis shows that the first-time compulsory voting boost gradually disappears
as voters experience subsequent compulsory elections. Evidence on potential mechanisms
suggests that targeted mobilisation of first-time compulsory voters is a plausible explanation
behind the turnout boost. Alternative explanations that focus on voters’ psychological
response to compulsory voting find less support in the data.
The paper makes three distinct contributions. First, it makes an important empirical
contribution to the voting habits literature, which has so far focused on countries with
voluntary voting systems. Whilst this literature has found that voting in one election increases
one’s propensity to vote in the future (Coppock and Green, 2016; de Kadt, 2017; Dinas,
2012; Fujiwara et al., 2016; Meredith, 2009), I provide first causal evidence of an opposite
association under compulsory voting. The paper therefore clarifies the scope conditions of
prior research on voting habits and shows that previous findings do not necessarily generalise
to contexts where voting is compulsory. To my knowledge, only two studies have so far
examined the relationship between compulsory voting and voting habits, and found no
evidence for a causal effect (Bechtel et al., 2018; Gaebler et al., 2017). However, both studies
rely on aggregate-level turnout data, which raises ecological inference concerns. In particular,
the null results at the aggregate level may hide significant heterogeneity in citizens’ response
to compulsory voting. This is important because research on political socialisation suggests
that young citizens, who have not yet become habitual voters or abstainers, are likely to
be more responsive to interventions such as compulsory voting compared to older citizens
(Franklin and Hobolt, 2011; Franklin et al., 2004; Plutzer, 2002). To draw firm conclusions
about the behavioural consequences of compulsory voting, we therefore need to analyse
4In this case, habit formation can be attributed to the introduction of compulsory voting at age 18.
5This interpretation is in line with recent quasi-experimental research from Denmark and Finland (Bhatti
et al., 2016), which I discuss in more detail in the next section.
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individual-level turnout data. I address this gap in the literature by providing first micro-level
evidence on the relationship between compulsory voting and citizens’ long-term turnout
behaviour.
Second, the paper speaks to the ongoing debate over the second-order effects of com-
pulsory voting.6 While some studies have found that compulsory voting can foster citizens’
pro-civic orientations by increasing their political knowledge, interest, and sense of civic
duty to vote (Córdova and Rangel, 2017; Feitosa et al., 2019; Sheppard, 2015; Shineman,
2012), others provide null results or evidence that compulsory voting can foster anti-system
sentiments (De Leon and Rizzi, 2014; Henn and Oldfield, 2016; Holbein et al., 2020; Loewen
et al., 2008; Selb and Lachat, 2009; Singh, 2019; Singh and Roy, 2018). In line with the
second set of studies, the results presented here suggest that the transformative potential
of compulsory voting is limited. In particular, the results cast doubts on recent proposals
to make voting compulsory for first-time voters only in order to boost aggregate turnout in
the long run (Birch and Lodge, 2015; Lodge and Birch, 2012) as there is no evidence that
compulsory voting can instil voting habits in young people.7
Finally, the paper makes a theoretical contribution to the small, but rapidly growing
literature on the first-time voting boost, which has found that (voluntary) turnout amongst
first-time voters in several European countries is often significantly higher than turnout
amongst comparable second-time voters (Bhatti and Hansen, 2012; Bhatti et al., 2016;
Konzelmann et al., 2012; Zeglovits and Aichholzer, 2014). Specifically, I propose (and test)
several mechanisms that can explain a first-time voting boost under compulsory voting rules.
Empirically, I provide first evidence of the first-time voting boost outside of Europe and in
the context of compulsory voting.
4.2 Theory and hypotheses
The voting habits theory posits that the act of voting is self-reinforcing (Aldrich et al., 2011)
and that voting habits are acquired during one’s first few electoral experiences (Franklin
et al., 2004; Plutzer, 2002). It remains unclear, however, what the precise causal mechanisms
6Second-order effects refer to those effects beyond the immediate impact of compulsory voting on turnout
(Fowler, 2013; Hirczy, 1994; Jaitman, 2013).
7No country in the world has compulsory voting for first-time voters, so it is not possible to directly test
the validity of the claim that first-time compulsory voting can instil voting habits. However, I show that the
introduction of compulsory voting at age 18 has no positive downstream turnout effects, despite having a strong
positive impact on contemporaneous turnout. This indicates that compulsory voting has very limited or no
influence on the formation of voting habits.
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are through which voting in one election increases one’s propensity to vote in the future.
In theory, past turnout could affect any of the terms in the Downsian cost-benefit model
(Fujiwara et al., 2016). Furthermore, it could influence the strategic behaviour of political
parties and interest groups, for example, if active voters are more easily mobilised than
inactive voters (Gerber et al., 2003).
If compulsory voting boosts turnout contemporaneously,8 then the voting habits theory
provides several plausible mechanisms through which compulsory voting can be expected
to have a positive effect on downstream turnout.9 First, voting in one election may lower
the perceived cost of voting in subsequent elections. In their first election, voters must incur
informational fixed costs such as learning how to get to the polling station, and if voters are
risk averse, they will become more likely to vote once they learn about the true opportunity
cost of voting (Fujiwara et al., 2016). Second, voting in one election may lead citizens to
positively update their taste for voting, thereby increasing the intrinsic rewards of voting in
the future. A plausible micro-foundation for this mechanism is cognitive dissonance, whereby
voters adjust their taste for voting in order to create consonance with their past behaviour
(Mullainathan and Washington, 2006). Third, voting in one election may increase citizens’
extrinsic motivation to vote in the future, for example through social norms that reward active
voters and punish abstainers (Gerber et al., 2008). The voting habits theory therefore predicts
that compulsory voting has a positive effect on downstream turnout, regardless of the specific
mechanism underlying the relationship.
H1: Downstream turnout is higher (or equal) amongst citizens who were compelled to
vote in a previous election compared to citizens who could vote voluntarily in a previous
election, all else being equal.
In contrast, the first-time voting boost theory predicts that first-time voters turn out at a
higher rate than comparable second-time voters due to the psychological rewards of being
able to vote for the first time (Bhatti et al., 2016; Zeglovits and Aichholzer, 2014). The theory
draws on recent quasi-experimental evidence from Denmark and Finland, which shows that
voluntary turnout amongst first-time voters can be up to 13 percentage points higher than
turnout amongst comparable second-time voters (Bhatti et al., 2016). Observational studies
from Germany and Austria also find evidence of a first-time voting boost (Konzelmann et al.,
2012; Zeglovits and Aichholzer, 2014). Whilst there is robust empirical support for the idea
8I show this empirically in Appendix B.
9If turnout behaviour is solely determined by voting habits (and cost-benefit calculations play no role), the
voting habits theory predicts zero downstream turnout effects. This is because there would be no difference
in contemporaneous turnout between voluntary and compulsory voters. However, in Appendix B, I show
that compulsory voting has a significant positive effect on contemporaneous turnout, which indicates that this
scenario has little empirical support.
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of a first-time voluntary voting boost, the causal mechanisms behind the phenomenon remain
largely unexplored. Furthermore, it is unclear which mechanism, if any, could account for a
first-time voting boost under compulsory voting, given that prior research has focused on
voluntary voting systems.
In theory, there are at least three plausible explanations for why first-time compulsory
voters can be expected to turn out at a higher rate than comparable second-time compulsory
voters. First, being compelled to vote in one election may lead citizens to negatively update
their taste for voting, thereby decreasing the intrinsic rewards of voting in the future. This
scenario is consistent with evidence showing that compulsory voting can foster anti-system
sentiments (Henn and Oldfield, 2016; Miles and Mullinix, 2019; Singh and Roy, 2018)
and that extrinsic incentives to bring about a specific behaviour may decrease individuals’
intrinsic motivation to engage in such behaviour (Deci et al., 1999; Gneezy et al., 2011).
Second, as suggested in previous studies (Bhatti and Hansen, 2012; Bhatti et al., 2016), one’s
first election may elicit a certain amount of excitement or hype, regardless of whether this
election is voluntary or compulsory. In Brazil, the first election for many young citizens is
indeed compulsory, despite the fact that voting is voluntary for 16-17 year-olds. Holbein
and Rangel (2020) estimate that only 15-20% of young Brazilians who are barely eligible
to vote voluntarily actually turn out, whereas an estimated 70% of those barely eligible for
compulsory voting turn out to vote.10 Finally, first-time compulsory voters may be more
receptive to mobilising agents such parents, political parties or the media (Bhatti and Hansen,
2012), so that mobilisation could account for higher turnout amongst this group compared to
second-time compulsory voters. Regardless of the mechanism underlying the relationship,
the first-time voting boost theory predicts that compulsory voting is negatively associated
with downstream turnout.
H2: Turnout is lower amongst citizens who are compelled to vote for the second time
compared to citizens who are compelled to vote for the first time, all else being equal.
4.3 Compulsory voting in Brazil
Brazil is an ideal case study to investigate the behavioural consequences of compulsory
voting. First, Brazil has used compulsory voting in all elections since 1934 (Power, 2009),
so the results are unlikely to be driven by novelty effects that may confound findings on
more recent electoral reforms (cf. Zeglovits and Aichholzer 2014). Second, compulsory
10Holbein and Rangel (2020) rely on voter files for the 2008-2012 elections and estimate the voting age
population using data from the Brazilian National Household Survey.
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voting is strictly enforced in Brazil, which is not the case in neighbouring countries such as
Bolivia or Paraguay (Power, 2009). Third, Brazil’s progressive open data legislation means
that validated turnout data are relatively easy to access. With an electorate of more than 169
million and a population of around 206 million, Brazil is also the most populous country in
the world to use compulsory voting, lending considerable statistical power to the analysis.11
Most importantly, however, Brazil’s electoral rules establish voting age thresholds, which
can be leveraged to isolate the causal effect of compulsory voting.
Brazil’s constitution mandates that registration and electoral participation is compulsory
for citizens who are aged 18 to 69 years on Election Day,12 and voluntary for those who are
aged 16 to 17 years, 70 years or older, illiterate, or members of indigenous tribes. Exemptions
are only granted upon request in the event of illness, travel, or to government employees.
Brazilians who fail to comply with compulsory voting must justify themselves before an
electoral court, or they incur a fine of R$1.05 to R$3.51 (approx. US$0.25 - US$0.85) for
each missed election.13 Those who fail to pay the fine are barred from enrolling or renewing
registration in public schools and universities, taking civil service exams, bidding for public
tenders, receiving public sector salaries, requesting loans from public banks, and obtaining a
passport or ID card. Registered voters who fail to vote, justify their abstention, or pay the
fine in three consecutive elections are removed from the voter register and need to re-apply in
person to regularise their status. Cepaluni and Hidalgo (2016) argue that the small monetary
fines are unlikely to deter even poor Brazilians from abstaining. However, the prohibition
on access to public services and employment appears to be effective and primarily deter
well-educated Brazilians from abstaining, as they are likely to seek access to public services
and employment (Cepaluni and Hidalgo, 2016).
Elections always take place on the first Sunday of October, alternating every two years
between municipal and general elections for federal- and state-level positions (see Appendix
A for details). Elections for president, governor, and mayor of municipalities with 200,000
or more registered voters follow a dual-ballot plurality rule, where a runoff is required
between the top two candidates if no candidate receives an absolute majority in the first
round. Elections for federal senator and mayor of municipalities with fewer than 200,000
registered voters follow a single-ballot plurality rule.14 Federal and state deputies as well
as municipal councillors are elected using a proportional representation system. In terms of
11Electorate and population figures are for 2016 and were obtained from the TSE voter file and IBGE
respectively (www.ibge.gov.br).
12Specifically, the day of the first round election in cases where there is a run-off election.
13Each missed election round is counted separately. If considered ineffective, a judge may increase the
maximum fine of R$3.51 by a factor of 10.
14As of 2016, 98% of all 5,568 municipalities had fewer than 200,000 registered voters.
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turnout, general and municipal elections in Brazil are very similar, with average turnout rates
of around 80 percent.15
4.4 Methods and data
The empirical strategy leverages the fact that Brazil’s electoral rules make voting compulsory
for individuals who turn 18 before or on Election Day, whereas individuals who are slightly
younger (aged 16-17) can still vote voluntarily. The causal effect of compulsory voting on
downstream turnout is isolated by comparing turnout in one election (e.g. the 2016 municipal
election) between individuals who are the same in all respects, except that some were just
old enough or just too young to be eligible for compulsory voting in the previous election
(in this case the 2014 general election).16 Given that elections always take place on the first
Sunday of October every two years, there is a nearly perfect overlap between individuals
who were just too young to be eligible for compulsory voting in one election and those who
are eligible for compulsory voting for the first time in the next election two years later (see
Appendix A for details).
In the main analysis, the treatment effect of compulsory voting eligibility on downstream
turnout is estimated using a sharp RD design under the assumption that the potential outcomes
of voters are continuous at the eligibility threshold (Hahn et al., 2001).17 This assumption is
a priori plausible given that individuals cannot precisely manipulate their date of birth.18
In Appendix C, I present several falsification tests (density, covariate balance, and placebo
cut-off tests) that lend additional support to the identification strategy. Point estimates are
obtained by fitting local linear regressions separately on both sides of the threshold. Optimal
bandwidths around the threshold are chosen to minimise the mean squared error (MSE) of
the local point estimator (Cattaneo, Idrobo and Titiunik, 2018a). A triangular kernel gives
15Aggregate turnout data for previous elections are available from the TSE data repository.
16In general elections, all citizens are equally exposed to a runoff election. However, this is not the case in
municipal elections due to the 200,000-population threshold rule. Consequently, individuals who were eligible
to vote in a run-off election in 2008 and 2012 are excluded from the analysis of downstream effects on turnout
in 2010 and 2014 respectively.
17Cattaneo, Idrobo and Titiunik (2018b) suggest that if the number of mass points in a discrete running
variable (in this case birthdate) is reasonably large, it is acceptable to employ a continuity-based RD approach.
18A potential threat to causal inference are other treatments that come into effect at the age threshold (e.g.
eligibility for driver’s licence at age 18). However, given that elections in Brazil take place on a Sunday, these
additional treatments are unlikely to have immediate effects (Cepaluni and Hidalgo, 2016). A related concern
is that treatment and control groups belong to different school-year cohorts. However, this is unlikely to be
a problem given that Brazil’s school year starts in February and ends in December, with children typically
enrolling in primary school if they turn six during their first school year.
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more weight to observations closer to the threshold and robust bias-corrected confidence
intervals are constructed using the approach described in (Calonico et al., 2014).
Given that compliance with compulsory voting is imperfect in Brazil, the sharp RD esti-
mates are likely to be lower-bound estimates.19 Furthermore, the likely causal mechanisms
by which compulsory voting eligibility in one election might affect downstream turnout run
through its effect on contemporaneous turnout (see “Theory and hypotheses”). I therefore
also employ a fuzzy RD design, which isolates the complier average causal effect (CACE)
of compulsory voting on young citizens’ downstream turnout behaviour (Cattaneo, Idrobo
and Titiunik, 2018b). In the fuzzy RD design, the CACE is obtained by calculating the ratio
between the estimated effect of compulsory voting eligibility (treatment assignment) on
downstream turnout (outcome) and the estimated effect of compulsory voting eligibility on
contemporaneous turnout (treatment take-up). As in the sharp RD analysis, fuzzy RD esti-
mates are obtained by fitting local linear regressions separately on both sides of the eligibility
threshold, using triangular kernels and MSE-optimal bandwidths.20 Valid causal identifica-
tion requires that both potential treatment take-up and potential outcomes are continuous at
the age threshold.21 The results from the density and covariate balance tests suggest that this
assumption is plausible (Appendix C). Furthermore, valid causal identification in the fuzzy
RD design requires (1) that the exclusion restriction holds, (2) that the first-stage effect is
statistically significant (relevance assumption), and (3) that there are no defiers (monotonicity
assumption) (Dong, 2018). Assumption (1) implies that compulsory voting eligibility in one
election only affects turnout in the subsequent election through its contemporaneous turnout
effect. Whilst this assumption is not directly verifiable from the data, it seems improbable that
compulsory voting eligibility in one election would have a direct effect on turnout behaviour
in a subsequent election. Furthermore, most of the plausible causal mechanisms by which
compulsory voting eligibility in one election could affect downstream turnout run through
its effect on contemporaneous turnout (see “Theory and hypotheses”). Assumption (2) in
turn implies that compulsory voting eligibility has a significant effect on contemporaneous
turnout. I show this empirically in Appendix B. Finally, assumption (3) implies that there
are no defiers. Defiers are individuals who would vote if and only if they are assigned to
the control group (eligible for voluntary voting), but would abstain if and only if they are
19An estimated 70% of those barely eligible for compulsory voting turn out to vote (Holbein and Rangel,
2020).
20In the fuzzy RD design, bandwidths are MSE-optimal only for the numerator (Calonico et al., 2015).
21This is also referred to as the local smoothness assumption (Dong, 2018). Note that the local smoothness
assumption is weaker than the local independence assumption proposed by Hahn et al. (2001).
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assigned to the treatment group (eligible for compulsory voting).22 Again, we cannot directly
verify this assumption, however, it seems unlikely that there are many voters in this category.
I use administrative data from the complete Brazilian voter files for all elections between
2008 and 2016. Each voter file records validated, individual-level turnout and exact date of
birth of over 150 million registered voters. In addition, the voter files record individuals’
gender, place of registration, biometric registration status, marital status, and education status
at the time of registration. The outcome variable used in the main (sharp) RD analysis
is continuous and records the average turnout rate in the first round of an election for all
registered voters who share the same date of birth.23 The running variable is individuals’
date of birth, centred on those who turned 18 on the day of the first round of the election
preceding the one being analysed.24 Illiterates are excluded as they are not affected by
compulsory voting rules. In the fuzzy RD design, the data are not collapsed to the birthdate-
level and the models are instead fitted on the raw data, with standard errors clustered at the
birthdate-level.25 The data are not collapsed in order to enable the matching of individuals
across different voter files using unique identifiers. Furthermore, the fuzzy RD analysis
only includes elections since 2012, given that unique identifiers are not available for earlier
elections.
4.5 Results
Contrary to the predictions of the voting habits theory, I find no evidence that the introduction
of compulsory voting at age 18 has a non-negative effect on downstream turnout (Hypothesis
1). This indicates that compulsory voting fails to be habit-forming. Instead, the results show
22In other words, the monotonicity assumption stipulates that compulsory voting eligibility either has no
contemporaneous turnout effect or causes an individual to vote contemporaneously who would have otherwise
abstained, but that it does not cause an individual to abstain contemporaneously who would have otherwise
voted.
23Following the advice of (Cattaneo, Idrobo and Titiunik, 2018b), the data are collapsed to the level of
birthdate (the discrete running variable) for the sharp RD analysis. In practice, fitting a local polynomial to the
collapsed data is roughly equivalent to fitting a local polynomial to the raw data with mass points (Cattaneo,
Idrobo and Titiunik, 2018b), which is the approach I take in the fuzzy RD analysis. In Appendix C, I show that
the main results also hold when fitting sharp RD models on the raw data and clustering the standard errors by
birthdate.
24All units receive a score (or running variable, forcing variable, index), where a treatment is assigned to
units who score above a known threshold and not assigned to units whose score below (Cattaneo, Idrobo and
Titiunik, 2018a).
25(Cattaneo, Idrobo and Titiunik, 2018b) show that when the running variable is discrete and the number of
mass points is relatively large (as is the case here), this approach is roughly equivalent to fitting an RD model
on the collapsed data.
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that the introduction of compulsory voting at age 18 has a small, but precisely estimated
negative effect on turnout in subsequent compulsory elections, in line with the predictions
of the first-time voting boost theory (Hypothesis 2). Figure 4.1 summarises the results
graphically using data from the 2016 municipal election. It shows that individuals who were
just old enough to be compelled to vote in 2014 (on the right of the threshold) have a lower
propensity to vote in 2016 compared to individuals who were just too young to be eligible
for compulsory voting in 2014 (on the left of the threshold), even though both groups are
compelled to vote in 2016.
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Data: 2016 voter file. Note: This graph shows the effect of 2014 eligibility for compulsory
voting on 2016 turnout. Curved solid lines represent 4th-order polynomial regressions
of turnout in 2016 on age in 2014 fitted separately above and below the cut-off. Grey
dots represent local turnout averages within evenly-spaced bins chosen to mimic the
variability in the underlying data.
Table 4.1 below provides estimates of the discontinuity displayed in Figure 4.1. Columns
2 and 3 show, respectively, sharp RD estimates from a local linear regression (Model 1) and
a local constant regression (Model 2). The last column (Model 3) replicates Model 1 using a
different bandwidth selection procedure. The RD estimates suggest that compulsory voting
eligibility in 2014 decreases turnout in 2016 by around 1 percentage point. This pattern is
found in all general and municipal elections for which complete voter files are available.
Figure 4.2 shows that the estimated effect of compulsory voting on downstream turnout
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is consistently negative for all elections between 2008 and 2016. The difference in point
estimates between 2016 and all other elections is not statistically significant, except for the
difference between 2016 and 2010.26 The results tables corresponding to Figure 4.2 are
found in Appendix B.
Table 4.1 Effect of compulsory voting on downstream turnout
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment effect -0.008 -0.009 -0.008
Robust 95% CI [-0.012, -0.006] [-0.012, -0.006] [-0.012, -0.005]
Robust p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Effective nr. obs. (left | right) 118 | 119 44 | 45 79 | 80
Bandwidth 118.6 44.97 79.57
Bias bandwidth 203.4 134.9 203.4
Bandwidth selection method MSE MSE CER
Note: Model 1 is a local linear MSE-optimal model. Model 2 is a local constant MSE-optimal model. Model
3 is a local linear CER-optimal model. Sharp RD estimates are constructed using local polynomial estimators
with triangular kernel; robust p-values are constructed using bias-correction with robust standard errors;
the MSE-optimal bandwidth minimises the mean squared error of the local polynomial point estimator; the
CER-optimal bandwidth minimises the coverage error rate of the robust bias-corrected confidence interval.
The bias bandwidth is used to calculate the bias correction estimate. Data: 2016 voter file.
Next, Table 4.2 presents results from the fuzzy RD design, which isolates the effect of CV
on downstream turnout amongst those who complied with CV when they first became eligible.
The estimated CACE is consistently negative across elections and statistically significant in
two out of three cases. The results indicate that the introduction of compulsory voting at age
18 decreases downstream turnout amongst compliers by 11-13 percentage points, which is
around ten times the size of the average downstream turnout effect.
Several robustness checks support the main findings. First, I show that the main results
are not sensitive to specific bandwidth choices (Appendix C). Second, I perform the standard
pattern of RD falsification tests (density, covariate balance, and placebo cut-off tests). While
the density and placebo cut-off tests are supportive of the identification strategy, the covariate
balance tests provide more mixed results (Appendix C). In particular, voters’ educational
status appears to be unbalanced at the compulsory voting threshold in 2014. To address this
concern, I show that the main results hold when controlling for educational status and when
using a much smaller bandwidth of only 24 days – where educational status is balanced
– together with a local randomisation RD approach (Appendix C). Third, I test whether
26To calculate the standard error and 95% confidence interval around the difference between two point
estimates, the sum of variances of the two point estimates is used as an estimate of the variance of the difference
(see Appendix B).
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the results hold unconditional on registration. Given that the voter files do not include
non-registered individuals, the results may suffer from post-treatment bias if individuals’
decision to register is affected by their eligibility for compulsory voting. In Appendix D, I
show that the main results hold unconditional on registration by using the estimated daily
turnout-to-population rate instead of the turnout-to-registration rate as the outcome variable.
Finally, I confirm that the main results are not confounded by a second treatment – the
introduction of voluntary voting at age 16. This is a possibility given that elections always
take place on the first Sunday of October every two years and voting becomes compulsory
exactly two years after 16-year-olds gain the right to vote voluntarily. To address this concern,
I leverage the fact that some voters are eligible for voluntary voting twice before becoming
eligible for compulsory voting. In Appendix E, I show that voluntary voting at age 16 has no
discernible effect on citizens’ downstream turnout behaviour, which suggests that the main
results are not confounded by this potential second treatment.27
































Data: 2008-2016 voter files. Note: Sharp RD estimates are from local linear regressions
with triangular kernel and MSE-optimal bandwidths. Vertical lines represent robust bias-
corrected 95% confidence intervals, which are constructed around the bias-corrected point
estimate, so they are not necessarily symmetric around the conventional point estimate.
Estimates for general elections 2010 and 2014 exclude individuals who were eligible to
vote in a run-off municipal election in 2008 and 2012 respectively. The corresponding
results tables are found in Appendix B.
27This is akin to showing that voluntary voting does not instil voting habits and that there is no first-time
voluntary voting boost in Brazil.
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Table 4.2 Fuzzy RD estimates of downstream turnout effect – 2012-2016
(1) (2) (3)
2016 - Municipal 2014 - General 2012 -Municipal
First-stage estimate 0.0625 0.0504 0.0416
Robust standard error 0.00291 0.00199 0.00218
Treatment effect (CACE) -0.116 -0.035 -0.133
Robust p-value (0.028) (0.281) (0.038)
Observations 11,640,762 10,148,627 14,227,078
Bias bandwidth 106.4 188.2 191.4
Bandwidth 42.60 120.1 62.51
Eff. nr. obs. R 216397 579580 405413
Eff. nr. obs. L 147546 449321 301878
Robust 95% CI R -0.0125 0.0454 -0.00752
Robust 95% CI L -0.222 -0.156 -0.271
Note: The binary dependent variable is individual-level turnout. The CACE represents the estimated effect
of introducing compulsory voting in the previous election on turnout in the current election for individuals
who complied with compulsory voting in the previous election. Fuzzy RD estimates are from local linear
regressions with triangular kernel and MSE-optimal bandwidths. Robust 95% confidence intervals are
bias-corrected. Standard errors are clustered at the birthdate-level. The estimate for the 2014 general election
excludes individuals who were eligible to vote in a run-off municipal election in 2012.
4.5.1 Does the first-time boost disappear over time?
In theory, turnout rates between first-time and second-time eligibles for compulsory voting
should become indistinguishable over time, as the two groups grow older and the novelty
effect of being compelled to vote gradually disappears. To assess whether the first-time
compulsory voting boost disappears over time, I examine how the downstream turnout effect
of compulsory voting develops over several elections. Figure 4.3 displays the effect of
compulsory voting on downstream turnout in 2016 for cohorts who were barely (in-)eligible
for compulsory voting in elections going back until 2002.28 The results indicate that the
first-time compulsory voting boost does indeed disappear after around two elections, given
that the estimates become indistinguishable from zero thereafter.29 Figure 4.3 also provides
further evidence that compulsory voting does not appear to be habit-forming. This is because
28A necessary assumption is that there are no significant differences between cohorts who became eligible
for compulsory voting between 2002 and 2016.
29An exception is the estimate for 2008.
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the estimates remain close to zero and never cross over into the positive, as one would expect
if compulsory voting were habit-forming.30



























Year of first compulsory election
Point estimate
Bias-corrected 95% CI
Data: 2016 voter file. Note: This graph shows the estimated effect of compulsory
voting on 2016 turnout for cohorts who were barely (in-)eligible for compulsory voting
in elections going back until 2002. Exact dates for all elections since 2002 are found
in Appendix A. Sharp RD estimates are from local linear regressions with triangular
kernel and MSE-optimal bandwidths. Vertical lines represent robust bias-corrected 95%
confidence intervals, which are constructed around the bias-corrected point estimate, so
they are not necessarily symmetric around the conventional point estimate.
4.5.2 Why is there a first-time compulsory voting boost?
The first-time voting boost theory provides several plausible explanations for the negative
association between compulsory voting and downstream turnout. These can be further
explored using the available data. Mobilisation is one potential mechanism behind the first-
time compulsory voting boost in Brazil. Previous studies from countries with voluntary voting
rules have attributed the first-time voting boost to first-time voters’ increased receptiveness
30There is little reason to assume that the first-time voting boost would persist for more than two or three
election cycles (Bhatti et al., 2016), whereas prior research on voting habits shows that voting in a single
election can affect downstream turnout several decades later (Dinas, 2012). If compulsory voting has any
positive effects on downstream turnout, the estimates should therefore eventually cross over into the positive,
which they do not do.
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to election-related information and mobilising agents such as the media, political parties,
parents and friends (Bhatti and Hansen, 2012; Bhatti et al., 2016). This explanation stands in
the tradition of the mobilisation theory of voter turnout, which argues that citizens decide
to vote because their families and peers do so, or because they are mobilised by political
campaigns (Gerber et al., 2008; Green et al., 2003; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).
Both street campaigns and media ads are important types of campaigning in Brazil, and
although television and radio airtime is free during the election period, candidates spend
significant resources on producing campaign ads (Avis et al., 2018). If mobilisation by
political campaigns plays a role in explaining the first-time compulsory voting boost in
Brazil, then we might expect the turnout boost to be more pronounced in closely contested
elections, given that campaigns are likely to focus their mobilisation efforts on marginal
seats (Cox and Munger, 1989). To assess whether this is the case, I disaggregate the RD
analysis by competitive and uncompetitive municipalities, using three different measures
of electoral competition: the percentage winning margin, the expected closeness, and the
raw winning margin (see Appendix F for details). The results are summarised in Figure
4.4, which shows that the first-time compulsory voting boost is roughly twice as large in
competitive municipalities compared to uncompetitive municipalities. This may indicate that
targeted mobilisation plays a role in explaining the first-time compulsory voting boost in
Brazil.
Psychological mechanisms may also play a role. First, one’s first election may elicit a
certain amount of excitement or hype, regardless of whether this election is voluntary or
compulsory (Bhatti et al., 2016). Second, being compelled to vote in one election may lead
citizens to negatively update their taste for voting, thereby decreasing the intrinsic rewards of
voting in the future. Unfortunately, the voter file data do not allow us to explore these potential
mechanisms in detail. However, in Appendix E, I show that there is no comparable first-time
voting boost amongst voluntary voters, which casts some doubts on the first explanation.
In relation to the second explanation, Holbein and Rangel (2020) recently showed that
compulsory voting in Brazil has precisely estimated null-effects on young citizens’ political
interest, knowledge, social awareness, and civic engagement. If we accept these measures as
suitable proxies for individuals’ intrinsic motivation to vote, then the null results cast some
doubts on the idea that compulsory voting leads citizens to negatively update their taste for
voting. However, there is also evidence that compulsory voting can trigger anger (Miles
and Mullinix, 2019) and exacerbate anti-democratic sentiments in citizens (Singh and Roy,
2018), so the idea of negative updating cannot be dismissed entirely.
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Competitive municipalities Uncompetitive municipalities
Winning margin 2016 (competitive if ≤ 10)
Av. winning margin 2004-12 (competitive if ≤ 10)
Raw winning margin 2016 (competitive if ≤ median)
Data: 2016 voter file. Note: This graph shows the effect of 2014 eligibility for compulsory
voting on 2016 turnout separately for voters registered in competitive and uncompetitive
municipalities. Municipalities are coded as competitive if 1) the winning margin of the
leading mayoral candidate in the 2016 municipal election is 10 percentage points; 2)
the average winning margin in municipal elections 2004-2012 is 10 percentage points;
3) the raw winning margin in 2016 is the median raw winning margin in 2016 (806
votes). Sharp RD estimates are from local linear regressions with triangular kernel and
MSE-optimal bandwidths. Vertical lines represent robust bias-corrected 95% confidence
intervals, which are constructed around the bias-corrected point estimate, so they are not
necessarily symmetric around the conventional point estimate.
4.5.3 Who is mobilised?
Recent research suggests that voter mobilisation can happen along various dimensions
simultaneously (Bechtel and Schmid, 2020; Gerber et al., 2013; Hodler et al., 2015). This
raises the question of what types of voters are mobilised in the first-time compulsory voting
boost in Brazil. The voter files include some individual-level covariates (educational status
and gender) that allow me to explore this issue in more detail.31 In Appendix G, I show that
the first-time compulsory voting boost is more pronounced amongst better educated, male
citizens,32 which may indicate that these socio-economic groups are particularly receptive
31Marital status is also recorded, but only around 2.5% of all 16-24 year olds are married (as of 2016).
32Better educated, male citizens are what Bechtel and Schmid (2020) refer to as “likely voters”. Education is
a strong predictor of turnout (Lindgren et al., 2019; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). There is also evidence of
a persistent gender gap in turnout, especially in second-order elections (Kostelka et al., 2019).
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to mobilisation efforts in their first compulsory election.33 The findings qualify previous
research by Cepaluni and Hidalgo (2016) who find that CV in Brazil has a stronger mobilising
effect on contemporaneous turnout amongst the better educated. My results indicate that
this unequal mobilisation due to CV may only be short-lived and primarily affects first-time
compulsory voters, as demobilisation in downstream elections is also more pronounced
amongst the better educated.
4.6 Discussion
Several experimental and quasi-experimental studies from countries with voluntary voting
rules suggest that voting is habit-forming (Coppock and Green, 2016; de Kadt, 2017; Dinas,
2012; Gerber et al., 2003; Meredith, 2009). Estimates from the US indicate that voluntary
voting in one election increases turnout in downstream elections by around 5-10 percentage
points, which is interpreted as evidence for habit formation (Coppock and Green, 2016). In
this paper, I leverage voting age discontinuities in Brazil’s electoral rules to show that this
pattern does not hold when voting is compulsory. The results highlight the scope conditions
of existing research on voting habits and suggest that previous findings do not generalise
to contexts where voting is compulsory. This is important given that around a quarter of
all democracies have compulsory voting systems (Birch, 2009) and compulsory voting
is frequently proposed as a solution to low and unequal turnout in Western democracies
(Bechtel et al., 2016; Franklin et al., 2004; Lijphart, 1977). While the findings from Brazil
may not necessarily generalise to all countries with compulsory voting systems – given
that enforcement and penalties vary widely (Singh, 2011) – they pertain directly to nearby
countries such as Argentina and Ecuador, which use the same compulsory voting age
thresholds as Brazil (Singh, 2019).34
Using validated, individual-level turnout data from the Brazilian voter files, I find no
evidence that compulsory voting is habit-forming, even after several compulsory elections.
This corroborates previous aggregate-level findings from Switzerland and Austria, where
ecological inference concerns have prevented firm conclusions (Bechtel et al., 2018; Gaebler
et al., 2017). In addition, however, the evidence presented in this paper points to a first-time
compulsory voting boost. Individuals who are compelled to vote for the second time are less
likely to turn out than comparable individuals who are compelled to vote for the first time.
33It is conceivable that the first-time compulsory voting boost is also driven by ‘reluctant’ voters, who are
particularly prone to cast blank or invalid ballots (Singh, 2019). Unfortunately, the Brazilian voter files do not
record invalid votes, so it is not possible to test this hypothesis using the available data.
34Note that in Ecuador voting is voluntary for over-65 year-olds.
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This negative association between compulsory voting and downstream turnout is precisely
estimated and observed across all general and municipal elections between 2008 and 2016.
At around ten percentage points, the estimated first-time compulsory voting boost amongst
compliers is comparable in size to the positive downstream turnout effects attributed to voting
habits in the US (Coppock and Green, 2016) as well as the first-time voluntary voting boost
of around 13 percentage points previously found in Denmark and Finland (Bhatti et al.,
2016).35 Furthermore, by focusing only on the effect of CV at the age 18 threshold, we
may in fact underestimate the overall mobilising effect of CV amongst first-time voters in
Brazil. Using a similar RD design, Turgeon and Blais (2019) find evidence for a significant
additional turnout boost amongst voters who turn 18 just before the end of the election year,
which they attribute to ignorance amongst Brazilians about when the age criterion for CV
applies.36 Turgeon and Blais (2019) also suggest that ignorance about the age criterion is
more prevalent amongst less educated voters, which implies that the end-of-the-year turnout
boost to some extent equalises the turnout differences between education groups identified at
the age 18 threshold (see Appendix G).
How can the findings from Brazil be reconciled with prior research on voting habits
from the US? One plausible explanation relates to differences between countries in terms of
institutional barriers to voting (Melton, 2014). In the US, for example, newly enfranchised
citizens face significant barriers to enrolling on the voter register (Holbein and Hillygus,
2016). Once completed, voter registration can therefore be perceived as an investment in
future electoral participation, which may increase the turnout propensity of second-time
eligibles relative to first-time eligibles (Bhatti et al., 2016). Whilst the first-time voting boost
may also be present in the US electorate,37 the existence of significant institutional barriers
to voting means that previous electoral experiences (i.e. voting habits) play a much more
important role in predicting turnout amongst young US citizens (Melton, 2014). In contrast,
young Brazilians are compelled to register and participate in elections as soon as they turn 18,
which means that the perceived cost of voting (or abstaining) should be roughly the same for
first-time and second-time compulsory voting eligibles. Compulsory voting might therefore
equalise some of the age differentials in youth turnout that previous studies from the US have
attributed to voting habit formation (Coppock and Green, 2016; Meredith, 2009; Plutzer,
2002).
35Coppock and Green (2016) estimate the CACE whilst Bhatti et al. (2016) estimate the ATE.
36Many Brazilian voters appear to mistakenly believe that CV eligibility is determined by the year of birth
rather than the date of birth. Turgeon and Blais (2019) estimate that nearly a third of the contemporaneous
turnout effect of CV can be attributed to voter ignorance about when the age criterion for CV applies.
37For example, there is evidence of a first-time voluntary voting boost in the Californian electorate (see
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/01/17/the-remarkable-california-turnout-curve/)
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An alternative explanation for the divergent findings from the US and Brazil is that the
coercive element of compulsory voting leads young citizens to negatively update their taste
for voting, thereby undermining habit formation in the Brazilian electorate. This explanation
has intuitive appeal. However, the available evidence on the link between compulsory voting
and citizens’ intrinsic motivation to vote remains limited and has so far been inconclusive
(cf. Feitosa et al. 2019; Holbein and Rangel 2020). Further research is necessary to establish
which psychological mechanism, if any, can best explain why compulsory voting is negatively
associated with downstream turnout. There also remains a concern that individuals’ age
at their first compulsory election represents a second treatment that could explain some
of the turnout differences between first-time and second-time compulsory voters in Brazil.
Unfortunately, the RD design using voting age discontinuities does not allow me to address
this methodological concern in a satisfactory manner, so the results should be interpreted
with this limitation in mind.38
Finally, the findings have important implications for the ongoing debate over the second-
order effects of compulsory voting. The idea that compulsory voting can have positive
externalities (beyond the well-established immediate impact on turnout) is frequently put
forward by academics and policymakers arguing for the introduction of compulsory voting in
the US and other Western democracies. For example, in his well-known presidential address
to the American Political Science Association, Arend Lijphart argued that the introduction of
compulsory voting in the US would “stimulate stronger participation and interest in other
political activities” (Lijphart 1997, p.10). Similarly, President Obama spoke out in favour
of compulsory voting, arguing that “it would be transformative if everybody voted – that
[it] would counteract money more than anything.”39 These optimistic accounts, however,
contrast markedly with more recent academic contributions, which suggest that compulsory
voting has no effect on citizens’ pro-civic orientations (De Leon and Rizzi, 2014; Holbein and
Rangel, 2020; Loewen et al., 2008) and may even exacerbate anti-system sentiments (Miles
and Mullinix, 2019; Singh and Roy, 2018). While the debate is far from being settled, the
results presented here give further credence to the sceptics and suggest that the transformative
potential of compulsory voting may be limited. In particular, the results cast doubts on the
idea that compulsory voting for first-time voters only could boost aggregate turnout in the
long run (Birch et al., 2015; Lodge and Birch, 2012), as there is no evidence that compulsory
voting can instil voting habits in young people.
38This limitation also pertains to previous studies on habit formation under voluntary voting that rely on
voting age discontinuities (Coppock and Green, 2016; Dinas, 2012; Meredith, 2009).





Elections in Brazil always take place on the first Sunday of October, alternating every two
years between municipal and general elections for federal- and state-level positions. Elections
for president, governor, and mayor of municipalities with 200,000 or more registered voters
follow a dual-ballot plurality rule, where a runoff is required between the top two candidates
if no candidate receives an absolute majority in the first round. Runoff elections always
take place on the last Sunday of October. Elections for federal senator and mayor of
municipalities with fewer than 200,000 registered voters instead follow a single-ballot
plurality rule. Federal and state deputies as well as municipal councillors are elected using a
proportional representation system. Voter registration closes 151 days before the election.
Registered voters are removed from the voter rolls if they fail to vote, justify their abstention
or pay a fine in three consecutive election rounds. Elected Presidents assume office on the
1st of January following the general election.
Table C1 Election dates 2002-2018
Election type Round Day Month Year Registration President
General 1 06 10 2002 08/05/2002
General 2 27 10 2002
Municipal 1 03 10 2004 05/05/2004
Municipal 2 31 10 2004
General 1 01 10 2006 03/05/2006
General 2 29 10 2006
Municipal 1 05 10 2008 07/05/2008
Municipal 2 26 10 2008
Lula
General 1 03 10 2010 05/05/2010
General 2 31 10 2010
Municipal 1 07 10 2012 09/05/2012
Municipal 2 28 10 2012
General 1 05 10 2014 07/05/2014
General 2 26 10 2014
Rousseff
Municipal 1 02 10 2016 04/05/2016
Municipal 2 30 10 2016
General 1 07 10 2018 09/05/2018
General 2 28 10 2018
Temer
Note: As of writing, complete voter files are unavailable for elections highlighted in
grey. Temer assumed office in August 2016 after his predecessor Dilma Rousseff was
impeached.
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B Results tables
Table C2 Effect of compulsory voting on contemporaneous turnout - all elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Election year 2016 2014 2012 2010 2008
Treatment effect 0.053 0.061 0.059 0.041 0.038
Robust SE 0.00149 0.00199 0.00188 0.00241 0.00151
Robust p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2,920 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923
Bias bandwidth 161.9 138.1 175.2 131.5 174
Bandwidth 76.80 50.89 73.50 56.58 81.48
Eff. nr. obs. R 77 51 74 57 82
Eff. nr. obs. L 76 50 73 56 81
Robust 95% CI R 0.0555 0.0640 0.0618 0.0451 0.0398
Robust 95% CI L 0.0497 0.0562 0.0544 0.0357 0.0339
Difference v 2016 0.008 0.006 0.012 0.015
Robust SE 0.002445 0.002389 0.002701 0.002124
p-value <0.05 <0.05 <0.05 <0.05
Note: Point estimates are from local linear regressions with triangular kernel and MSE-
optimal bandwidths. Robust 95% confidence intervals are bias-corrected. To compute the
standard error and confidence interval around the difference between the point estimates,
the sum of variances of the two point estimates was used as an estimate of the variance of
the difference.
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Table C3 Effect of compulsory voting on downstream turnout - all elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Election year 2016 2014 2012 2010 2008
Treatment effect -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003 -0.006
Robust SE 0.00165 0.00164 0.00170 0.00173 0.00134
Robust p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000)
Observations 2,920 2,921 2,923 2,921 2,923
Bias bandwidth 203.4 238.1 215.2 247.4 195.8
Bandwidth 118.6 140.7 134.9 158.3 124.5
Eff. nr. obs. R 119 141 135 159 125
Eff. nr. obs. L 118 140 134 158 124
Robust 95% CI R -0.00566 -0.00388 -0.00388 -0.000236 -0.00297
Robust 95% CI L -0.0121 -0.0103 -0.0105 -0.00701 -0.00822
Difference v 2016 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.002
Robust SE 0.002342 0.002383 0.002457 0.002116
p-value >0.05 >0.05 <0.05 >0.05
Note: Point estimates are from local linear regressions with triangular kernel and MSE-
optimal bandwidths. Robust 95% confidence intervals are bias-corrected. Estimates
of downstream effects for general elections 2010 and 2014 exclude individuals who
were eligible to vote in a run-off municipal election in 2008 and 2012 respectively. To
compute the standard error and confidence interval around the difference between the
point estimates, the sum of variances of the two point estimates was used as an estimate
of the variance of the difference.
C Robustness checks
Sensitivity to alternative bandwidths
To examine whether the main results are sensitive to alternative bandwidth choices, Figure
C1 shows how RD estimates from local linear regressions on the 2016 data vary for all
bandwidths between 20 and 400 days. The estimated contemporaneous effect of compulsory
voting is consistently positive and statistically significant across the range of alternative
bandwidths, varying between 5 and 7 percentage points. The estimated downstream effect of
compulsory voting is consistently negative and only becomes indistinguishable from zero at
extremely small bandwidths of less than 30 days. Bandwidth sensitivity results for all other
available elections are very similar to the results from 2016 and available on request.
156 Is compulsory voting habit-forming?





























) 42 126 211 295 379 463 548 632 716 800
Bias bandwidth (days)
20 60 100 140 180 220 260 300 340 380
Bandwidth (days)



























34 103 171 240 308 377 445 514 582 651
Bias bandwidth (days)
20 60 100 140 180 220 260 300 340 380
Bandwidth (days)
Conventional Bias-corrected
Effect of compulsory voting on downstream turnout
Data: 2016 voter file. Note: The figure displays the estimated effect of compulsory voting
eligibility in 2014 on contemporaneous and downstream turnout for various bandwidths.
Conventional (solid black line) and bias-corrected (solid blue line) point estimates are
from local linear regressions with triangular kernel; the vertical red line marks the MSE-
optimal bandwidth; dashed lines show robust bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals.
Robust bias-corrected confidence intervals are constructed around the bias-corrected
point estimate, so they are not necessarily symmetrical around the conventional point
estimate.
Density test of the running variable
A typical falsification test in RD analysis examines whether the number of observations
just above the cut-off is “surprisingly” different from the number of observations just below
the cut-off (Cattaneo, Idrobo and Titiunik, 2018a). Using data from the 2016 municipal
election, a visual inspection of the density of the running variable (birthdate) around the
compulsory voting eligibility thresholds (at age 18 in 2016 and 2014) suggests no obvious
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sorting of units to avoid or receive treatment (see Figures C2-C3 below). This makes intuitive
sense, as it is improbable that individuals (or their parents) would precisely manipulate their
date of birth to avoid being eligible for compulsory voting in a specific election. However,
Figure C2 does suggest an overall upward trend in the number of individuals included in
the voter file, which may be because older individuals are more likely to make themselves
known to the state for administrative reasons (e.g. because 18-year-olds need to prove their
voter file status is regular in order to enrol in university or renew their passports). To assess
whether different registration rates between treatment and control groups might bias the main
RD results on the contemporaneous turnout effect of CV, I replicate the analysis using the
turnout-to-population rate instead of the turnout-to-registration rate as outcome variable. The
results are presented in Table C9 in Appendix D and indicate that the overall upward trend in
registrants (depicted in Figure C2) is unlikely to bias the main RD results.










16 17 18 19 20
Individuals' age at 2016 election
Density
CV eligibility threshold
Data: 2016 voter file. Note: The range of the running variable is restricted to 2 years
around the threshold.
To formally test whether there is a disproportionate number of individuals just above the
thresholds relative to those just below the thresholds (or vice versa), I employ an automated
manipulation test using local polynomial density estimation (Cattaneo et al., 2017). At the
18+ threshold in 2016 (used in the RD analysis of contemporaneous turnout effects) the test
fails to reject the null hypothesis of no discontinuity in the density of the running variable
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Individual's age at 2014 election
Density
CV eligibility threshold
Data: 2016 voter file. Note: The range of the running variable is restricted to 2 years
around the threshold.
(p = 0.25), which is evidence against sorting.40 However, the same test rejects the null (p =
0.003) at the 18+ threshold in 2014. In other words, individuals who were just old enough
to be eligible for compulsory voting in 2014 appear to be disproportionately represented in
the 2016 voter file compared to those who were just too young to be eligible for compulsory
voting in 2014.
One explanation for this discontinuity is that registration rates differ systematically
between the two groups of young people. Even though both groups are legally required to
be registered for the 2016 election (given that compulsory voting applies to both), only the
slightly older group was already required to be registered for the previous election. It may be
that the additional two years in between the two elections as well as penalties imposed on
those who did not register in 2014 (despite being legally required to do so), increased the
likelihood of individuals in the slightly older group to be registered in 2016. To address this
concern, I employ administrative data on daily birth totals in Brazil to estimate the number of
unregistered citizens in treatment and control groups (see Appendix D). The results suggest
that the main RD estimates are not subject to differential registration bias.
Another explanation for the discontinuity at the 18+ threshold in 2014 is that systematic
manipulation of the running variable score occurred. In this case, it is natural to assume that
40Density tests for other elections included in the robustness checks are available on request.
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the units closest to the threshold are most likely to be affected by such sorting (Cattaneo,
Idrobo and Titiunik, 2018a). To address this concern, I run several “donut hole” RD models
– where units that are very close to the threshold are excluded from the analysis. The results
from the donut hole RD models (Table C4) show that the main results are robust to excluding
observations in close proximity to the threshold.
Table C4 Donut hole RD estimates of downstream turnout effect – 2016 data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exclusion bandwidth 5 days 10 days 15 days 20 days
Treatment effect -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006
Robust p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.045)
Observations 2,911 2,901 2,891 2,881
Bias bandwidth 194.8 199.8 212.2 199.2
Bandwidth 112.8 111.9 113.3 106
Eff. nr. obs. R 108 102 99 86
Eff. nr. obs. L 108 102 99 86
Robust 95% CI R -0.00626 -0.00448 -0.000660 -0.000135
Robust 95% CI L -0.0130 -0.0128 -0.0118 -0.0123
Note: Point estimates are from local linear regressions with triangular kernel and MSE-
optimal bandwidths. Robust 95% confidence intervals are bias-corrected.
Covariate balance tests
Another common falsification test in RD analysis examines whether treated units (just above
the threshold) and control units (just below the threshold) are similar in terms of observable,
pre-determined covariates. If units do not have precise control over their score on the
running variable, there should be no difference between units just above and below the
threshold, except for their treatment status (Cattaneo, Idrobo and Titiunik, 2018b). Suitable
covariates recorded in the voter files are individuals’ gender, biometric registration status and
educational status at the time of registration.41 Using data from the 2016 municipal election,
Table C5 presents sharp RD estimates of the effect of compulsory voting eligibility in 2016
and 2014 on predetermined covariates (aggregated to birthdate).42 The results show that the
41Marital status is also recorded in the voter files. However, I do not conduct balance tests on this variable,
as only 2.5% of all 16-24 year olds in the 2016 voter file are married.
42For balance tests, the CER-optimal bandwidth selection procedure is the most appropriate, given that we
are primarily interested in testing the null hypothesis of no discontinuity at the cut-off (Cattaneo, Idrobo and
Titiunik, 2018a).
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null hypothesis of no discontinuity cannot be rejected in 4 out of 8 tests, which suggests
covariate balance in those cases. Educational and biometric status, however, appear to be
unbalanced at the 18+ threshold in 2014, although the difference between treatment and
control groups is in both cases relatively small. Given that educational status may be related
to turnout behaviour in Brazil (Cepaluni and Hidalgo, 2016), this imbalance at the threshold
might bias the results.
Table C5 Sharp RD estimates for predetermined covariates – 2016 data
Variable Sharp RD estm. CER-optimal bw. Bias bw. p-value
At 18+ threshold in 2016
Primary education 0.004 75.74 179.3 0.354
Secondary education 0.003 45.37 158.5 0.450
Females 0.006 117.1 269.9 0.004
Biometric registration -0.006 54.06 158.1 0.051
At 18+ threshold in 2014
Primary education -0.036 124.6 346.2 0.000
Secondary education -0.064 126.2 329.4 0.000
Females 0.001 144.9 328.0 0.740
Biometric registration -0.032 92.72 287.7 0.000
Note: Sharp RD estimator, CER optimal bandwidth, bias bandwidth and robust p-values are shown. Point
estimates are constructed using local polynomial estimators with triangular kernel; robust p-values are
constructed using bias-correction with robust standard errors; the CER-optimal bandwidth is chosen automat-
ically to minimise the coverage error rate of the robust bias-corrected confidence interval. Predetermined
covariates are aggregated to date of birth.
One explanation for the imbalances in the education variables is that they are an artefact
of comparing younger and older citizens across relatively large (although CER-optimal)
bandwidths of around 125 days. To examine how sensitive the imbalances at the 18+ threshold
in 2014 are to alternative bandwidths, I therefore replicate the balance tests for the primary
and secondary education variables using all bandwidths between 20 and 400 days (see Figure
C4). The results suggest that the two education variables only become balanced at relatively
small bandwidths of 24 days. For all bandwidths smaller than 24 days we cannot reject the
null of no discontinuity using 95% confidence intervals.
Next, I examine whether the main RD results on the downstream turnout effect of
compulsory voting hold when using only observations within the narrow bandwidth of
24 days (where the education variables are balanced). The small number of mass points
around the threshold (24 days on each side) means that a continuity-based RD analysis is not
advisable and a local randomisation RD approach is preferable (Cattaneo, Idrobo and Titiunik,
2018b). The local randomisation RD approach makes the (stronger) assumption that there is a
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Note: Note: The figure displays the estimated effect (for various bandwidths) of com-
pulsory voting eligibility in 2014 on the proportion of individuals (who share the same
birthdate) with completed primary (or secondary) education in 2016. Conventional (solid
black line) and bias-corrected (solid blue line) point estimates from local linear regres-
sions with triangular kernel; the vertical red line marks the CER-optimal bandwidth;
dashed lines show robust bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals.
narrow window around the voting age threshold where observations are assigned to treatment
and control group as in a randomised experiment (Lee, 2008). In the local randomisation
framework, treatment effects can be estimated using simple difference-in-means tests rather
than local polynomial regressions (Cattaneo, Idrobo and Titiunik, 2018b). To guarantee
sufficient statistical power, the outcome variable is a binary indicator of individual-level
turnout in the 2016 municipal election, rather than the average turnout by birthdate measure
used in the main analysis.
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Overall, the main results are confirmed when using the local randomisation RD approach
and the 24 days bandwidth. Results from a t-test and a chi-squared test suggest that 2016
turnout is on average 1 percentage point lower amongst individuals in the treatment group
(n = 215,507), who were already eligible for compulsory voting in 2014, compared to
individuals in the control group (n = 188,248), who are first-time compulsory voting eligibles.
These results are effectively the same as the main RD estimates. Similar results are also
obtained from a logistic regression using 2014 compulsory voting eligibility as an indicator
to predict 2016 turnout. These results are robust to clustering the standard errors by birthdate.
Furthermore, disaggregated RD analysis based on citizens’ educational status suggests that
the main RD results hold when conditioning on individuals’ educational background (see
Appendix G).
Another common response to covariate imbalance in RD designs is to include the “prob-
lematic” covariate as a control variable (Calonico et al., 2019). If the RD estimate is robust
to covariate-adjustment, this is typically interpreted as evidence in favour of the identifying
assumption of continuous potential outcomes at the threshold.43 Table C6 below presents
results from sharp RD models predicting the effect of compulsory voting on downstream
turnout whilst controlling for primary and secondary education respectively. For consistency,
the models use the same bandwidths as the main RD model used for predicting downstream
turnout (see Model 1 in Table 4.1). In order to control for educational attainment at the
individual level, the models are fitted on the raw 2016 turnout data instead of the data
collapsed by date of birth.44
Overall, controlling for educational attainment does not appear to change the main
findings. In Model 1 (which controls for completed primary education) the estimated effect
of CV on downstream turnout is negative and statistically significant as in the main results.
In Model 2 (which controls for completed secondary education) the estimated effect of CV
on downstream turnout is also negative and statistically significant as in the main results.
43Calonico et al. (2019) show that, whilst this approach can improve the precision of RD estimate, it also
involves invoking parametric assumptions on the regression functions, or redefining the parameter of interest.
44Cattaneo, Idrobo and Titiunik (2018b) show that when the running variable is discrete and the number of
mass points is relatively large (as is the case here), this is equivalent to fitting the RD model on the collapsed
data.
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Table C6 Effect of compulsory voting on downstream turnout controlling for education –
2016 data
(1) (2)
Control: primary education Control: secondary education
Treatment effect -0.005 -0.004
Robust p-value (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 20,634,342 20,634,342
Bias bandwidth 203.4 203.4
Bandwidth 118.6 118.6
Eff. nr. obs. R 1,020,746 1,020,746
Eff. nr. obs. L 913,173 913173
Robust 95% CI R -0.00313 -0.00258
Robust 95% CI L -0.00831 -0.00777
Note: Sharp RD models predicting the effect of 2014 eligibility for compulsory voting
on 2016 turnout. Point estimates are constructed using local polynomial estimators with
triangular kernel; robust p-values are constructed using bias-correction with robust stan-
dard errors; the bandwidths are the same as in the main RD model predicting downstream
turnout (see Model 1 in Table 4.1). Primary education is a binary indicator of whether an
individual completed primary education at the time of registration. Secondary education
is a binary indicator of whether an individual completed secondary education at the time
of registration. The model is fitted on the raw data from the 2016 voter file.
Placebo cut-off tests
Another falsification test frequently employed in RD analysis examines whether there are
significant treatment effects on the outcome of interest (mean turnout by birthdate) at placebo
cut-offs away from the true cut-off. The presence of significant discontinuities away from the
true cut-off would cast doubts on the appropriateness of the RD specification (Hyytinen et al.,
2018). Using data from the 2016 municipal election, Table C7 presents sharp RD estimates
for several placebo cut-offs (in increments of 100 days), using local linear regressions and
MSE-optimal bandwidths. There is no evidence of significant discontinuities away from
the true cut-off at age 18 in 2014, and only one significant discontinuity away from the true
cut-off at age 18 in 2016. These null findings suggest that the main RD specification used in
the paper is appropriate.
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Table C7 Sharp RD estimates for placebo cut-offs – 2016 data
Alternative Sharp RD Robust p-value MSE-optimal Bias Effective Effective
cut-off estimator p-value bandwidth bandwidth Obs. (left) Obs. (right)
18+ in 2016
-300 -.00452 0.001 67.7 131.4 67 68
-200 -.00158 0.450 62.2 91.5 62 63
-100 -.00214 0.422 53.2 78.7 53 54
0 .05222 0.000 77.5 163.2 77 78
100 .00173 0.910 114.5 203.4 100 115
200 .00104 0.921 55.6 118.6 55 56
300 .00259 0.035 46.8 86.3 46 47
18+ in 2014
-300 .00025 0.733 97.2 149.3 97 98
-200 -.00023 0.974 63.7 88.5 63 64
-100 .00324 0.599 103.7 124.7 103 100
0 -.00874 0.000 119.1 204.0 119 120
100 .00037 0.840 100.4 135.9 100 101
200 .00086 0.383 102.4 150.1 102 103
300 -.00169 0.243 103.2 158.5 103 104
Note: Point estimates are constructed using local polynomial estimators with triangular kernel; robust
p-values are constructed using bias-correction with robust standard errors; the MSE-optimal bandwidth
minimises the mean squared error of the local polynomial point estimator. Observations used for placebo
estimates are restricted to those on the same side of the true cut-off. Estimation with observations from the
opposite side would be invalid due to the actual non-zero treatment effect observed at the true cut-off.
Sharp RD estimates using raw turnout data
As an additional robustness check, I re-run the main RD analysis on the raw 2016 turnout
data instead of the collapsed data – both with and without clustering the standard errors
at the birth date-level. The clustering approach is recommended by Lee (2008) for RD
designs where the running variable is discrete. Kolesár and Rothe (2018), however, show that
when the number of mass points is moderate, the clustering approach can lead to confidence
intervals with substantially worse coverage properties than those based on conventional
standard errors. Regardless, Cattaneo, Idrobo and Titiunik (2018a) show that when the
running variable is discrete and the number of mass points is relatively large (as is the case
here), both approaches are roughly equivalent to fitting the RD model on the collapsed data.
The results presented in Table C8 confirm this view. The estimated treatment effects of
compulsory voting eligibility on contemporaneous and downstream turnout are very similar
to the main results.
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Table C8 Sharp RD estimates using raw 2016 turnout data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Contemporaneous Downstream
Treatment effect 0.053 0.053 -0.008 -0.008
Robust p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 20,634,342 20,634,342 20,634,342 20,634,342
Bias bandwidth 168.3 158.8 197.4 211.5
Bandwidth 72.90 69.76 119.2 116.1
Eff. nr. obs. R 420385 402300 1.029e+06 1.004e+06
Eff. nr. obs. L 325245 313495 920462 896535
Robust 95% CI R 0.0558 0.0555 -0.00622 -0.00573
Robust 95% CI L 0.0492 0.0496 -0.0115 -0.0122
Clustered SEs ✓ ✓
Note: The binary dependent variable is individual-level turnout. Point estimates are from
local linear regressions with triangular kernel and MSE-optimal bandwidths. Robust 95%
confidence intervals are bias-corrected. In Models (2) and (4) the standard errors are
clustered at the birthdate-level.
D Estimating the voting age population
One way to address the potential problem of differential registration rates amongst treatment
and control group at the compulsory voting age threshold (see Appendix C) is to adjust
estimates of the treatment effect by the registration rate for each group, which can be
approximated using external data on daily births in Brazil (Cepaluni and Hidalgo, 2016).
This strategy amounts to replicating the main RD analysis using estimated daily birth totals
as the denominator for calculating turnout rates (TPop) rather than using the number of
registrants as the denominator (TReg) (Nyhan et al., 2017). Ideally, the denominator would
be the voting-eligible population (VEP) or the voting-age population (VAP), but lack of
data means that we need to rely on daily birth totals as a proxy (Cepaluni and Hidalgo,
2016). Daily birth totals are more likely to approximate the VAP than the VEP, given that
disenfranchised populations such as non-citizens, conscripts and prisoners are included
(Nyhan et al., 2017).
Data on the daily number of births come from the Sistema de Informações sobre Nascidos
Vivos (SINASC), which records all live births in Brazil since 1994.45 SINASC was rolled-out
gradually throughout the 1990s, which means that the data are likely to be incomplete for
45The SINASC data and documentation are available at http://www2.datasus.gov.br/DATASUS/index.php?area=0901
(accessed 16/03/20).
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the relevant time-period. The turnout estimates based on birth totals in the denominator
are therefore not valid estimates of TPop. However, the difference between the estimates
of TPop in the treatment and control group is a valid estimate of the treatment effect that is
unconditional on registration (Nyhan et al., 2017). The only assumption needed is that there
is no systematic difference in the under-recording of live births in the SINASC data in the
narrow window around the compulsory voting eligibility thresholds.
Table C9 below presents sharp RD estimates of the effect of compulsory voting eligibility
on ‘contemporaneous’ turnout for elections between 2012 and 2016, using birth totals
rather than registrants as the denominator for calculating turnout. Prior elections are not
included given that corresponding SINASC birth data are not available for pre-1994 years.
Model specifications and bandwidths are the same as in the main RD analysis (see Table
C2) to allow for comparison between results that are conditional and unconditional on
registration. In line with the main results, the estimated treatment effect of compulsory voting
on contemporaneous turnout is consistently positive across elections. At around 0.05, the
unconditional estimate for 2016 is remarkably similar to the conditional estimate for that
election year. Unconditional estimates for 2012 and 2014 are larger than the corresponding
conditional estimates, but point in the same direction. This indicates that the main results
hold even when the possibility of differential registration rates between treatment and control
group is accounted for.
Table C9 Unconditional RD estimates of contemporaneous turnout effect – 2012-2016
(1) (2) (3)
2016 - Municipal 2014 - General 2012 - Municipal
Treatment effect 0.053 0.178 0.173
Robust p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2,465 1,738 1,010
Bias bandwidth 161.9 138.1 175.2
Bandwidth 76.80 50.89 73.50
Eff. nr. obs. R 77 51 74
Eff. nr. obs. L 76 50 73
Robust 95% CI R 0.0601 0.205 0.177
Robust 95% CI L 0.0479 0.148 0.141
Note: Sharp RD estimates are from local linear regressions with triangular kernel. The
coefficient represents the estimated effect of being eligible for compulsory voting in one
election on turnout in that same election unconditional on being registered. Bandwidths
are fixed at the same values as Models 1-3 in Table C2 to allow for direct comparison
between conditional and unconditional estimates.
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Table C10 below presents sharp RD estimates of the effect of compulsory voting eligi-
bility on ‘downstream’ turnout for elections 2014 and 2016, using birth totals rather than
registrants as the denominator for calculating turnout. Prior elections are not included given
that corresponding SINASC birth data are not available for pre-1994 years. Model specifica-
tions and bandwidths are the same as in the main RD analysis (see Table C3) to allow for
comparison between results that are conditional and unconditional on registration. In line
with the main results, the estimated treatment effect is negative across elections, although
only statistically significant for the 2014 election. This provides indicative evidence that the
main findings on downstream turnout hold even when differential registration rates between
treatment and control group are accounted for.
Table C10 Unconditional RD estimates of downstream turnout effect – 2014-2016
(1) (2)
2016 - Municipal 2014 - General
Conventional -0.000 -0.023
Robust p-value (0.326) (0.000)
Observations 2,465 1,738
Bias bandwidth 203.4 238.1
Bandwidth 118.6 140.7
Eff. nr. obs. R 119 141
Eff. nr. obs. L 118 140
Robust 95% CI R 0.00538 -0.0201
Robust 95% CI L -0.0162 -0.0474
Note: Sharp RD estimates are from local linear regressions with triangular
kernel. The coefficient represents the estimated effect of being eligible for
compulsory voting in the previous election on turnout in the current election
unconditional on being registered. Bandwidths are fixed at the same values as
Models 1-2 in Table C3 to allow for direct comparison between conditional
and unconditional estimates.
E Downstream turnout effects of voluntary voting
Given that elections in Brazil take place every two years at the beginning of October and
voting is voluntary at age 16 and compulsory at age 18, there is a concern that the estimated
effect of compulsory voting eligibility in one election (e.g. the 2014 general election) on
turnout in a subsequent election (in this case the 2016 municipal election) may reflect a
compound treatment effect that also includes the downstream turnout effect of becoming
eligible for voluntary voting four years before (in the 2012 municipal election). This is a
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legitimate concern given that several quasi-experimental studies from countries with voluntary
voting rules have found evidence that eligibility for voluntary voting can have significant
downstream turnout effects, even after several elections (Coppock and Green, 2016; Dinas,
2012; Meredith, 2009).
To address this concern, I examine whether eligibility for voluntary voting in the 2014
general election has any downstream effects on turnout in the 2016 municipal election. Given
that there is a nearly perfect overlap between individuals who are barely eligible for voluntary
voting in 2014 and individuals who are barely eligible for compulsory voting in 2016, the
standard RD design used in the main analysis cannot be employed to assess the downstream
turnout effect of voluntary voting. However, we can exploit the fact that the first round of
Brazilian elections always takes place on the first Sunday of October, which means that the
exact date of the first round varies slightly every two years. Because of this rule, there are
some individuals (those born between 3 and 5 October 1998) who are eligible for voluntary
voting twice (in 2014 and 2016) before becoming eligible for compulsory voting. These
individuals can be regarded as the treatment group in this RD set-up. The control group
instead includes individuals born between 6 and 8 October 1998 who are ineligible to vote in
2014 and only become eligible for voluntary voting in 2016. By comparing 2016 turnout
amongst individuals within a narrow 3-day window around the voluntary voting eligibility
threshold, we can therefore isolate the effect of voluntary voting eligibility in 2014 on turnout
in 2016 without the risk of confounding the estimate with the contemporaneous turnout effect
of compulsory voting.
Because including individuals who were born before 3 October 1998 would mean in-
cluding individuals who are eligible for compulsory voting in 2016, it is not possible to vary
the bandwidths around the eligibility threshold. The small number of mass points around
the threshold (three days on each side) also means that a continuity-based RD analysis
is not advisable and a local randomisation RD approach is preferable (Cattaneo, Idrobo
and Titiunik, 2018b). To guarantee sufficient statistical power, the outcome variable is a
binary indicator of individual-level turnout in the 2016 municipal election, rather than the
average turnout by birthdate measure used in the main analysis. Results from a t-test and a
chi-squared test suggest that there is no significant difference (p = 0.16) in 2016 turnout rates
between treatment group (n = 15,409) and control group (n = 16,340). Similar results are
obtained from a logistic regression using 2014 voluntary voting eligibility as an indicator
to predict 2016 turnout (p = 0.16). Results also remain insignificant at the 95% confidence
threshold when clustering the standard errors by birthdate (p = 0.07).
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F Does mobilisation explain the first-time boost?
To examine the potential role of mobilisation as a mechanism behind the first-time compulsory
voting boost, I disaggregate the main RD analysis of downstream turnout in the 2016
municipal election. Specifically, I examine whether the first-time compulsory voting boost is
stronger in electorally competitive municipalities compared to uncompetitive municipalities,
as we might expect if political parties focus their mobilisation efforts on marginal seats (Cox
and Munger, 1989). In Brazil, municipal elections for mayor and municipal councillors are
held every four years. These elections are dominated by the contest for mayor (Klašnja and
Titiunik, 2017), which in most cases follows a single-ballot plurality rule.46
To establish the electoral competitiveness of a municipality, I use several measures of the
margin of victory in mayoral elections.47 First, the winner’s percentage of the vote in the
2016 mayoral election minus the runner-up’s percentage of the vote (“percentage winning
margin”). Second, the average percentage margin of victory in all mayoral elections between
2004 and 2012, which is an ex ante measure of competitiveness and therefore a more suitable
indicator of the expected closeness of the 2016 mayoral election (“expected closeness”).48
Municipalities with a percentage winning margin or expected closeness of equal to or less
than 10 percentage points are considered competitive, whilst all other municipalities are
considered uncompetitive. Third, the total number of votes for the winner minus the total
number of votes for the runner-up in the 2016 mayoral election (“raw winning margin”).
Using the raw winning margin is less likely to result in spurious correlation between the
margin of victory and turnout, as it does not include total votes cast in the denominator, which
by construction appears in the numerator of turnout (Cox and Munger, 1989). Municipalities
with a raw winning margin of less than or equal to the median raw winning margin (806 votes)
are considered competitive, whilst all other municipalities are considered uncompetitive.
In line with our expectations, the results from the disaggregated RD analysis indicate
that the first-time compulsory voting boost is more pronounced in competitive municipalities
compared to uncompetitive municipalities, regardless of the specific measure used to divide
the sample into competitive and uncompetitive municipalities (see Tables C11-C13). Whilst
the estimated treatment effect of compulsory voting on downstream turnout ranges from
46In the 2% of municipalities that have 200,000 or more registered voters, elections for mayor follow a
dual-ballot plurality rule, where a runoff is required between the top two candidates if no candidate gets an
absolute majority in the first round.
47Data on municipal election results come from the TSE data repository (available at:
http://www.tse.jus.br/eleitor-e-eleicoes/estatisticas/repositorio-de-dados-eleitorais-1/repositorio-de-dados-
eleitorais), were downloaded on 29/10/18 and pre-processed using the R-package “electionsBR” (available at:
https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/electionsBR/vignettes/introduction.html).
48In the case of a run-off election, the margin of victory in the second round is used.
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-0.6 to -0.7 percentage points in uncompetitive municipalities, this negative effect roughly
doubles in size in competitive municipalities, ranging from -1.2 to -1.7 percentage points.
The difference in point estimates between the sub-samples is statistically significant at the
95% confidence level for two competitiveness measures (“expected closeness” and “raw
winning margin”) and just short of conventional significance thresholds for one of the
competitiveness measures (“percentage winning margin”). The results provide indicative
evidence that mobilisation by political campaigns may play a role in explaining the first-time
compulsory boost in Brazil.
Table C11 Percentage winning margin – disaggregated RD estimates
2016 winning margin ≤ 10 pp (1) (2) (3)
Competitive Uncompetitive Difference
Treatment effect -0.012 -0.007 0.005
Robust standard error 0.00207 0.00208 0.00294
(Robust) p-value (0.000) (0.001) >0.05
Observations 2,920 2,920
Bias bandwidth 263.9 210.8
Bandwidth 135.8 121.2
Eff. nr. obs. R 136 122
Eff. nr. obs. L 135 121
Robust 95% CI R -0.00885 -0.00315 0.01076
Robust 95% CI L -0.0170 -0.0113 -0.00076
Note: The outcome variable is average turnout by birthdate in the first round of the 2016
municipal election. Municipalities with a percentage winning margin of equal to or less
than 10 percentage points in the 2016 mayoral election are considered competitive and
all other municipalities are considered uncompetitive. Point estimates are constructed
using local polynomial estimators with triangular kernel; robust p-values are constructed
using bias-correction with robust standard errors; MSE-optimal bandwidths are chosen
in a data-driven, automatic way that seeks to minimise the mean squared error of the
local polynomial point estimator. To compute the standard error and confidence interval
around the difference between the subsamples, the sum of variances of the two point
estimates was used as an estimate of the variance of the difference
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Table C12 Average percentage winning margin – disaggregated RD estimates
2004-2012 winning margin ≤ 10 pp (1) (2) (3)
Competitive Uncompetitive Difference
Treatment effect -0.014 -0.007 0.007
Robust standard error 0.00255 0.00185 0.00339
(Robust) p-value (0.000) (0.000) <0.05
Observations 2,920 2,920
Bias bandwidth 333.2 204.2
Bandwidth 165.8 118.3
Eff. nr. obs. R 166 119
Eff. nr. obs. L 165 118
Robust 95% CI R -0.0103 -0.00391 0.01364
Robust 95% CI L -0.0202 -0.0112 0.00034
Note: The outcome variable is average turnout by birthdate in the first round of the 2016 municipal
election. Municipalities with an average percentage winning margin of equal to or less than 10 percent-
age points for mayoral elections 2004-2012 are considered competitive and all other municipalities
are considered uncompetitive. Point estimates are constructed using local polynomial estimators with
triangular kernel; robust p-values are constructed using bias-correction with robust standard errors;
MSE-optimal bandwidths are chosen in a data-driven, automatic way that seeks to minimise the mean
squared error of the local polynomial point estimator. To compute the standard error and confidence
interval around the difference between the subsamples, the sum of variances of the two point estimates
was used as an estimate of the variance of the difference.
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Table C13 Raw winning margin – disaggregated RD estimates
2016 raw margin ≤ median raw margin (1) (2) (3)
Competitive Uncompetitive Difference
Treatment effect -0.018 -0.007 0.011
Robust standard error 0.00243 0.00173 0.00342
(Robust) p-value (0.000) (0.000) <0.05
Observations 2,920 2,920
Bias bandwidth 350.3 202.1
Bandwidth 203 120.5
Eff. nr. obs. R 204 121
Eff. nr. obs. L 203 120
Robust 95% CI R -0.0135 -0.00377 0.01771
Robust 95% CI L -0.0231 -0.0105 0.00428
Note: The outcome variable is average turnout by birthdate in the first round of the 2016 municipal
election. Municipalities with a raw winning margin of less than or equal to the median raw winning
margin (806 votes) are considered competitive and all other municipalities are considered uncompetitive.
Point estimates are constructed using local polynomial estimators with triangular kernel; robust p-values
are constructed using bias-correction with robust standard errors; MSE-optimal bandwidths are chosen
in a data-driven, automatic way that seeks to minimise the mean squared error of the local polynomial
point estimator. To compute the standard error and confidence interval around the difference between
the subsamples, the sum of variances of the two point estimates was used as an estimate of the variance
of the difference.
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G Who is mobilised?
To assess whether the introduction of compulsory voting at age 18 effects downstream
turnout asymmetrically across different socio-demographic groups, I replicate the main
RD analysis on sub-samples of the voter file based on individuals’ educational status and
gender. Educational status is an acceptable proxy for socio-economic status in the context of
Brazil (Cepaluni and Hidalgo, 2016). The voter file records individuals’ self-reported highest
level of education at the time of registration. Table C14 lists the eight different education
categories recorded in the voter files. To avoid measurement error for those who continued
their education after registration, the education variable is coarsened into a binary indicator
of whether an individual completed primary education at the time of registration. By age
16, which is the earliest age at which one can register to vote in Brazil, primary education
completion should be accurately measured (Cepaluni and Hidalgo, 2016).
Table C14 Education categories recorded in voter file
Educational status Grau instrução
1 Illiterate Analfabeto
2 Can read and write Le e escreve
3 Incomplete primary education Ensino fundamental incompleto
4 Complete primary education Ensino fundamental completo
5 Incomplete secondary education Ensino médio incompleto
6 Complete secondary education Ensino médio completo
7 Incomplete tertiary education Superior incompleto
8 Complete tertiary education Superior completo
Note: Educational status in the voter file is self-reported by citizens at the time of their
first registration.
Table C15 shows that amongst all voters registered for the 2016 election, the more
educated turned out at a significantly higher rate than the less educated, regardless of whether
they were eligible for compulsory voting. The difference in average turnout rates between
the less and more educated is particularly pronounced amongst those eligible for voluntary
voting.
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Table C15 2016 turnout rate (%) by educational status
Less educated More educated Difference (pp)
Eligible for comp. voting 83.2 84.6 -1.4*
Eligible for vol. voting 42.5 62.9 -20.4*
Note: * p < 0.01, Chi-squared test. The sample includes all literate voters registered
for the 2016 municipal election. Less educated individuals have incomplete primary
education or no formal education at the time of registration. More educated individuals
have completed at least primary education at the time of registration.
Next, I examine whether compulsory voting affects downstream turnout asymmetrically
depending on citizens’ educational status. Table C16 below presents sharp RD estimates from
local linear regressions fitted separately on sub-samples of more and less educated individuals
in the 2016 voter file. The results suggests that the first-time compulsory voting boost is
more pronounced amongst the more educated than amongst the less educated. However,
the difference in point estimates between the sub-samples does not reach the conventional
significance threshold, so we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the
two point estimates. The insignificant RD estimate for the less educated sub-sample may
indicate that downstream turnout behaviour amongst this group remains largely unaffected
by the introduction of compulsory voting at age 18. Finally, I examine whether compulsory
voting affects downstream turnout asymmetrically depending on citizens’ gender. Table
C17 below presents sharp RD estimates from local linear regressions fitted separately on
sub-samples of men and women in the 2016 voter file. The results suggest that the first-time
compulsory voting boost is more pronounced amongst men than amongst women. In this
case, the difference in point estimates between the sub-samples is statistically significant at
the 95% confidence level.
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Table C16 Effect of compulsory voting on downstream turnout by education – 2016 data
(1) (2) (3)
More educated Less educated Difference
Treatment effect -0.006 -0.001 0.005
Robust standard error 0.0014 0.0034 0.0038
(Robust) p-value (0.000) (0.562) >0.05
Observations 2,920 2,920
Bias bandwidth 197.8 284.9
Bandwidth 123.1 137.2
Eff. nr. obs. R 124 138
Eff. nr. obs. L 123 137
Robust 95% CI R -0.00361 0.00462 0.0126
Robust 95% CI L -0.00931 -0.00851 -0.0026
Note: Point estimates are constructed using local polynomial estimators with
triangular kernel; robust p-values are constructed using bias-correction with ro-
bust standard errors; the MSE-optimal bandwidth minimises the mean squared
error of the local polynomial point estimator. More educated individuals have
completed primary education at time of registration. Less educated individ-
uals have incomplete primary education at time of registration. To compute
the standard error and confidence interval around the difference between the
subsamples, the sum of variances of the two point estimates was used as an
estimate of the variance of the difference.
176 Is compulsory voting habit-forming?
Table C17 Effect of compulsory voting on downstream turnout by gender – 2016 data
(1) (2) (3)
Men Women Difference
Treatment effect -0.011 -0.005 0.006
Robust standard error 0.00220 0.00160 0.00266
(Robust) p-value (0.000) (0.001) <0.05
Observations 2,920 2,920
Bias bandwidth 190.7 300.1
Bandwidth 127.2 194.3
Eff. nr. obs. R 128 195
Eff. nr. obs. L 127 194
Robust 95% CI R -0.00657 -0.00213 0.01121
Robust 95% CI L -0.0152 -0.00839 0.00078
Note: Point estimates are constructed using local polynomial estimators with
triangular kernel; robust p-values are constructed using bias-correction with
robust standard errors; the MSE-optimal bandwidth is chosen in a data-driven,
automatic way that seeks to minimise the mean squared error of the local
polynomial point estimator. To compute the standard error and confidence
interval around the difference between the subsamples, the sum of variances
of the two point estimates was used as an estimate of the variance of the
difference.
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